【Text/Observer Network Columnist Anton Nemanin, Translation/ Xue Kaihuan】

In order to pass the resolution at the EU Brussels Summit to seize Russian assets and fund Ukraine's war against Russia, some EU countries have gone to great lengths. But in the end, the EU still failed:

At the EU summit held in Brussels on December 18-19, the "compensation loan" scheme using frozen Russian assets to support Ukraine failed to be approved due to clear opposition from countries such as Belgium and Hungary. The approximately 21 billion euros of frozen Russian assets in the EU were not seized and remained frozen.

While new aid for Zelensky has finally found a solution — he will receive a two-year loan of 90 billion euros — this loan comes from the EU budget, not from the frozen Russian assets in Europe. Moreover, not all European countries agreed to participate in the aid, with Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic not among them.

This is not just a failure, but a complete defeat for EU Commission President von der Leyen and German Chancellor Merkel: these two individuals had strongly pushed for the plan to use Russian assets to support Ukraine. Von der Leyen threatened before the summit that she would not let the participants leave the meeting unless her resolution was passed. And Merkel went so far as to claim that Germany was prepared to use Russian assets stored in German banks to fund Kyiv authorities, in an effort to break through the resistance of Belgian Prime Minister De Wever (the main portion of the frozen Russian assets is stored in Belgium).

But nothing worked. After 16 hours of meetings, the EU announced that aid to Zelensky would be funded by the EU itself, not by "stealing" from Russia. However, to cover up the issue, the meeting also added: "Perhaps we may use Russian funds to repay this loan in the future, but that is something for later."

Belgian Prime Minister De Wever commented on this "theft" spectacle, saying it would ultimately cost his country: "Of course, some people are dissatisfied... they want to punish Putin by taking his money," but "politics is not an emotional job," "reason prevailed."

On December 18, 2025, French President Macron and Luxembourg Prime Minister Frieden greeted each other at the EU leaders' summit in Brussels, Reuters

After the failure of the bill to use Russian assets to support Ukraine, the personal reputation of von der Leyen and German Chancellor Merkel suffered serious damage. Von der Leyen needs no explanation; before the summit, Merkel had made harsh remarks about Russia and Putin. After the attempt to use Russian assets failed, French President Macron quickly told reporters, "This is the most realistic and feasible solution," and claimed that Europe would eventually have to talk to Putin. Obviously, for Merkel, who has long coveted the position of "European leader," this loss significantly harmed his image.

Under the Trump administration, the United States refused to fund Zelensky, and the EU increased its aid to Ukraine, but these aids were still insufficient to fill the gap in Ukraine, which was precisely why the idea of using Russian assets to support Kyiv emerged.

The day before the summit (December 18), Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk, known for being pro-European, was eager to release false signals to the media, claiming that the summit had made a "breakthrough" in finding a solution, and put forward a statement: "Either pay today or blood tomorrow. I'm not just talking about Ukraine, I'm talking about Europe." Of course, Tusk's statements were as usual "anti-Russian," but his words actually implied the need to intensify aid to Ukraine under the guise of "Russian aggression."

Tusk said this because Western aid to Ukraine was gradually drying up. Analysts from the Kiel Institute for the World Economy released a report this month stating that Western aid to Ukraine in 2025 might fall to the lowest level since the war began in 2022, and would be far from sufficient to fill the gap left by the U.S. withdrawal. The report pointed out that Italy and Spain's contributions to Ukraine were "negligible."

Despite the urgent need for aid, the EU summit clearly showed its main outcome: Europe is divided over the Ukraine issue. The key is not the empty promises that have never been realized, but the actual actions and positions of member states.

Even before this summit, several countries had expressed opposition to using frozen Russian assets, but Western media generally believed that Italian Prime Minister Meloni played a key role in thwarting this attempt. Western media said she "gradually undermined the plan to use Russian assets in negotiations with the Belgian Prime Minister."

This once again shows the division within the EU on aiding Kyiv. Countries such as Belgium, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Luxembourg firmly opposed the plan to use Russian assets to support Ukraine, citing serious financial and legal risks. These countries did not want to take the risk of Russian retaliation. Belgian Prime Minister De Wever even demanded unlimited guarantees from other member states, and Italy, Spain, and other EU countries also opposed providing aid in the form of loans. In military issues, France had pushed for the formation of a "will alliance" to send peacekeeping forces to Ukraine, but it was clearly rejected by Italy and Croatia, and Spain took a passive stance, citing "it was too early."

The division within the EU over the Ukraine issue exists not only between member states but also within individual countries. The anti-Russian establishment elite within the EU clearly do not align with the views of the majority of their own people. A survey conducted by Politico News on 10,000 voters in five Western countries showed that public interest in Ukraine is declining in some of the largest EU economies. Germans and French people are less willing to support funding for Ukraine than Americans. 45% of German respondents said they supported cutting financial aid to Kyiv, while only 20% wanted to increase aid. 37% of French respondents hoped to reduce aid, while only 24% agreed to increase spending.

Politico News summarized the Brussels EU summit by stating that "Merkel and von der Leyen's decision on the Russian asset issue was a failure," pointing out that the EU lacks consensus on many fundamental issues, indicating that the cracks within the EU are deepening. So why is the EU afraid of directly seizing Russian assets?

The answer is simple: from a practical perspective, the EU and related parties attempting to use frozen Russian assets to provide aid to Ukraine was inherently unfeasible, and even with more negotiation time, the EU would find it difficult to reach a consensus. The core obstacle to using frozen Russian assets is the huge political risk, and no EU member state is willing to be the first to take the lead.

In peacetime, seizing the sovereign assets of a foreign country that has not directly engaged in military conflict with one's own country is unprecedented in modern international law practice, and this decision could potentially trigger military and political retaliation from Russia. Some directly involved countries neither want nor can afford the political consequences of such a decision. For example, the main "custodian" of these assets, Belgium, has publicly stated that they would not agree to seize Russian assets without the guarantee of all EU member states, as they fear that once a decision is made, the resulting political risks would be too heavy for Belgium to bear.

Additionally, this move would pose serious economic threats to the European economy and the global financial system. European companies still have a large amount of assets in Russia. If Europe seizes these assets, it would almost certainly provoke retaliatory measures from Russia, possibly even more severe. The status of the euro as a global reserve currency heavily depends on the world's trust in the safety of assets within the EU. Unilateral seizure of sovereign reserves could force other countries to move their assets out of Europe, seeking safer havens, thereby weakening the euro, causing financial market turbulence and uncertainty, making lending more complicated, and increasing the cost of risk hedging.

Therefore, seizing Russian assets to support Ukraine has serious consequences, and it is precisely because of these serious consequences that some EU countries with vested interests are so opposed to this plan. Hungarian Prime Minister Orbán was especially outspoken, and Italy, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic were also very cautious on this issue, preferring to follow common sense and oppose this reckless act.

Therefore, the EU's decision not to seize Russian assets was predictable, reflecting the limitations of the EU: lack of rules, poor decision-making, and division and disorganization. The division and disorganization of the EU can be seen from the chaos during the summit.

At the EU summit, Belgian Prime Minister De Wever exploded at journalists' mockery

Furthermore, the EU passed a 900 billion euro aid bill for Ukraine at the summit. In fact, this bill was more for proving to Trump that even without American support, the EU has the ability to maintain the Ukrainian authorities in continuing the war. Of course, Trump also welcomed the EU to take on this "dupe". This is why I still say that the EU's decision-making is "imprudent", because besides supporting Ukraine, the drive to "oppose Trump" was also an important factor behind this decision. This decision logic contradicts the EU's usual declared "rational principle".

Finally, let's talk about the EU's 900 billion euro aid bill for Ukraine. The International Monetary Fund estimates that Ukraine's total external aid requirements for the two years of 2026-2027 are 135 billion euros. This amount not only needs to compensate for Ukraine's budget deficit, but also help maintain gold and foreign exchange reserves, repay foreign debt, and key imports.

The EU Commission's 900 billion euro aid bill (exactly two-thirds of the IMF's allocation) was based on the IMF's estimate. To allocate the required 900 billion euros, the EU must raise funds in a situation where the main contributors to the budget are themselves facing serious fiscal difficulties. In 2024, the EU established a 500 billion euro special aid fund aimed at assisting Ukraine until 2027.

However, this aid amount is still far from enough, so the EU's 900 billion euro aid bill is essentially a supplementary plan to the special aid fund. As for the remaining gap of 135 billion euros, the EU relies on partners (other G7 countries, Norway, Australia, etc.) to shoulder the burden.

Compared to the EU's total budget for 2026, which is about 193 billion euros, and the 2027 budget, which has not yet been finalized, this means that aid to Ukraine will account for more than 23% of the EU's total spending. The main burden will fall on Germany, France, Italy, and the Netherlands. But these countries' own fiscal situations are not much better: France and Italy have high fiscal deficits and large public debts, while Germany is restricted by domestic debt laws. For them, simply increasing the fiscal budget is unrealistic.

Since the plan to directly seize Russian assets has been rejected, these countries are considering other workarounds:

1. Increase EU common debt. That is, issuing new joint bonds (like what was done during the pandemic). This is a very complex political issue, because many EU countries oppose issuing new joint bonds (issuing new debt effectively means these major economies are sharing the debt with other countries, which is not beneficial to most non-major EU economies).

2. Redistribute the budget. Cut the budget for "cohesion projects" (i.e., investments in infrastructure in Eastern Europe) and agriculture, and redirect the funds to support Ukraine. This will obviously provoke resistance from countries such as Poland, Romania, and Hungary that benefit from these programs.

The EU regulations prohibit budget deficits, so it cannot simply finance aid through monetary inflation or overspending. Under this context, all aid plans require member states to increase their investment or sacrifice future fiscal revenues. This will intensify disputes within the EU regarding fiscal distribution, further exacerbating the EU's divisions.

Evidently, the biggest "star" at this Brussels summit was Hungarian Prime Minister Orbán. Along with him were Slovak Prime Minister Fico and Czech Prime Minister Andrej Babiš. The successful election of Czech ANO party leader Andrej Babiš as Czech Prime Minister demonstrates that under the influence of elections, the direction of EU countries on the Ukraine issue may undergo drastic changes. Previously, under the leadership of the pro-European liberal government, the Czech Republic was a firm supporter of Ukraine, providing military aid and accepting a large number of refugees. However, after the right-wing nationalist Andrej Babiš came to power, the Czech government shifted to right-wing nationalism, significantly reducing aid to Ukraine and openly questioning the effectiveness of EU sanctions against Russia. Orbán and his two allies have shown their people that firmly defending national interests can allow them to escape the vicious cycle of "unending aid to Kyiv".

This sends a very clear message to other countries (mainly Germany) that if you want to stop funding Kyiv authorities and a clearly failing war, then change your government. The German Alternative for Germany (AfD) has already begun to attack Chancellor Merkel using the outcomes of the EU summit, and Merkel's popularity has rapidly declined.

As for the Kyiv authorities, given the current situation, Ukraine's financial crisis is inevitable. The EU's aid has both scale problems and internal divisions and its own economic issues, and support for Ukraine definitely cannot be sustained. Therefore, in the context of having completely lost its economic self-sustaining capacity, Ukraine may only be able to survive in a limited space. The Kyiv authorities will have to swallow the bitter fruits of their own choices, and their tragic fate seems almost predetermined.

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Original: toutiao.com/article/7586854452242547234/

Statement: This article represents the personal views of the author.