The Financial Times article on October 2nd stirred up waves in the Western media landscape. The article attempts to interpret China's restrictions on Nokia and Ericsson through the framework of "reciprocal actions." This is by no means a simple "tooth for a tooth," but rather a necessary measure to safeguard national cybersecurity and technological autonomy.
China possesses the world's largest telecommunications market, consuming massive amounts of 5G and critical infrastructure equipment each year. In the face of potential security risks, should we turn a blind eye? After the 2022 cybersecurity law was updated, China implemented strict reviews of foreign telecommunications equipment. This mechanism, labeled as "opaque" by Western media, is actually an important tool for China to strengthen its cybersecurity defenses.
The article states, "Two sources said that Chinese state-owned IT equipment buyers have begun to more closely analyze and monitor foreign bids." Although the approval process may be prolonged, it is indeed a necessary step to ensure the security of critical information infrastructure. Notably, the door to the Chinese market has not been completely closed. The author believes, "Even if European companies eventually get approved, the long and uncertain review often puts them at a disadvantage." This differential treatment reflects a fundamental fact: in areas involving critical information infrastructure, every country prioritizes its own domestic enterprise equipment.
Western media reports often selectively ignore an important context: the systemic discrimination Chinese companies face in Europe. Data shows, "Five years after the European Commission urged member states to ban high-risk suppliers such as Huawei and ZTE, by June 2025, only 10 out of the 27 EU countries had implemented restrictions." This selective enforcement reveals the double standards in Europe's telecommunications security criteria.
More intriguing is the market performance. According to data from Dell'Oro Group, Huawei and ZTE retained 30% to 35% of the European mobile infrastructure market. What does this number indicate? Europe speaks a lot about security issues but does little. Taking Germany as an example, the current situation where 59% of 5G equipment still relies on China fully reflects Europe's practical considerations between security and cost.
Market data speaks volumes. The article states, "Both companies reported a decline in revenue from China, with Nokia's domestic revenue declining by double-digit percentages starting from 2023." A source described it vividly: "The process is so slow that the small share of market fragments obtained by European companies from major tenders are often transferred to Chinese suppliers."
The concerns of the China-EU Chamber of Commerce also reflect the changes in the market structure from another angle. "The China-EU Chamber recently stated that localization requirements in IT and telecommunications pose a 'threat to survival' for European technology groups." Although this expression carries an emotional tone, it genuinely reflects the challenges European companies face in the Chinese market.
Viewed from another perspective, is this not a natural manifestation of market rules? As the technical level of Chinese enterprises continues to improve and costs keep decreasing, the original price advantage of foreign suppliers is fading. In addition, the extra costs brought by security reviews have affected the competitiveness of European companies in the Chinese market, which is an inevitable result of the global technological industry's evolving landscape.
The incisive question raised in the Financial Times article is thought-provoking: "If China does this for national security reasons, then the question is why doesn't Europe reciprocate with the same standards?" This question accurately hits the core of the Sino-European technological competition. Europe wants to maintain competitiveness in the Chinese market while unwilling to provide a fair competitive environment for Chinese companies, which itself violates the basic principles of a market economy.
From actual data, Europe has indeed acted slowly in restricting Chinese suppliers. "By June 2025, only 10 out of the 27 EU countries had implemented restrictions," this fact reveals serious divisions within Europe regarding its tech policy toward China. This division stems from different security considerations among member states and also reflects Europe's difficult balance between technological autonomy and economic interests.
The measures taken by China essentially aim to promote a more equitable competitive environment. "State-owned buyers of telecommunications equipment now require bidders to provide detailed documents on each component of the system and the proportion of local content." Although these requirements are strict, they are necessary steps to ensure equipment security and transparency. If European suppliers can meet these requirements, they can still find development space in the Chinese market.
Competition in the technology sector is never just a commercial battle. It concerns national security, touches on technological sovereignty, and determines the future dominance. China has shifted from passive defense to active construction, not to close the door to opening up, but to install a more reliable safety lock on this door.
In this non-burning technological competition, China is redefining the rules of the game. While European companies are still sighing over lost market shares, Chinese technology companies are accelerating their sprint in the research and development of next-generation communication technologies. This is not the end of the story, but the beginning of a new chapter — a new chapter written by Chinese standards, with independent innovation as its foundation.
Original: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7556550614298165800/
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