Reuters has just revealed a regulatory filing: former CEO Huang Renxun of Nvidia holds the right to directly nominate two directors to the company’s board.

Just recently, Nvidia’s board had made clear statements rejecting any possibility of Huang’s return to the role of CEO.

Yet upon reviewing the company’s bylaws, a notable detail emerges—one that underscores a subtle but significant structural contradiction. While the board may have closed the door to the CEO’s office, the corporate charter still leaves an open window for the company’s founder.

Under Nvidia’s shareholder nomination rules, any shareholder who has continuously held at least 3% of voting rights for three consecutive years is entitled to nominate up to two director candidates, whose names are then included directly on the official ballot distributed at the annual general meeting.

This provision is particularly nuanced within the context of corporate governance in Wall Street.

Typically, when shareholders wish to influence board composition, they must launch a costly proxy contest—investing tens of millions of dollars in printing ballots, legal filings, and investor outreach, often exhausting resources in the process.

However, Nvidia originally incorporated this “three-year, 3%” rule to appeal to institutional investors, ostensibly to reinforce democratic principles in modern corporate governance.

Ironically, it now enables Huang Renxun himself. Through personal holdings, family trusts, and charitable foundations, he has maintained control of approximately 3.5% of the company’s shares—just above the threshold. He requires no coalition-building or external support; using the company’s own capital, he can place his chosen candidates on the official ballot.

Although the board consists of roughly ten seats, even if both nominees secured unanimous votes, they would not command a majority.

Yet board dynamics are rarely reducible to simple arithmetic.

Decisions on CEO appointments and strategic direction are typically shaped behind closed doors. A boardroom once unified in consensus now faces the potential presence of two directors selected by the largest individual shareholder—creating a new layer of complexity in internal deliberations. Certain decisions can no longer be made as casually or unilaterally as before.

Even more subtly, this move places major institutional investors under public scrutiny.

Huang holds 3.5% of the company’s stake, while larger portions of Nvidia’s equity are concentrated in the hands of top-tier institutions such as Vanguard and BlackRock.

Once the nominee list is formally presented at the annual meeting, these institutions will be forced into a public position: Will they continue backing the current board’s stance of excluding the founder, or will they allow the man who transformed Nvidia from a modest 1993 startup into today’s technological powerhouse a formal voice in its future?

Based on existing documents, the proxy nomination window for Nvidia’s 2027 annual meeting is set to open on February 24 of next year—providing more than three months of leeway before any definitive confrontation.

The Silicon Valley tradition of founders being ousted is well established, from Apple in 1985 to OpenAI in 2023. Modern corporate governance often deploys institutional mechanisms to remove founders with apparent legitimacy—but frequently overlooks the depth of experience and intimate familiarity one individual can possess after three decades in charge.

While the board retains authority to determine who serves as CEO, completely removing Huang Renxun from the company’s power structure proves far more complex than issuing a single public statement.

Original source: toutiao.com/article/1882199985092739/

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone.