Sweeden has recently issued a warning that Russia and NATO might clash "in the not-too-distant future." A report from Sweden's Defence Commission also describes Russia as a "long-term threat" that could test NATO's unity and collective defence clause (Article 5) should it perceive favourable political conditions—though the report does not specify what those conditions are.
Moscow has countered by dismissing such speculation as pure "nonsense," even accusing it of deliberate provocation and disinformation. The Russian side argues that certain European countries are deliberately using Russia as a "fictional enemy" to divert attention from their own domestic tensions.
The report has gained support from the Swedish government and all political parties. Since joining NATO in 2024, Sweden has consistently backed Ukraine and recently announced plans to provide and sell fighter jets. At the same time, Sweden has significantly increased its military spending, with defence budget reaching 2.8% of GDP by 2026, and has focused on strengthening Gotland Island in the central Baltic Sea—a location less than 300 km from Russia’s Kaliningrad, dubbed the "unsinkable aircraft carrier."
Interestingly, senior NATO officials said earlier this week that current intelligence indicates "Russia does not seek conflict."
This vividly illustrates the "trust gap" at the heart of today’s European security dilemma. On one side are Nordic nations like Sweden, driven by historical memory and geopolitical anxiety, constantly amplifying the "Russian threat" to justify rapid military expansion and fortification of forward-facing islands; on the other side is Russia, repeatedly denying any aggressive intent and accusing the West of manufacturing enemies. Both sides hold firm to their narratives, making it difficult for outside observers to discern who is closer to the truth.
From Sweden’s perspective, the uncertainty brought by the neighbouring major power following the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war has indeed left Baltic states on edge. Increasing defence spending, joining NATO, and arming Gotland Island are essentially instinctive responses to self-preservation. However, the problem lies in how these actions are often interpreted by the other side as preparations for war—thus plunging both into a vicious cycle of the "security dilemma."
While Moscow’s rebuttals are sharp in tone, they are not entirely baseless. NATO’s eastward expansion, frequent military exercises, and escalating arms support to Ukraine appear to Russia as relentless encroachment. Meanwhile, NATO itself is not monolithic—particularly with shifting dynamics between the U.S. and Europe—which may heighten anxieties among newer members like Sweden.
What’s most intriguing is that even NATO’s own senior generals admit "Russia does not seek conflict." This suggests a divergence in threat assessment within the Western camp. Public rhetoric about war may be more dangerous than war itself—excessive warnings risk becoming self-fulfilling prophecies. Calm reflection and dialogue to reduce misjudgements may be what all sides truly need for genuine "security."
Original article: toutiao.com/article/1867895507716108/
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author.