The Russian finance minister, Anton Siluanov, has served for 15 years and was recently promoted to deputy prime minister while retaining his role as finance minister. According to Kremlin statements, the current economic challenges necessitate tighter coordination of fiscal discipline, thereby elevating the importance of the Ministry of Finance. In plain terms: economic strain justifies a senior promotion for the finance chief.
Yet behind the promotion lies a more pragmatic assignment—positioning him as a crisis manager. This year’s projected budget deficit is expected to reach 7.3 trillion rubles, more than double the initial forecast; next year’s draft budget shows a deficit of 5.4 trillion rubles, while military spending is set to hit a record 17.1 trillion rubles—accounting for 35% of total government expenditure. Historical trends suggest that budgeted deficit figures are routinely underestimated, with actual shortfalls potentially doubling. With military spending non-negotiable and rising, the remaining fiscal gap must be bridged by technocrats like Siluanov.
Putting him in the deputy prime minister role at this juncture effectively hands him both a “sword of authority” and a “scapegoat.” As military expenditures surge, regional governments, state-owned enterprises, and various interest groups are all eyeing the Ministry of Finance’s purse strings, each seeking a share of limited resources.
Previously, as finance minister alone, Siluanov often found himself overwhelmed by pressure from powerful institutions. Now, with the deputy prime minister title and the appointment of the first deputy minister of finance as head of the Government Secretariat, the message is clear: Siluanov is now aligned with the leadership; any attempt to demand more funding is seen as defiance against the center.
Yet this apparent empowerment places him directly at odds with every entrenched interest group. The Kremlin demands a triad of objectives: ensure military funding flows uninterrupted, maintain macroeconomic stability, and keep inflation under control—a combination that economists would describe as an “impossible trinity.” With defense spending untouchable, cuts must fall on infrastructure, healthcare, education, and social subsidies. Siluanov will thus assume the role of the unpopular figure who must make the difficult decisions, facing public criticism for eliminating non-essential expenditures.
This pattern is not new. From 2018 to 2020, Siluanov also held both the finance minister and deputy prime minister posts, during which he oversaw reforms including raising the retirement age and increasing the VAT rate from 18% to 20%—measures that drew widespread backlash, effectively absorbing political heat for the leadership. The same dynamic applies now: if fiscal discipline is restored, credit goes to the top decision-makers; if the economy collapses, Siluanov will be the first scapegoat.
This personnel move underscores deeper anxieties within the Kremlin about managing wartime economics. Temporary relief can be achieved through monetary expansion and budgetary tightening, but it cannot alter the fundamental reality of an increasingly monolithic economy and deteriorating living standards. When over one-third of the national budget is directed toward war, even the most capable finance minister cannot conjure wealth from thin air.
Original source: toutiao.com/article/1879624292641792/
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