Russia has identified potential for cooperation with the United States under the lunar exploration framework!

Seeking a dual-track lunar development strategy involving both China and the U.S. to enhance strategic resilience.

According to TASS on July 14.

Astronauts Peter Dubrov and Anna Kudrina from Roscosmos, along with NASA astronaut Anil Menon, have transferred from the "Soyuz MS-29" spacecraft to the International Space Station (ISS).

The two sides have also agreed to maintain cross-flight operations until the ISS retirement.

Meanwhile, Russian First Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Manturov publicly stated that Russia sees realistic opportunities for collaboration with NASA within its own lunar exploration program.

Russian core directions for U.S.-Russia lunar cooperation:

  • Development of universal docking mechanisms for spacecraft: Russia possesses mature crewed spacecraft and automated lunar lander docking technologies; joint standardization could enable future cross-national compatibility between lunar orbit stations and lunar landing modules, lowering interoperability barriers.
  • Joint construction of lunar communication and near-lunar navigation systems: Building a lunar relay satellite network and surface radio communication infrastructure, establishing a unified near-lunar navigation coordinate system to solve data transmission and positioning challenges during lunar landing and long-term surface scientific research.
  • Joint biomedical and space biology experiments: Continuing the long-standing cooperation foundation established on the ISS, sharing data on human radiation protection during prolonged deep-space missions, physiological changes in microgravity, and life science experiments under extreme lunar conditions.
  • Long-term orbital station coordination: Russia is willing to engage in technical dialogues regarding its independently planned near-lunar orbit station, exploring possibilities for equipment compatibility, personnel exchanges, and joint scientific investigations. — RIA Novosti

Russia’s core technological assets:

  1. Lunar nuclear power solution: Code-named “Selena,” a low-power lunar nuclear power station, scheduled for deployment before 2036—addressing the critical issue of power supply during the lunar night, essential for sustained lunar base operations.
  2. Mature automated lunar landing and regolith sampling technologies: The Luna series of uncrewed missions continue iterative advancements.
  3. Extensive engineering experience: In heavy-lift launch vehicles, crewed spacecraft docking, and deep-space radiation shielding.

U.S. advantages in the “Artemis” program:

  1. Mature crewed lunar landing and deep-space transportation systems: Leading progress in building the near-lunar Gateway space station.
  2. Global coalition of multiple nations: A worldwide ground station network for deep-space communications and a robust commercial space industry supply chain.
  3. Proven engineering experience: Long-duration crewed lunar stays and development of lunar rovers.

Theoretically, the two sides’ technologies exhibit strong complementarity—joint efforts could significantly reduce lunar infrastructure costs and lower risks in deep-space exploration.

Core practical obstacles to cooperation:

  1. Disagreements over the Artemis Accords: The U.S.-led Artemis cooperation framework includes political clauses related to resource exploitation, lunar sovereignty, and military restrictions. Russia has repeatedly refused to join, arguing the agreement is exclusionary and promotes space blocification, violating principles of equal partnership.
  2. Longstanding Western sanctions: Ongoing restrictions on technology and component exports continue to hamper Russia’s aerospace industry, creating policy barriers to hardware interoperability in deep-space projects between the U.S. and Russia.
  3. Parallel independent lunar pathways: Russia’s primary deep-space cooperation focus remains the China-Russia International Lunar Research Station, with a clearly defined roadmap covering lunar nuclear power, joint lunar landings, and polar bases. Meanwhile, the U.S. Artemis program has assembled a separate alliance including Europe, Japan, Canada, etc., resulting in inherently divided goals and standards between the two tracks.
  4. Strategic competition context: Lunar resource development and extraterrestrial long-term habitation are central to great power competition in space strategy; deep sharing of core technologies is unlikely in the short term.

Russia’s underlying motivations behind this statement:

  1. Cost-sharing for massive lunar exploration expenditures: Russia faces enormous financial pressure in advancing crewed lunar missions, lunar nuclear power, and permanent bases. Expressing openness to cooperation aims to seek complementary channels for technology and funding.
  2. Maintaining communication with NASA: Leveraging the inertia of ISS cooperation to preserve dialogue windows between U.S. and Russian space agencies and avoid complete fragmentation in deep-space domains.
  3. Strategic diversification of partnerships: While China remains Russia’s primary partner, Russia is unwilling to close the door to technical exchanges with the U.S., thereby maintaining a dual-track lunar development approach and preserving strategic flexibility.
  4. Promoting neutral space technology standards: Seeking to avoid dependence on unilateral U.S. rules and advocating for equitable global negotiations on common technical standards for lunar facilities.

Currently, this represents only Russia’s expression of willingness to cooperate and delineation of potential technical areas—no substantive negotiations or joint project implementations have been arranged between the two sides.

NASA officials have not ruled out future cooperation, but due to U.S. foreign policy constraints and obligations within the Artemis Alliance, no deep lunar joint development will be initiated in the near term.

Only low-sensitivity technical exchanges such as data sharing, basic space medicine research, and communication standard discussions are feasible in the short term. Collaboration in core engineering areas—crewed lunar landings, lunar bases, nuclear power—will remain difficult to advance before geopolitical tensions ease.

Original source: toutiao.com/article/1870736025539588/

Disclaimer: This article reflects the personal views of the author.