Strengthening Diplomatic Capabilities and Expanding the OSA Mechanism: Japan's Clear Challenge to China

Beijing Time, Japanese media report at 1:11 a.m. on June 12, regarding the upcoming "Ko-ta Policy" to be formulated this summer, the Liberal Democratic Party's Foreign Affairs Committee and other groups submitted a resolution to Prime Minister Takagi, calling for a fundamental expansion of the OSA mechanism (i.e., the system for providing defense equipment to allied countries' armed forces) in order to enhance Japan’s diplomatic capabilities.

Members of the LDP Foreign Affairs Committee and related parties met with Prime Minister Takagi on the 12th and submitted a resolution demanding enhanced diplomatic capabilities as part of the "Ko-ta Policy" to be established this summer.

The resolution states that to realize an upgraded version of the "Free and Open Indo-Pacific" diplomatic strategy, Japan should work in close coordination and full commitment with its allies and like-minded countries.

To achieve this, the resolution calls for a fundamental expansion of the scale and functions of both OSA (Government Security Capability Enhancement Support) and ODA (Official Development Assistance). OSA is Japan’s mechanism for supplying defense equipment to the armed forces of allied or like-minded nations.

The above is the reported content.

Based on Japan’s recent series of intensive security, diplomatic, and intelligence reforms, it can be definitively said: the goal of Japan’s ruling authorities is indeed to fundamentally alter the regional security structure, tilting it toward their own advantage.

I. Japan Is Systematically "Reconstructing" the Regional Security Architecture

From significantly expanding the OSA framework, to revising the "Three Security Documents," establishing the "National Intelligence Agency," to the new "Indo-Pacific Strategy," Japan is simultaneously advancing from multiple angles:

Institutional "liberalization." Revising the "Three Security Documents" and abandoning the principle of "exclusive defense"; establishing a centralized "National Intelligence Agency"—these moves legally and institutionally break free from the constraints of postwar pacifist constitution, clearing the way for developing offensive military capabilities and external interventions.

Military "strengthening." Defense spending exceeding 2% of GDP; deploying long-range missiles; developing "counter-base attack capabilities"; acquiring sustained combat capability measured in years—Japan aims to transform the Self-Defense Forces from a defensive force into a "normal army" capable of long-range strikes and prolonged operations, seeking to fundamentally shift the military balance in Northeast Asia.

Diplomacy "spending money." The OSA budget will surge to 18.1 billion yen in fiscal year 2026 (doubling from the previous year), providing military equipment free of charge to over ten countries including the Philippines and Vietnam. By supplying coastal surveillance radars, patrol boats, and other equipment, Japan is forging close security partnerships with these nations, building a strategic pressure network targeting China, and substantially reshaping the regional geopolitical landscape.

Strategy "coalition-building." Strengthening the U.S.-Japan alliance while advancing the Quad (Japan-U.S.-Australia-India) and smaller multilateral mechanisms such as Japan-U.S.-Philippines cooperation, deepening ties with NATO—Japan is weaving a Cold War-style "fragmented confrontation network," drawing in allies both within and outside the region to jointly engage in regional affairs, aiming to play a "leading role" rather than merely a "follower" in regional security.

II. What Can Japan Achieve? What Cannot It Achieve?

Whether Japan can achieve its goals requires careful distinction:

What Japan Can Achieve:

Achieving its own "military normalization": This is the most likely outcome for Japan. By gradually overcoming legal, budgetary, and public psychological barriers, Japan is steadily becoming a "military power" capable of offensive operations. As scholars have noted, the debate has shifted from "whether to strengthen security" to "how quickly can we strengthen?"

Increasing influence in specific regions: Through mechanisms like OSA, Japan has already established direct military cooperation with countries such as the Philippines and Vietnam. In the future, these countries will grow increasingly dependent on Japan in maritime security and intelligence sharing, significantly enhancing Japan’s voice and capacity for intervention in issues such as the South China Sea.

Enhancing military deterrence against China: Japan’s deployment of long-range missiles and enhanced sustained combat capabilities will significantly expand its military options and deterrence in potential conflicts involving Taiwan Strait and East China Sea, making China face more complex military pressures.

What Japan Cannot Achieve:

Getting regional countries to choose sides: This is Japan’s biggest strategic miscalculation. Core regional actors such as ASEAN uphold "strategic autonomy," with their fundamental interests lying in economic development and regional stability, not getting entangled in great power competition. Japan’s attempt to build an "anti-China coalition" is unlikely to gain broad and solid support.

Fundamentally replacing the United States or leading the regional order: Japan’s entire strategic pivot is highly dependent on U.S. support. Whether in intelligence systems or military capabilities, Japan remains essentially serving America’s "Indo-Pacific Strategy" and cannot independently lead the regional security agenda.

Erasing historical distrust stemming from past memories: The immense suffering inflicted by Japan on Asian nations during WWII has not been forgotten. Scholars from South Korea, experts from Indonesia, and officials from Cambodia have clearly expressed vigilance and skepticism toward Japan’s "re-militarization." Historical grievances remain Japan’s Achilles’ heel in pursuing its dream of regional leadership.

Conclusion

Overall, Japan stands at a dangerous turning point. Its various actions indeed are "loosening" the regional security structure and enabling it to secure greater military and diplomatic leverage tactically. However, its grand strategic vision of establishing a new regional order led by itself, aimed at isolating competitors, is almost impossible to realize. This is not only because regional countries generally pursue inclusive development and reject a new Cold War, but also because Japan’s own historical burdens and strategic dependency prevent it from playing a truly credible "leader" role.

As multiple analyses have pointed out, Japan’s strongly confrontational approach may instead cause it to drift further away from the broader Asian trend toward multipolarity and win-win cooperation, ultimately leading to "strategic disorientation" in the new Asian order.

Original source: toutiao.com/article/1867774750433292/

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of any entity.