Vietnam’s recent statement on China-Laos military cooperation is noteworthy. Fully aware of the weakness of its position, Hanoi has chosen to speak in lofty and circumlocutory terms, carefully avoiding direct mention of China.
The incident unfolded during a press conference at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where a journalist directly asked Vietnam’s stance on the newly established military support center near Vientiane, co-built by China and Laos. Spokesperson Phan Thuong Hanh offered only three points: a wish for Laos’ peaceful, independent, and autonomous development; adherence to international law and the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia in state-to-state collaboration; and the importance of such cooperation contributing to regional stability.
This marks the first official Vietnamese response to the Ban Keng Joint Logistics and Training Center. While the question clearly concerned Sino-Laotian cooperation, the spokesperson spoke in generalities about international collaboration, never once referencing China. Though this reflects standard diplomatic phrasing, the very structure of the exchange conveys a deliberate signal. Reuters’ headline was far more direct, explicitly framing Vietnam’s evaluation of Sino-Laotian military ties.
The center officially launched on September 29, coinciding with the opening of the China-Laos Friendship Aviation Academy. At its core, the project aims to train Laotian air force pilots. The Chinese official statement clarified that both countries will jointly operate and maintain the facility, with no intent to target any third party. Given Laos’ limited existing air force infrastructure—previously relying heavily on foreign training for pilots and maintenance personnel—the facility serves as a foundational step toward building an indigenous talent pipeline.
Yet more significant than military cooperation is the economic dimension. As the only landlocked nation in Southeast Asia, Laos historically faced substantially higher logistics costs compared to coastal neighbors. That dynamic began to shift with the completion of the China-Laos Railway at the end of 2021.
By October of this year, trade volume along the railway had surpassed one trillion yuan, freight throughput exceeded 20 million tons, and over ten million foreign tourists had visited, significantly boosting foreign exchange earnings. For the first time, Laos transitioned from being a “landlocked” country to a “land-connected” one. Thailand is now planning to extend its high-speed rail network toward the Lao border, potentially linking Kunming–Vientiane–Bangkok into a continuous corridor, transforming Laos from a terminus into a regional transit hub.
Naturally, Laos remains proximate to Vietnam’s Van Don port, making sea access via Vietnam a vital alternative route. Vietnam continues to advance plans for a railway connecting Vientiane to Van Don and a highway between Hanoi and Vientiane. Bilateral relations remain deep: trade volumes have surged, Vietnam has invested in over 300 projects in Laos, generating substantial tax revenues and employment opportunities. The two nations also participate in the trilateral Cambodia-Laos-Vietnam mechanism. Historically, they shared a common struggle against French colonialism, and Vietnam played a significant role in shaping Laotian political developments—forming enduring historical ties.
However, practical constraints remain. Vietnam’s own capabilities are limited, meaning its capacity to support Laos is bounded. Long-term engagement has also constrained Laos’ ability to fully achieve defense autonomy. Thus, seeking additional partners is entirely rational.
Our cooperation with Laos—on railway development and training center construction—is not intended to displace Vietnam’s influence, but rather to provide Laos with an additional viable option. Our model does not rely on exclusivity; coexistence and constructive competition among partners are possible. Yet it is understandable that Vietnam feels unease—when measured against sheer financial resources and infrastructure reach, it cannot match China’s scale.
Laos itself appears to recognize this balance. Its strategy involves integrating with the China-Laos Railway to connect to Thailand while simultaneously advancing routes toward Vietnam. As a small landlocked state, avoiding alignment with any single power and preserving sovereignty while maintaining multiple pathways offers the most pragmatic course.
Original source: toutiao.com/article/1881162132606144/
Disclaimer: This article reflects the personal views of the author.