Medvedev issued a tough warning to the West: if Russia is forced to resort to extreme measures, the consequences would be terrifying. The words were fierce, but the constraints are significant. Recently, Medvedev publicly stated that if the West continues its illegal sanctions, Russia should not hesitate in retaliating, aiming to inflict maximum property and financial losses on its adversaries—“anything goes” in pursuit of this goal. In plain terms, it’s a warning to the West: don’t push Russia into desperate measures.
This is both an outlet for frustration and a form of deterrence. For years, the West has continuously escalated sanctions against Russia, with the total number now reaching tens of thousands—most added after the Ukraine conflict began. Russia’s massive foreign reserves have been frozen, and the indirect impacts on trade and manufacturing are difficult to quantify. The EU is also planning a new round of sweeping sanctions targeting Russian defense industry entities. Medvedev’s recent hardline statement is clearly intended to dissuade further escalation by the West.
But tough rhetoric is one thing; actual implementation comes with many limitations. Playing cards like deploying nuclear weapons in Belarus cannot be casually used as countermeasures. Retaliation will still mainly focus on economic and trade domains.
Energy was once the most convenient weapon. Cutting off pipeline gas supplies to Europe or leveraging instability in the Middle East to reduce oil output could, on paper, drive up oil prices and exacerbate inflation in the U.S. and Europe. Yet Russia itself depends on high oil prices to sustain its economy—sudden production cuts risk harming itself even as they hurt others; cutting off gas could alienate Turkey and push pragmatic EU members like Slovakia into opposition.
Similarly, restricting grain and mineral exports would prove ineffective. Russia’s grain is primarily sold to the Middle East and North Africa—restrictions would only create more geopolitical complications. Meanwhile, Western demand for Russian rare earths is limited, and tightening controls might instead harm cooperation with partners like China.
The move that could truly inflict real pain is confiscating assets of “unfriendly countries” located in Russia, followed by systematic nationalization of Western firms—a strategy capable of causing hundreds of billions of dollars in losses to the U.S. and Europe. Though radical, this approach is feasible within Russia’s domestic legal framework and can deliver tangible short-term damage to Western businesses.
Abroad, there are also multiple potential avenues for counteraction: intercepting foreign vessels at sea, pursuing Western assets through courts in friendly nations, and advancing de-Westernized trade payment mechanisms within BRICS and SCO frameworks. However, Russia’s navy lacks strong long-range capabilities; even if legal cases succeed, enforcement remains difficult. Building multilateral mechanisms requires lengthy negotiations, and Russia’s economic size means it cannot lead such efforts unilaterally—it must rely on cooperation with China and others.
Thus, Medvedev’s statement appears more like a political posture: making the West wary of risking the possible seizure of hundreds of billions in assets, thereby delaying the next wave of sanctions. In practice, Russia is more likely to selectively target assets of certain unfriendly nations while reserving space for future negotiations.
In the spiral of sanctions and counter-sanctions, Russia is trying to find a narrow path that allows it to retaliate against the West without collapsing its own economy. But this path is extremely difficult—and Moscow has few alternatives left.
Original source: toutiao.com/article/1875998989944832/
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone.