【A wave of constitutional amendment fervor is sweeping through Japanese politics, but Takagi's aggressive push faces technical bottlenecks.】 During this year’s Golden Week holiday, anti-war rallies opposing Takagi’s cabinet’s militarization and constitutional revision efforts erupted across Japan. Over 50,000 people gathered in front of the Diet Building in Tokyo—highlighting an increasingly polarized society over how to amend the constitution. Particularly, the ruling party won a supermajority of more than two-thirds of seats in the House of Representatives during the February 8 general election this year. Meanwhile, opposition parties such as the Constitutional Democratic Party, the Komeito Party, and the Conservative Party are expected to support constitutional revision in the House of Councillors’ deliberations, potentially enabling the House of Councillors to achieve a two-thirds majority. This has effectively opened the countdown for constitutional revision in Japanese politics. But can we really be so optimistic? Here, I would like to cite an analysis by Taro Bando from several years ago in his commentary on current expressions, to examine whether the passage of the revised National Referendum Law in the Diet automatically means immediate constitutional revision?
First, let’s look at the general process of constitutional revision in Japan—the proposal for revising the constitution must be initiated by the Diet. A “proposal” refers to legislators introducing a bill for deliberation. According to Article 96 of the Japanese Constitution, a constitutional amendment must secure the support of two-thirds or more of all members in both the House of Representatives and the House of Councillors. However, regarding how the proposed amendment gains “popular approval” after being initiated, the Constitution only stipulates that it must receive a majority of votes in either a special national referendum or elections designated by the Diet. In May 2007, during the first Abe administration, the National Referendum Law (Law Concerning Procedures for Amending the Constitution of Japan) was passed and enacted in the Diet, establishing procedures for constitutional amendments.
However, several unresolved issues remained during the pre-enactment debates—and these remain unaddressed even after its implementation in 2010, with further revisions made in 2014.
First, setting the voting age at “18 or older.” This issue was effectively resolved following the 2016 June implementation of the revised Public Office Election Act granting voting rights at age 18, and the 2018 civil code reform making 18-year-olds legal adults, effective April 2022.
Second, prohibiting public officials and teachers from using their positions to influence the vote. While citizens may express support or opposition to a constitutional amendment, it remains unclear what constitutes “abuse of official position,” and due to the absence of penalties, this provision has become largely symbolic.
Third, expanding the scope beyond constitutional amendments. The 2014 legal revision did not reach a conclusion; instead, the wording on constitutional referendums stopped at “further discussion on its significance and necessity, taking necessary measures.”
Finally, the conditions for holding a national referendum. The law requires “a majority of valid votes cast” (i.e., the sum of yes and no votes). Yet there is strong sentiment advocating for a minimum voter turnout threshold.
Next, the procedure for submitting a constitutional amendment draft to the Diet—despite the passage of the revised National Referendum Law seemingly brightening the prospects for constitutional revision, the outcome remains largely unchanged from before. The ruling parties (Liberal Democratic Party, Komeito) support constitutional revision, and securing over 100 Diet members' support to introduce a constitutional amendment draft in the House of Representatives poses no difficulty. After formal debate and questioning in the full House session, the constitutional review committee (composed of 50 members) begins its examination. As a standing body responsible for reviewing constitutional amendments, the committee conducts hearings and votes. Currently, the ruling party holds a majority of votes in this committee—no surprise here. Then comes the final vote in the full House of Representatives, requiring approval from two-thirds or more of all members. Given that the ruling party currently holds more than two-thirds of seats in the House of Representatives, if the amendment passes, it will be sent to the House of Councillors.
The House of Councillors must go through the same process—should the constitutional review committee (with 45 members) approve the draft, it will be submitted to the full chamber. However, the ruling party does not hold a majority in the House of Councillors and still lacks 46 seats to reach two-thirds. Thus, the amendment could still be rejected. Without both houses achieving a two-thirds majority among all members, the Diet cannot formally propose constitutional revision to the people. Therefore, if either house rejects the amendment, the National Referendum Law becomes irrelevant. Conversely, in the House of Councillors, a constitutional amendment draft can be introduced with support from over 50 members. If the House of Councillors acts first, and passes the draft, it will be sent to the House of Representatives. Only when both chambers pass the draft is it considered a formal proposal by the Diet for constitutional revision.
Finally, the national referendum process—assuming the constitutional amendment draft passes with two-thirds majorities in both houses, it enters the national referendum campaign phase. The voting date for the referendum must be set between 60 and 180 days after the proposal is made. The shortest possible timeframe is 60 days (about two months) after the proposal. As previously noted, if more than half of the total valid votes cast are in favor, the constitutional amendment is deemed approved by the people. According to Article 96 of the Constitution, the Emperor shall immediately promulgate it in the name of the people. If Article 66 of the National Diet Act applies, “immediately” means within 30 days (about one month). Although there is no specific provision for the exact timing of enforcement (effective date) after promulgation, the Japanese Constitution itself allows a six-month buffer period (Article 100), meaning the revised constitution should take effect six months later.
For the LDP under Takagi, pushing forward constitutional revision through its overwhelming majority in the House of Representatives risks provoking resentment among opposition lawmakers sympathetic to revision, and also raises public skepticism. In other words, many feel uneasy about the ruling party’s approach to advancing constitutional discussions in the Diet. This unease partly explains why the "Abe dominance" era failed to propel the LDP into actual constitutional revision. Another crucial factor cannot be ignored: the timing of parliamentary maneuvering and national referendums may not align. Unlike national elections where voters choose candidates, constitutional referendums involve choosing policies. Voters compare the current constitution with the proposed amendment. If they perceive excessive war risks or reckless overreach in the policy, they can simply say “No.” Now, Takagi has begun signaling that he might temporarily “pause” on Article 9 revision while pushing ahead with other constitutional changes—clearly sensing massive public resistance and the risk of failing to secure a majority. In short, if the people reject the amendment, the Self-Defense Forces’ status could plunge into an irreversible crisis.
Original source: toutiao.com/article/1864413572950080/
Disclaimer: This article reflects the personal views of the author.