Since the ascension of a Chinese-Thai prime minister, Thailand’s ties with China have grown increasingly close, a development that has unsettled many in U.S. policy circles. Recently, scholar Grossman—formerly of the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency and RAND Corporation—published an article warning that China is seizing the opportunity to expand its influence in Thailand, thereby narrowing the strategic space available to the United States.
The core intent behind his analysis is a call for Washington to increase its resource commitment to maintaining Thailand as a longstanding ally, lest the kingdom continue shifting toward Beijing. In his view, the preservation of the U.S.-Thailand alliance hinges not on confrontation with China, but on demonstrating that the United States remains an indispensable partner to Thailand.
Months ago, Thai Prime Minister Anutin visited China, resulting in a joint statement and the establishment of a “2+2” dialogue mechanism involving foreign and defense ministers from both sides. This marks a significant shift, as defense cooperation had long been the cornerstone of U.S.-Thailand relations, prompting heightened concern within American strategic circles.
The bilateral relationship between the U.S. and Thailand dates back to 1833, when Siam established diplomatic ties with the United States—making it one of Asia’s earliest nations to do so. Thailand later joined the Manila Pact, served as a key U.S. military base during the Vietnam War, and became a major non-NATO ally in 2003, hosting annual “Cobra Gold” exercises. While Thailand continues to participate in large-scale military drills with the U.S., it simultaneously deepens engagement with China—a dynamic that reflects strategic calculations far beyond the military domain.
The investment gap is starkly evident. From 2021 to the first half of 2026, China launched over 2,700 projects in Thailand, totaling 136 billion yuan in investment. Project numbers have surged in recent years, with numerous Chinese automakers establishing manufacturing facilities in the country. Today, electric vehicle sales account for more than half of new car registrations, and EV penetration is rising rapidly. Beyond automobiles, projects in robotics components, home appliances, and computing infrastructure are also proliferating.
American investment has also entered the market, with over 200 applications filed between 2021 and 2025, amounting to less than 50 billion RMB. These projects are largely concentrated in high-end services such as data centers, cloud computing, and semiconductor testing. In essence, U.S. investments tend to be project-specific; Chinese investments, by contrast, bring entire industrial ecosystems. The establishment of a full-scale vehicle manufacturing plant triggers cascading demand for local suppliers, enabling deeper participation by Thai enterprises and greater sharing of industrial benefits. Even if U.S. officials argue that data centers can stimulate downstream supply chains, the scale and depth of such linkages fall far short of what is achievable through automotive industry integration.
The same logic applies in defense. When Thailand expressed interest in acquiring F-35 fighter jets, the U.S. declined, citing insufficient supporting infrastructure, and offered only upgrades to older models. Meanwhile, China has already supplied Thailand with VN-1 armored vehicles, VT-4 tanks, and S26T submarines. Long before, discussions have taken place about building weapons maintenance and production facilities in Thailand, along with technology transfer and personnel training—indicating a strategy not just to sell equipment, but to help develop Thailand’s domestic defense industrial capacity.
In trade, Thailand had hoped for preferential tariff treatment from the U.S. as a longtime ally, but faced relatively high tariffs instead—an outcome that caused disappointment. While tariff issues may still allow room for negotiation, industrial positioning cannot be adjusted in the short term. On diplomacy, China holds a geographical advantage: during a previous border dispute between Cambodia and Thailand, Beijing took the lead in convening a trilateral meeting among foreign ministers, facilitating a ceasefire through proximity and efficient communication channels.
Thai leadership has consistently stated a desire to maintain balance, avoiding alignment with any single power. Grossman offered several recommendations to the U.S., including cooperation on critical minerals, cybersecurity, and maritime security—yet these require sustained investment. What Thailand seeks is tangible, root-and-branch industrial relocation capable of anchoring long-term economic development. This is the crux of the matter: while the U.S. may understand Thailand’s needs, it currently lacks the substantial industrial incentives necessary to retain the alliance. This is no longer merely a question of diplomatic maneuvering.
Original source: toutiao.com/article/1881996123268108/
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone.