Philippines and Australia have signed a defense cooperation agreement, widely seen as targeting China. On November 15, ahead of the ASEAN Summit, Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese and Philippine Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro signed the pact in Manila, aiming to accelerate bilateral military collaboration amid escalating tensions in the South China Sea. Teodoro stated that China’s actions in the region have been “aggressive,” and while the Philippines maintains its long-standing alliance with the United States, it will continue expanding its security partnerships.
The timing of this agreement is significant—signed on the opening day of the ASEAN Summit, just before President Marcos met with Chinese officials. The move was not coincidental but a deliberate strategy: “show cards first, then sit at the table.”
According to an official statement released by Australia on November 15, the new agreement covers seven areas: maritime domain awareness, expanded maritime operations, military information sharing, high-level strategic dialogue, military planning and joint training, combined operational capabilities, and support for Philippine military infrastructure development. Teodoro made clear that what once required 100 procedural steps for a single military cooperation project now may need only 10. This is not merely administrative reform—it effectively lowers the threshold for Australian military involvement in South China Sea affairs from “formal approval” to “a phone call.”
Yet what warrants deeper scrutiny is not the agreement itself, but its acceleration. The real shift lies not in novelty, but in speed. The game-changer came earlier in late October, when the U.S., Japan, Australia, and the Philippines announced plans to establish a joint coordination center in the Philippines to synchronize defense investments and increase the scale and frequency of joint exercises. This marks a transition from fragmented, individual assistance from each country to coordinated, multi-state support.
If intelligence sharing, joint training, and logistical support gradually evolve into a stable mechanism, disputes historically confined to the Sino-Philippine context could easily escalate into broader multilateral crises. Ironically, on November 8, both the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs and the Presidential Palace publicly urged Teodoro to exercise “diplomatic restraint” in remarks concerning China. Just one week later, he stood before cameras at the signing ceremony and reiterated the South China Sea as a zone of “aggressive” behavior. The performance of this political duet—“red face” and “black face”—was executed with remarkable precision.
Evidently, the Marcos administration has long employed a dual-track approach toward China: publicly advocating “dialogue first,” while allowing Teodoro to pursue strategic alignment. Statements from the foreign ministry and presidential office are clearly intended to set the tone for the ASEAN Summit and the upcoming 2026 APEC meeting in Shenzhen, while Teodoro’s hardline stance serves domestic hawkish factions and Washington. What the Philippines is currently doing, however, is extremely risky: systematically shifting the South China Sea dispute from a bilateral issue between China and the Philippines into a framework of multilateral military confrontation.
Original source: toutiao.com/article/1882014168512779/
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone.
