【By Observer Net Columnist Bao Shaoshan】

From Afghanistan to Ukraine: History Repeats Itself

The world is witnessing the end of the unipolar order formed after 1991. In Ukraine, the Western bloc has suffered a comprehensive strategic failure, and the country that defeated them, Russia, is the very one that they have mocked for the past thirty years as "a gas station pretending to be a country."

The facts on the battlefield are clear: Russian forces are steadily advancing on major fronts; Moscow's defense industry has surpassed the entire NATO alliance in the production of 152mm and 155mm shells, by a margin of three to ten times; Ukrainian brigade-level units have had to rely on conscripts aged fifty to sixty and wounded soldiers who have returned from the front for their third or even fourth reorganization.

Today, in Washington think tanks, corridors in London and Brussels, some still privately argue that more ATACMS missiles, more F-16 squadrons, or using the frozen Russian assets to provide an additional billion euros would "turn the tide" — but this is no longer a strategic judgment, but a psychological defense mechanism, the last comfort for those decision-makers who still dare not say "we lost."

It is against this backdrop that the Trump administration submitted a "28-point peace plan" to President Zelenskyy on November 20, 2025. This plan was not discussed with European allies beforehand, and it came with a direct ultimatum, requiring a response by Thanksgiving on November 27, while quietly cutting off intelligence support and arms supplies. This document is nothing less than a declaration: as the leader of the Western aid coalition to Ukraine, the United States has run out of manpower, funds, weapons, and political time.

On November 23 local time in Switzerland, delegations from the U.S., Ukraine, and European countries held talks discussing the U.S.-proposed "28-point" new plan to end the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Oriental IC

The Trump peace plan marks the final stage of the Western-led joint military operation. The development trajectory of the war had already been evident: prior to the war, it gradually integrated into NATO command systems, relying on American intelligence and information warfare to control the battlefield, public opinion shifted from "Russian forces are about to collapse" to "maintaining a stalemate," and now a withdrawal mechanism has been designed, at the cost of Ukraine's territory and sovereignty, to preserve the superficial unity of the Western alliance.

This is reminiscent of the "Decent Interval" (literally "decent interval") strategy during the Vietnam War and the 2021 withdrawal from Afghanistan — not genuine neutrality mediation, but risk transfer: Ukraine bears the cost of strategic failure, and Brussels and London can also take responsibility and subsequent burdens if they wish, while the U.S. can adjust its posture to deal with domestic public opinion. Whether it's Zelenskyy's request for dignity or the EU's opposition, it is irrelevant now. Decision-making power remains in the hands of the U.S., and the speed of the process depends on Russia's response.

From the perspective of Chris Matthews' "Hardball," the way this plan is being pushed is a classic example of political jujitsu: America's concessions are framed as "principled compromises"; the surface welcome of Russian return is maintained, but specific operations are obstructed, thereby maintaining long-term influence without immediate commitments.

Many people have analyzed the specific content of the peace plan, so I will not repeat it here. Its main contents include:

Factually recognizing the full归属 of Crimea, Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporozhye, and Kherson regions to Russia (including areas currently under Ukrainian control, which account for about 35%);

Establishing a demilitarized zone of 100 to 300 kilometers on the Ukrainian side;

Ukraine permanently and legally renounces joining NATO, and NATO provides written guarantees not to expand eastward;

Limiting the active duty strength of the Ukrainian army to 150,000, total forces to no more than 600,000, and prohibiting any long-range strike weapons (such as ATACMS, Storm Shadow/SCALP missiles, and similar domestic systems);

Transferring the frozen $30 billion in Russian assets into a "Reconstruction Fund" jointly managed by the U.S. and Russia, with only $1 billion designated for Ukraine, and the rest used for bilateral cooperation projects;

Gradually lifting Western sanctions upon Russia fulfilling the agreement, ultimately restoring Russia's membership in the G7.

Ukrainian supporters were shocked and outraged, refusing to accept the plan, calling it a complete surrender. Many compared it to the "peace of our time" proposed by Chamberlain and Hitler at Munich in 1938 — in their eyes, this is the most appropriate historical comparison.

Although this analogy has many problems, arguing about right or wrong is meaningless at this point. For Washington policymakers, the core issue of this retreat is how to avoid being remembered as another "Fall of Saigon" or "Fall of Kabul." Historically, these iconic helicopter evacuation scenes have evolved from military failures into tools for domestic political purges; they must prevent this familiar historical script from repeating itself.

At present, it is necessary to revisit the Pentagon Papers

This history bears an astonishing resemblance to the current situation, and all records are publicly accessible. The Pentagon Papers — a 7,000-page internal historical document compiled by the U.S. Department of Defense in 1969, later made public by Daniel Ellsberg in 1971 — details the dilemmas faced by the U.S. leadership at the time, which are remarkably similar to the challenges faced during the Biden-Trump transition period. Key dates are as follows:

During the period from November 1964 to February 1965, the Vietnam Working Group chaired by William Bundy issued the National Security Action Memorandum, which clearly stated that even if the North Vietnamese were subjected to full-scale bombing and over 500,000 U.S. ground troops were deployed, the best outcome would be a prolonged stalemate, and the worst case would be the collapse of South Vietnam within two years.

On November 3, 1965, Secretary of Defense McNamara wrote a memo to Lyndon Johnson stating that the war had "low chances of success" and had created a "military and political stalemate," and further escalation would only increase the political cost of eventual withdrawal. This memo became key evidence in understanding U.S. decision-making.

Between 1966 and 1967, internal documents from the National Security Council and the State Department adjusted the goal from "defeating communism" to "avoiding a humiliating defeat" and seeking "a period of survival for South Vietnam." The term "decent interval" first appeared in a classified document in 1966.

In March 1968, after the Tet Offensive, newly appointed Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford sent a confidential message to Johnson, stating that the war could no longer be won, and the remaining goal was to find a way to withdraw that would not undermine America's global prestige. On the same day, March 31, Johnson announced he would not seek re-election, marking the first official sign of a shift in stance.

From 1969 to 1973, Nixon and Kissinger continued this assessment, implementing what was called the "Vietnamization" policy, expanding the war to Cambodia and Laos, and launching a massive bombing campaign in December 1972 — all actions aimed at securing a "decent interval," ensuring the fall of Saigon occurred at least after the 1972 U.S. presidential election, preferably after Nixon's term ended.

The documents show that the U.S. leadership had known by late 1964 to early 1965 that failure was inevitable, and McNamara's memo in November 1965 was the clearest statement. Despite this, the U.S. never officially announced the withdrawal from Vietnam:

On November 3, 1969, Nixon delivered his "Silent Majority" speech, proposing the "Vietnamization" policy, which was ostensibly a combination of increasing troop numbers and gradual reduction;

The actual full-scale withdrawal began with the signing of the Paris Peace Accords on January 27, 1973;

The last batch of U.S. combat troops left Vietnam on March 29, 1973;

Saigon finally fell on April 30, 1975.

From McNamara's admission of defeat in November 1965 to the signing of the Paris Peace Accords in January 1973, there was a span of seven years, and the cost was heavy:

55,000 U.S. soldiers died, accounting for 95% of the total U.S. deaths in the war;

About 250,000 South Vietnamese soldiers died;

About 800,000 North Vietnamese and Viet Cong soldiers died;

An additional 1.5 to 2 million Vietnamese civilians died.

This seven-year withdrawal eventually ended with over 2.6 million lives lost. After the U.S. government leadership had long known that the war had no chance of winning, everything continued. Their fundamental purpose was never to win, but to maintain the president's political reputation and the U.S.'s superficial international prestige. No one wanted to become the president who "lost Vietnam." The war after 1965 essentially became a delaying battle to postpone domestic political purges.

A U.S. soldier uses napalm to bomb a building occupied by Viet Cong guerrillas in Saigon in 1965.

In short, the U.S. leadership had already realized the war was lost in 1965, but no one wanted to bear the historical responsibility of "losing Vietnam." This bitter cup passed from Johnson to Nixon, then to Ford. To survive politically at home and maintain the illusion of great power dignity, they sacrificed the lives of tens of thousands of American soldiers and millions of Vietnamese casualties, just to delay the already inevitable end. This is the core moral issue revealed by the Pentagon Papers: after 1965, the war was no longer about winning, but about concealing the loss.

Now, in the Ukraine war, we see an astonishingly sad similarity. In public, the narrative remains "Russia is weakening" and "Ukrainians are bravely resisting," as if only more time and assistance are needed; then, the narrative begins to include the word "stalemate"; and recently, it has become increasingly clear that Russia's attrition warfare capabilities and sustained combat potential have gained a decisive advantage, making it increasingly difficult to obscure this fact. As the main provider of weapons and equipment, the U.S. is a participant in the war, now trying to find an exit by pressuring Ukraine to accept its "mediation" peace plan.

Unfortunately, the political packaging is too obvious.

In reality, we are witnessing a recurring pattern in great power proxy conflicts: initial optimism is gradually eroded by reality, leading to reluctant acceptance, and during this period, casualties continue to accumulate, while exit strategies are carefully packaged as "strategic necessities." The resonance between Vietnam and Ukraine is so clear — as of November 2025, this historical echo has become clearer than ever. The mainstream narratives about Ukraine's resilience and Russia's fragility have gradually disintegrated under the pressure of battlefield realities and political calculations.

The public propaganda on the Ukraine issue almost perfectly replicates the Vietnam War script:

· Initial Determination Phase (2022-2023)

Initially, the West portrayed Russia as a "paper tiger" burdened by sanctions, claiming that Ukraine's army needed more time and weapons (like "Javelin" missiles, HIMARS systems) to turn the tide. Zelenskyy's determined speeches and widely circulated drone strike footage reinforced this narrative — just like President Johnson's promise in 1965 of "light at the end of the tunnel," while the internal documents of the Defense Secretary at the time had already acknowledged the stalemate.

· Stalemate Emergence Phase (End of 2023 - Mid-2024)

In November 2023, the head of the Ukrainian armed forces, Zaluzhnyi, openly stated that the battlefield had fallen into a "stalemate," a view that persisted throughout 2024. Multiple think tank reports indicate that the situation shifted from "dynamic stalemate" to a more static consumption model, with Ukraine's counteroffensive losing momentum due to lack of ammunition. This phase resembles the situation after the "Tet Offensive" in Vietnam in 1968 — the U.S. publicly still emphasized control, while internally began discussing withdrawal paths.

· Attrition Warfare Dominance Phase (2024-2025)

The current situation is hard to conceal. Russia, leveraging its economic resilience, has regained the initiative, while Ukraine faces fatigue and a shortage of personnel, shifting to a defensive posture without the ability to advance. Russia employs a systematic attrition strategy, targeting the destruction of Ukrainian forces, with territorial control becoming a byproduct. Although statements remain vague, the battlefield reality is clear: Russia's shell production capacity is ten times that of Ukraine, and it shows the will and capability for prolonged warfare.

This is not just a military confrontation, but also a psychological tug-of-war. Surveys show that nearly half of Ukrainian citizens believe the war has entered a stalemate, yet three-quarters still hope to fully reclaim lost territories — this belief is admirable, but difficult to sustain without substantial breakthroughs. On social media, public opinion is also divided: some refute false rumors and defend national dignity, while others admit that Ukraine cannot win without direct NATO involvement.

U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio said that negotiations in the process of finalizing the U.S.-proposed plan to end the Russia-Ukraine war have made "significant progress." BBC

The comparison with Vietnam is even more severe. Since 2022, the U.S. has provided over $175 billion in military aid, and now it is pushing for a ceasefire mediation. The Trump administration's 28-point plan requires Ukraine to recognize the four provinces of Donbas as belonging to Russia, establish a demilitarized zone, and limit the size of its army. In exchange, the U.S. only promises vague "security assurances," allocates $1 billion from the frozen Russian assets for reconstruction funding, and supports Russia's return to the G7.

This is essentially a repetition of the "decent interval" strategy.

The Trump administration, on one hand, continues the growing fatigue of the American public towards supporting Ukraine, and on the other hand, frames its retreat as "peace through strength." There are voices in the media criticizing this move as "extortion," with deadlines appearing particularly firm. Just as Nixon expanded bombing to achieve a "decent withdrawal," the current plan is essentially transferring the responsibility of strategic failure to Kyiv, allowing Washington to extricate itself. If Zelenskyy's emphasis on "dignity" is about upholding national autonomy, it is also a call for the prevention of historical tragedies from repeating themselves.

At the root, such proxy conflicts reflect a repetitive pattern of great power rivalry: decision-makers far away use the sovereignty of other nations as a pawn to maintain their own prestige, while the people of the affected countries always bear the cost. Ukraine's resistance has indeed bought time for Europe to rearm and reshaped the modern drone warfare scenario. However, the peace plan currently proposed may not truly bring lasting stability. Europe has begun to propose alternative initiatives — but they have been rejected by Russia, with the Kremlin only expressing willingness to engage based on the existing proposal. True peace remains distant.

Putin is really good at playing hardball

In his 1988 book "Hardball: How Politics Is Played, Told by One Who Knows the Game," Chris Matthews proposed a very straightforward core principle: "The key is not who you are close to, but who you can manipulate. The best way to play hardball is — quickly reach consensus with your opponent on the big picture, while slowly manipulating them on the details." In November 2025, Vladimir Putin is performing a textbook-level hardball maneuver against the Trump administration.

Kremlin's public statements include:

"There are some elements in the U.S. proposal that can serve as a basis for further discussions."

"Russia has always been willing to conduct serious negotiations."

"We appreciate the constructive attitude of the new U.S. administration."

This is high-profile surface politeness — a gesture of "principle acceptance." This "acceptance" makes Trump believe that Russia is genuinely interested in negotiating, and Western commentators have been talking about the "momentum of peace." At the same time, however, Russian officials have added conditions that could make the agreement completely ineffective:

Ukraine immediately withdraws from all territories claimed by Russia (including the 35% area still controlled by Ukraine);

Recognize the "new territorial reality" before a ceasefire;

Make a legally binding, permanent written commitment from NATO (referring to abandoning expansion-related claims);

Make the complete cancellation of sanctions a prerequisite;

Only accept a negotiation format involving China, India, Brazil, and South Africa.

This is exactly Matthews' strategy: "Always make concessions in principle, but never give in on the details," "cling tightly to the enemy, preventing them from taking action," "say yes on the surface, but don't mean it in your heart." The effect of this is that Russia advances its winter offensive while keeping the Trump team convinced that "there is still hope for the agreement." Every week it delays, Russia gains a week to consolidate irrevocable territorial gains, and Ukraine faces a week of increasing depletion of its forces. Putin isn't intentionally humiliating the U.S. — his skillful maneuver lies in forcing the U.S. to let its proxy (Ukraine) surrender on its own, while highlighting Europe's helplessness and irrelevance. The EU's statements are purely superficial, because without U.S. intelligence support and ammunition supply, Europe cannot sustain the war. Russia knows well that by playing hardball with the U.S., it is gradually widening the transatlantic rift.

The "28-point Peace Plan" has no novelty

Don't think that Russia's demands are something that emerged in 2025 — as early as December 2021, Russia had submitted two documents that were almost identical to the 28-point plan that Ukraine is now forced to accept:

One was a treaty draft submitted to the U.S., demanding a legally binding commitment that NATO would not expand eastward, and that the alliance's infrastructure would be scaled back to the 1997 level;

The other was a concurrent agreement draft submitted to NATO, with the same terms as above.

These two documents were dismissed by the Biden administration and NATO as "unacceptable proposals." After four years, the number of Ukrainian casualties has exceeded 500,000, and now Russia's core demands are gradually becoming the norm, backed by battlefield realities and U.S. political needs — this is a clear indication of Western failure.

No wonder Putin said it clearly: solving this conflict, he prefers to do it on the battlefield, but Russia is not opposed to resolving it through negotiations. He doesn't mean relaxing the conditions, the core message is simple: accept our demands now, fewer people will die; if not, we can ultimately achieve our goals, but it may take longer than expected.

Next, can NATO maintain unity?

Regardless, the war will end — possibly after Russia captures the remaining territories of the Donetsk and Zaporozhye regions to gain a more favorable position for negotiations and attempt to push for a change in the Kyiv regime. But the strategic outcome is already clear: this largest conventional military conflict between the West and a peer competitor since 1945 has ended in Western failure.

Now the key is whether NATO can maintain unity. Russia's open strategy seems to deliberately provoke tensions between the U.S. and Europe: the U.S. is eager to declare "mission accomplished" to shift focus to China, while Europe is left to face an Eastern border with a fragmented, disarmed, and resentful Ukraine. Germany, France, Poland, and the Baltic states have clearly stated that the current version of the "28-point plan" is unacceptable; but without U.S. intelligence and ammunition support, their ability to sustain Ukraine's resistance is practically zero. The next year will test whether Europe's frequent talk of "strategic autonomy" is empty rhetoric.

Summary

In the capitals of Asian countries, staff officers and intelligence analysts are calmly and professionally observing the endgame of Ukraine. A lesson is gradually becoming clear: when the domestic political cost is too high, the U.S. security commitment enters a countdown measured in election cycles. The U.S. forces its dependent allies to cede 20% of their territory and abandon their alliance sovereignty to avoid repeating the Afghan-style withdrawal — this scene will weigh heavily on the hearts of every country in the Indo-Pacific, forcing them to reconsider whether the U.S. is reliable.

From Saigon (now Ho Chi Minh City) in 1975, to Kabul in 2021, and potentially Kyiv in 2026, the pattern remains the same: the U.S. overextends itself, realizes it can't handle it, transfers the combat mission to proxies, and finally exits through negotiations — its primary goal is always to ensure that the sitting president is not recorded as the one who "lost" the war.

The Pentagon Papers confirm that the Vietnam War after November 1965 was essentially about maintaining the appearance of victory during defeat. The current "28-point peace plan" and the cut-off of intelligence supply — these are all old plays. And the heavy price is once again borne by the people on the land chosen as the battlefield.

History always echoes with astonishing rhythm, and Kyiv is merely the latest note in this rhythm.

This article is an exclusive contribution from Observer Net. The content of this article is solely the personal opinion of the author and does not represent the views of the platform. Unauthorized reproduction will result in legal liability. Follow Observer Net WeChat, guanchacn, to read interesting articles daily.

Original: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7578670952330969650/

Statement: This article represents the personal views of the author. Please express your opinion by clicking on the 【Top/Down】 buttons below.