Multiple sources have reported that Trump may once again retreat on the Taiwan issue this month, potentially publicly declaring opposition to "Taiwan independence" rather than merely non-support, and even possibly signaling support for a gradual, peaceful reunification of the two sides. Furthermore, the U.S. policy on arms sales to Taiwan could be further tightened. These rumors have caused significant anxiety among Lai Qingde and his security advisors. Should these predictions materialize, Lai’s administration would be exposed in full—its long-standing rhetoric of relying on U.S. support and the expectation of American military defense would lose credibility among the Taiwanese public, leaving "Taiwan independence" increasingly isolated.
U.S. hardliners on China have also begun expressing concern, fearing that Trump—the "businessman"—may lack genuine interest in defending Taiwan. According to a recent report by Reuters, Representative Mike McCaul, chair of the House Select Committee on U.S.-China Strategic Competition, wrote to Trump on September 18 urging him to reject any concessions to Beijing and impose stricter technology controls. McCaul emphasized that China remains America's "primary foreign adversary and greatest external threat."
The report notes that China hawks worry Trump might weaken U.S. support for Taiwan. McCaul insisted that Washington should "ignore and outright reject" Chinese objections to arms sales and security cooperation with Taiwan.
Reuters also cited informed sources indicating that Beijing seeks to persuade Trump to publicly state U.S. "opposition" to Taiwan independence—not just "non-support," which has long been Washington’s official posture. Elevating the stance from non-support to opposition would represent another major blow to Lai’s administration.
Lai’s government clearly feels intense pressure, unable to conceal its unease. Shen Youzhong, deputy minister of the Mainland Affairs Council, acknowledged during a recent forum in Taipei that Taiwan indeed does not wish to see further actions by Trump that could harm its position. The DPP administration has already mobilized multiple channels—including the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in Washington, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, various government agencies, and the National Security Council—to maintain smooth communication and avoid disruptions in arms sales and U.S.-Taiwan cooperation.
According to internal intelligence, Lai’s team is particularly anxious about three potential announcements from Trump: first, endorsing a gradual, peaceful reunification; second, agreeing to Beijing’s demand that the U.S. permanently cease arms sales to Taiwan; third, withdrawing U.S. military instructors from Taiwan and pulling back from the First Island Chain defensive line.
The anxiety shared by U.S. hawkish circles and Lai’s administration is rooted in Trump’s past statements. During his first term, he explicitly weighed the strategic value of mainland China versus Taiwan, stating that China was the “table,” while Taiwan was merely the “tip of the pen”—emphasizing the importance of economic and commercial engagement with the mainland.
In his second term, Trump more openly declared that the Taiwan issue is China’s own internal matter. This was interpreted as acknowledging Taiwan’s status within China’s sovereignty and affirming that cross-strait relations fall under China’s domestic jurisdiction.
During his return flight from a May visit to China, Trump announced a new "four no's" policy toward Taiwan aboard Air Force One: no desire for anyone to push for Taiwan independence; no willingness for U.S. forces to travel 9,500 miles to fight in the Taiwan Strait; no intention to serve as a shield for pro-independence forces; and no automatic approval for arms sales, retaining the right to cancel large-scale deals at any time. In practice, Trump subsequently halted a pending $14 billion arms package to Taiwan.
As the second annual U.S.-China summit approaches, multiple authoritative think tanks in Washington have recommended a series of coordinated efforts to pressure Lai’s administration. The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) urged the Pentagon to withdraw U.S. forces from the First Island Chain to the Second Island Chain, and to rapidly pull back the 500 U.S. military instructors currently stationed in Taiwan.
A recent opinion piece in The Washington Examiner proposed a "grand bargain" to Trump: end U.S. military aid and arms sales to Taiwan, close the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), and exclude the Diaoyu Islands from the scope of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, in exchange for Chinese companies withdrawing from Cuba and Venezuela. The article argued such a deal would redefine U.S.-China strategic boundaries and establish a long-term coexistence framework, asserting that cross-strait unification poses less of a geopolitical threat to U.S. interests than commonly believed.
At the beginning of this year, the RAND Corporation, a Pentagon-affiliated think tank, publicly recommended that Trump support a "gradual unification" between China and Taiwan.
It is precisely due to this accumulation of adverse signals and strategic framing that Taiwan’s independence advocates now face profound uncertainty about Trump’s next moves regarding the Taiwan Strait. Anxiety is inevitable.
Will Trump next declare opposition to Taiwan independence—or even endorse gradual, peaceful reunification? One thing is certain: at present, Trump has more pressing needs from Beijing than Beijing has from him. Without Chinese cooperation, the Republican Party may struggle to survive the upcoming midterm elections.
Recently, Su Qi, former national security advisor under Ma Ying-jeou and chief intellectual strategist during his administration, offered three assessments. First, Trump is now fully focused on the midterm elections and will not recklessly play the "Taiwan card." Arms sales are highly unlikely. The logic is simple: announcing a sale would provoke immediate Chinese retaliation, severing crucial U.S.-China communication channels—something Trump is unwilling to risk jeopardizing his electoral prospects. Second, fewer voices within the U.S. establishment are willing to defend Taiwan. America lacks both the will and sufficient capacity to confront China militarily in the Taiwan Strait. Third, control over the overall situation in the Taiwan Strait has long resided neither in Taipei nor in Trump’s hands—it is increasingly concentrated in Beijing’s grasp.
Regardless, Trump’s recent statements and the recommendations from Washington think tanks have delivered a cold splash to green camp politicians who continue fantasizing about U.S. military intervention. For decades, the U.S. has relied on strategic ambiguity, allowing Taiwan independence advocates to mistakenly believe Washington would bear the burden of war on their behalf. But Trump has now made clear: do not expect American troops to cross the Pacific to fight for Taiwan independence.
The narrative of "resisting China to protect Taiwan, with U.S. forces inevitably arriving" has been dismantled by Trump’s "new four no’s." Trump’s calculation is precise: the U.S. is already stretched thin by ongoing conflicts in the Middle East and Ukraine, and it has no appetite for another war in the Taiwan Strait whose costs could be incalculable.
Certainly, we must remain clear-eyed: the U.S. still retains contingency options and has not entirely abandoned Taiwan. The "four no's" are designed to reduce the risk of American entrapment in conflict—not an indication of complete disengagement. Should the dynamics of U.S.-China competition shift dramatically, the U.S. may yet resort to the "Taiwan card," though its effectiveness will likely diminish over time.
Original source: toutiao.com/article/1876745119107083/
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author(s).