15242 words
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Author | Chietigj Bajpaee, Yu Jie
Translated | Liu Zhuoyan
Editor of this issue | Rao Jinshan
Reviewer of this issue | Shan Minmin
Editor's Note
According to media reports, India and Pakistan reached a ceasefire agreement on May 10 after three days of military confrontation. However, there are two key points in the dramatic changes that occurred during these three days that are worth pondering. One is that Indian Prime Minister Modi expressed a strong stance before the conflict, but quickly sought peace after suffering severe setbacks in the battle. The second is that the Indian government "hit back" against Trump, who was promoting the idea that the India-Pakistan agreement was not brokered by Washington, but rather "directly negotiated by the two countries."
India's series of actions may seem absurd at first glance, but they actually reflect its long-standing strategy and structural contradictions. Analysts point out that this conflict highlights India's awkward position in the regional geopolitical landscape. India has always emphasized its dominant advantage in South Asia - not only towards Pakistan but also towards China. However, in this brief confrontation, India was "crushed" by the Pakistani side using Chinese-made aircraft and missiles, while China strongly urged both sides to return to peaceful political solutions. This means that whether in military or diplomatic terms, India's expansionist intentions have clearly been thwarted. At the same time, this event also reflects India's distrust of the United States as an ally.
The Indian government's statements, which appear to be clarifying that the United States did not play any role in this coordination, actually send a signal to the United States that "India takes charge of Indo-Pacific affairs." When people combine these two aspects, they can find that this conflict event reflects the failure of India's "balancing strategy": India originally intended to profit from the situation between China and the United States, seeking to gain the maximum strategic space with minimal cost during the restructuring of the global order. However, its capabilities fell short of expectations, leading it into a situation where it could neither succeed nor fail.
This article is a research report released by the Chatham House (UK) in April 2025, offering important insights from a Western strategic perspective on the relations between China and India, and between the United States and India. The report points out that there are structural differences in strategic perceptions between China and India; however, economically, India is heavily dependent on China's supply chain system. In terms of global governance and regional leadership, although the two countries have competition and differences, they maintain consensus on the issue of multipolarity, thus forming a low-intensity but high-risk confrontation strategy.
Although India and the United States are within the "democratic framework," India has never fully integrated into the Western-dominated system, thereby limiting India's comprehensive resonance with the West on global issues. At a historical moment when the center of world power is accelerating eastward and the international order is deeply restructured, the relationships between China-India and US-India will become key variables affecting the global pattern. To help domestic sectors understand external dynamics and grasp the changes in the situation, the Eurasia System Science Research Association has specially translated and compiled this report for readers' critical reading. The article represents the author's views. The South Asian Research Communication reprints this article for the reference of all readers.
Photo source: CFP
One, the Historical Evolution of Sino-Indian Issues
(1) The Historical Context of Bilateral Relations
Since the late 1940s, when both countries gained independence successively, the Sino-Indian relationship has experienced a complex process from cooperation to competition and then to confrontation. In the early 1950s, the two countries briefly experienced a period of friendly cooperation. In the context of anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism, as two ancient civilizations of Asia, China and India worked together to promote the unity and self-strengthening of Third World countries. The widely circulated slogan "Hindi-Chini Bhai-Bhai" (Hindi-Chinese Brothers) vividly illustrates this harmonious relationship, reaching its peak in 1954 when the two countries jointly established the "Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence" (Note: Panchsheel, "Panchsheel" originates from the Buddhist term in ancient India, meaning "five precepts", later extended to "Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence").
However, this friendly situation did not last. As border issues became increasingly prominent, bilateral relations gradually became tense. In 1962, the two countries erupted in a brief military conflict, becoming a turning point that affected Sino-Indian relations for decades. Bilateral relations remained tense for many years until 1988, when Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi made a historic visit to Beijing, the first visit by an Indian government head to China in over three decades. This visit successfully broke the ice in bilateral relations, establishing a pragmatic coexistence model: on one hand, building trust mechanisms to ease border tensions, and on the other hand, actively expanding cooperation in economic, cultural and other fields.
Over the following decades, the relationship between the two countries showed a prosperous development trend. Concepts such as "Chindia" cooperation and the "Himalayan Consensus" were proposed successively, reflecting both sides' shared expectations for building a new type of major country relationship. High-level exchanges between China and India maintained a good momentum, until 2019, when leaders of the two countries still maintained strategic communication through informal summits. However, after the border conflict in 2020, bilateral relations clearly cooled down.
(2) The 2020 Border Conflict: A Turning Point in Relations
The border conflict in 2020 became the most serious border tension between China and India in more than four decades, resulting in the first casualties in the region since 1975. This event not only affected the border management mechanism carefully built by the two countries between 1988 and 2019, but also broke the strategic balance maintained by the two sides since 1988.
After the conflict, the mode of strategic interaction between the two sides underwent a fundamental transformation. Although China actively sought to restore the cooperative situation, the bilateral relationship entered a new game pattern - India set the border issue as the primary prerequisite for resuming normal bilateral relations. This change in attitude reflected a fundamental adjustment in India's strategic perception of China.
The report analysis pointed out that although the 2020 border conflict is regarded as an important turning point in Sino-Indian relations, in fact, the bilateral relationship had already shown a cooling trend in the previous few years, and border standoff incidents became more frequent and the intensity gradually increased. This change in relations resulted from multiple factors working together. First, the change in the domestic political ecology of the two countries is a key factor. Since 2014, the foreign policies of China and India have shown a more autonomous characteristic, and this policy orientation adjustment has profoundly influenced the bilateral interaction model.
A deeper reason lies in the structural changes in the balance of regional power. With the continuous enhancement of China's comprehensive national strength, it has been more proactive in advancing relations with neighboring countries. In addition, the strategic alignment between India and the United States has cast a shadow over Sino-Indian relations. The conclusion of the India-US nuclear agreement in 2008 forced China to re-examine India's strategic intentions and interpret them within the framework of the Sino-US competition, which somewhat exacerbated the strategic suspicion between China and India.
(3) 2024: The Dawn of Reconciliation
In June 2024, Modi successfully won his third consecutive term, taking control of the Indian political arena, creating favorable conditions for the easing of Sino-Indian relations. The senior officials of the Modi government have continuously released signals of reconciliation, emphasizing the urgent need to resolve the long-standing border issues to bring bilateral interactions back to the normal track.
China's positive response further enhanced the possibility of the turnaround of bilateral relations. After 18 months of vacancy, the Chinese government re-appointed the ambassador to India, which was widely interpreted as a strategic move by Beijing to promote the warming of bilateral relations. Behind the scenes, multiple rounds of consultations at the political and military levels between the two countries have already been simmering, paving the way for the final reconciliation.
The successful signing of the Sino-Indian border agreement in October 2024 marked a key step for the two Asian powers to normalize their relations. The timing of the signing of this agreement coincided with the BRICS summit in Kazan, Russia, reflecting Russia's diplomatic wisdom in promoting unity among the founding members of the BRICS. However, the fundamental driving force behind this historic breakthrough still lies in the rational considerations and strategic adjustments based on the national interests of China and India.
From a strategic perspective, this reconciliation has multiple motivations. For China, facing the prospect of a more complex relationship with the U.S. after Trump's return to the White House, improving the surrounding environment to enhance strategic depth is of great importance. At the same time, the increasingly tight foreign investment access policies of Western countries have prompted China to strengthen cooperation with developing countries, and India, as an important force in this camp, has seen its strategic value increase day by day.
For India, this border agreement reflects its pragmatic shift in foreign policy. Previously, India set the resolution of border issues as a prerequisite for developing bilateral relations, which not only limited its diplomatic flexibility but also hindered the implementation of India's manufacturing development strategy. Especially in the context of India's efforts to build a "global manufacturing hub", its dependence on China's key components and raw material supply chain has been continuously increasing, and the economic reality urgently needs the stability and improvement of bilateral relations.
The successful signing of the border agreement in October 2024 opened up a comprehensive process for the thawing of Sino-Indian relations. The two countries smoothly resumed the special representative meeting mechanism, which had been suspended since 2019, and restored the high-level strategic dialogue platform between foreign ministers, marking the normalization of high-level exchanges. Both sides not only focused on traditional security areas, but also expanded their cooperation vision to the field of people's livelihood, actively exploring practical projects that benefit the people of the two countries, such as restoring direct flights and promoting religious pilgrimages.
However, the report also pointed out that although the relationship between the two sides shows positive signs of turning around, the process of Sino-Indian reconciliation is still in its early stages and has a long way to go. The current border agreement does not mean that the bilateral relationship will fully return to the state before the 2020 conflict. In fact, since the border conflict, the two countries have formed a new strategic situation in the border area - each side has deployed 5 to 60,000 troops along the front line, and the modernization level of infrastructure in the border area has been significantly improved.
More importantly, the border agreement has not resolved all disputed points. This agreement mainly focuses on solving specific regional issues, but does not involve other disputed areas. In addition, potential conflicts in areas such as transboundary water resource management have not been included in the agreement scope, and water resource issues may become another important variable affecting the relationship between the two countries.
The fundamental resolution of the border dispute requires the two countries to reach a comprehensive strategic arrangement, not only to finally resolve the boundary demarcation issue, but also to take into account other geopolitical and economic interests, which inevitably requires both sides to demonstrate political wisdom and make certain strategic compromises. Objectively speaking, although comprehensive reconciliation is difficult to achieve in the short term, the possibility of large-scale conflicts is also very low. Historical experience shows that only when the core interests of both sides are breached, the relationship between the two countries may fall into a serious crisis.
Two, the Deep Roots of Tension in Bilateral Relations
(1) The Historical Context of Bilateral Relations
As two Asian countries with a long history of civilization, China and India have a deep psychological foundation in their strategic cognition of each other's international status. By examining the historical evolution of bilateral relations, it is not difficult to find significant gaps in strength between the two countries. This gap is manifested not only in material strength, but also in strategic cognition.
Regarding material strength, the most obvious difference is the disparity in economic scale. Data show that China's GDP is about five times that of India, and this economic strength gap directly affects the influence of the two countries on the international stage. Although India is currently the fastest-growing major economy in the world and is expected to surpass Germany and Japan by 2030 to become the third largest economy in the world, the absolute gap in economic scale between China and India will continue to widen in the future. The economic strength gap is also reflected in the military field, as China's defense budget is about three times that of India, and this military power comparison directly affects the strategic considerations and policy choices of both sides in border disputes.
The report points out that the gap in strategic cognition, although not as obvious as the gap in economic and military strength, has also had a profound impact on Sino-Indian relations. For a long time, the Indian side has believed that China is unable to regard India as an equal strategic partner, even in historical periods when the economic sizes of the two countries were similar, this cognitive attitude has never fundamentally changed, which has become an important root of the Indian side's accumulated grievances. In terms of international status recognition, India positions itself as an independent strategic force in the emerging multipolar world, while China often sees India as a pawn in the larger game between the U.S. and China.
Several figures in the Indian foreign affairs and academic circles hold similar strategic judgments. An Indian diplomat analyzed that "the Chinese do not see India as a competitor or a global power," but rather "as a troublesome factor in aligning with the U.S. in the Indo-Pacific region." Another scholar pointed out that the Chinese view India as "an affiliate of the U.S., not an equal partner."
This cognitive difference is also reflected in the senior personnel arrangements of the foreign departments of the two countries. Among the 14 Indian foreign secretaries (the highest-ranking career diplomats in the Foreign Ministry) in recent years, six have served as ambassadors to China or held core positions in the Foreign Ministry responsible for China-related matters. This number is roughly comparable to the number of those who have served as ambassadors to the U.S., reflecting India's equal strategic emphasis on the relations with the two major powers, the U.S. and China. In contrast, the Chinese foreign affairs system places more emphasis on cultivating diplomats with rich experience in the U.S. or other G7 countries, and Indian work experience seems not to be considered a necessary path to the positions of Foreign Minister or Director of the Central Foreign Affairs Commission.
This strategic cognitive difference not only exists among the decision-making elite, but also roots in the general public. Although the Indian business community indeed hopes to break the trade restrictions with China, a cross-border survey by the Pew Research Center in 2023 showed that the public's favorability toward China is relatively low among several emerging economies.
(2) Economic Interdependence: Challenges and Opportunities
From India's strategic perspective, the Sino-Indian economic relationship presents a typical "double-edged sword" feature - it is both a source of strategic concern and an inescapable economic reality. The latest trade data released by the World Bank reveals the severe situation of growing imbalance in bilateral trade. China's exports to India have exceeded $100 billion, while India's exports to China have barely surpassed $15 billion. To reverse the deficit, India has taken tough trade protection measures - in just one year, 2024, India launched more than 30 anti-dumping investigations against China, and the cumulative number of investigations from 1995 to 2023 has exceeded 300, ranking first among all countries worldwide.
However, even when political relations between the two countries fell to a low point, China still remained India's largest trading partner. From pharmaceuticals to renewable energy, multiple key industries in India are severely dependent on China, and this dependence is difficult to shake off in the short term. Specifically, more than 40% of the drug raw materials imported by India come from the Chinese market; more meaningfully, India's position as the largest supplier of generic drugs to the U.S. is actually supported by more than half of the active pharmaceutical ingredients relying on the Chinese supply chain. Even after the Galwan Valley clash in 2020, India promptly introduced investment restrictions on strategically sensitive industries and banned several Chinese internet applications, including TikTok and WeChat, but this deep-seated supply chain dependency has not fundamentally changed. This complex interaction pattern of "cold politics and hot economics" reflects the objective reality of economic complementarity between the two Asian giants, as well as the difficult balance that India faces between pursuing strategic autonomy and maintaining economic interests.
Indian decision-makers have to acknowledge a reality: without the support of Chinese components and raw materials, India's dream of becoming a global manufacturing hub would be impossible. The Indian Ministry of Finance also candidly admitted in its "Economic Survey 2023-2024" that "it is not wise to think that India can easily fill the gap left by China in some manufacturing areas." The survey report also bluntly stated: "To promote the development of India's manufacturing industry and integrate it into the global supply chain, it is actually unavoidable to connect with China's supply network. Whether to rely solely on imports or to appropriately introduce Chinese investment is a choice that India must face."
At the same time, the Indian business community has begun to actively advise the government to relax visa and investment restrictions on China. They are exploring various ways to pave the way for Chinese enterprises to enter the Indian market, including forming joint ventures and other cooperative models.
This policy thinking reflects India's pragmatic position in seeking a balance between geostrategic considerations and economic development needs. On the surface, it emphasizes "autonomy," but in reality, it clearly knows that without Chinese industrial support, India's manufacturing ambitions cannot be fulfilled. This posture of maintaining strategic composure while not forgetting economic pragmatism is the true reflection of India's current economic policy toward China.
Although Sino-Indian commercial cooperation faces policy restrictions, it has shown some breakthrough cases in recent years. For example, the Chinese fashion e-commerce giant Shein, which was banned by the Indian government in 2020, cleverly achieved a "backdoor return" to the Indian market by entering into a brand licensing agreement with India's largest retail group, Reliance Retail. Indian electronics manufacturer Bhagwati Products has formed a joint venture with Chinese smart terminal design and manufacturing company Huaqin Technology to jointly develop smartphone manufacturing businesses in India. Indian industrial giant JSW Group acquired a stake in MG Motors from Chinese state-owned automaker SAIC Motor, achieving complementary advantages.
Although these cooperation cases have received approval from the Indian government, they have undergone strict approval mechanisms on a case-by-case basis, and have been attached with numerous restrictive conditions, the most typical of which is requiring Chinese parties to hold only minority shares in the joint ventures. During the approval process, the Indian government particularly considers whether these cooperations meet the country's more macro-level strategic demands, including whether they can promote technology transfer, enhance local manufacturing capabilities, and ensure that Chinese capital does not penetrate into strategically sensitive areas recognized by India. Data show that 40% of Chinese investment applications are rejected, and the success rate is only 15%.
This reality of India's economic dependence on China has had a profound impact on the formation of a strategic partnership between the West and India. This reality contrasts sharply with the expectations commonly held by the Western decision-making circle - the latter often assumes that India will be the biggest beneficiary of the global supply chain "de-Chinaization" or "risk diversification" strategy. However, the actual situation is much more complicated than this linear thinking. On one hand, economic interdependence objectively increases the threshold for a full-scale conflict between China and India, serving as a "stabilizer" for bilateral relations; on the other hand, this economic link has not fundamentally prevented the two Asian giants from engaging in strategic rivalry on a broader geopolitical stage.
Three, Competition for Regional and Global Leadership
(1) Strategic Rivalry Between Two Ancient Civilizations
Since the outbreak of the border conflict in 2020, international public opinion has mostly focused on the border dispute, viewing it as the core of the strategic opposition between the two countries. However, this simplified framework fails to touch the essence of the problem. The report believes that the border conflict is essentially an external manifestation of the struggle between two Asian countries representing "civilization-states" on a broader geopolitical stage, both striving to secure a more prominent strategic position and voice in the transitional period of the international system.
The strategic competition between the two countries actually stems from their respective deep civilizational identities and great power aspirations. Since the 1940s, when both countries returned to the international stage as independent sovereign states, they have engaged in complex strategic games in the Asian region and even globally, each striving for a more prominent international status and voice.
The two ancient civilizations have a cautious attitude towards each other's historical positioning and civilizational achievements. India positions itself as the legitimate heir and leader of the Asian order. In 2017, M. J. Akbar, then Secretary of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs, emphasized in a strategic speech: "If Asia is considered the East, then India is undoubtedly the true center of this East... From a geopolitical structure and multiple historical factors, India is the strategic hub and core country of the Asian continent." This view can be traced back to the strategic thoughts of India's father figure, the first Prime Minister Nehru, who explicitly claimed that India is the "natural leader" of Asia.
China, on the other hand, through the active promotion of the "Global Civilization Initiative," has demonstrated and strengthened its strategic positioning and voice as an ancient civilization on the international stage. At the same time, some Chinese scholars have conducted in-depth thinking on the Modi government's efforts to shape India as a civilization state. They especially worry that the rising nationalistic sentiment within India might push its foreign policy towards a more hardened trajectory.
Looking back at history, Sino-Indian relations have also had a brief honeymoon period. When the bilateral atmosphere was relatively friendly, the two countries often used a gentle tone, emphasizing win-win cooperation. In 2009, then-Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh (who ruled from 2004 to 2014) made a forward-looking statement: "The world has much to offer, enough to satisfy the development ambitions of both China and India." However, looking at the development trajectory of Sino-Indian relations, such strategic easing periods are both short-lived and rare, and the beautiful vision of win-win cooperation often faces real challenges.
It is not difficult to see that the concept of "civilization-state" has now become an important battlefield for soft power competition between China and India. Both sides are trying to highlight the unique charm of their cultural traditions to enhance their international influence. In the future, how to find a way to coexist with each other within their respective dreams of civilizational revival will be a key perspective for observing Sino-Indian relations.
(2) Struggle for Influence in Regional and Global Forums
The competition between China and India at the civilizational level mainly manifests as mutual contention in regional and global arenas. India has always been suspicious of China's various regional and global initiatives. The Belt and Road Initiative is the best example - India remains the only country in South Asia that has not joined this initiative. In 2019, India withdrew from the largest trade agreement in Asia, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). The main reason for this is that India is concerned that the agreement would allow Chinese goods to freely enter the Indian market and impact domestic enterprises.
India's cold attitude toward the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) also illustrates the point. During its chairmanship of the SCO in 2023, India clearly showed little interest, merely holding a routine online summit. By 2024, PM Modi even skipped the SCO summit. These actions clearly indicate that India is deliberately reducing its interaction with this regional organization created by China.
The West's "Indo-Pacific" strategy has also made China wary of India, tending to limit India's influence to South Asia rather than the broader Asia.
(3) Consensus and Divergence in Global Governance Architecture
In the major issues of global governance system reform, China and India have held similar positions on many global governance issues. Although the two countries have competition in the process of seeking international influence, they have shown a rare strategic consensus on the fundamental issue of pushing for the reform of the existing global governance system to better reflect the interests of developing countries.
Both countries firmly support the construction of a more balanced multipolar international system. This consensus is most clearly reflected in their joint participation and deep involvement in the BRICS cooperation mechanism and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). A Indian financial expert once served as the founding president of the New Development Bank of BRICS, and India holds a substantial 20% equity in this institution; at the same time, India remains the second-largest shareholder of the AIIB, second only to China. More convincingly, a considerable proportion of the loan projects of these new multilateral institutions have been directed towards the Indian market. The active participation and support of China and India in these new multilateral mechanisms fully demonstrate the common strategic interests of the two emerging powers in the process of reforming the international financial governance system, and also provide a realistic basis for potential cooperation between the two countries in a broader global governance field.
Both China and India adhere to the core positions of upholding the inviolability of national sovereignty, respecting the basic principles of international law, peacefully resolving international disputes, and promoting an open international economy. At the same time, both countries have a cautious attitude towards the Western-led human rights discourse, liberal values, and interventionist policy orientations, seeking to establish international norms that better serve the interests of developing countries.
This strategic consensus is clearly reflected in multiple key global governance issues - from the interpretation of freedom of navigation, the sharing of responsibility for climate change, the priority of development rights, to the definition of the boundaries of the responsibility to protect, the policy stances of India often form a certain默契 with China, while differing from Western countries. A systematic analysis of India's voting behavior at the United Nations General Assembly from 2022 to 2023 showed that the consistency rate between India and China was as high as 81%, while the consistency rate with the United States was only 38%. In response, Indian Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar rarely commented: "Despite many differences between China and India, both sides have a common understanding deep in their hearts, that they are also jointly challenging the established international order dominated by the West."
However, the report analysis indicates that, looking at the actual actions of the two countries in the field of global governance, there is little concrete evidence of substantial policy coordination or strategic cooperation between the two. Taking the attitude towards the use of the dollar as a sanction tool as an example, although both China and India have expressed concerns about the use of the dollar as a sanction tool after the Ukraine-Russia conflict in 2022, their strategic views on responding to the challenges of the Western-dominated global financial system are completely different. A senior official who once participated in India's financial diplomacy decisions pointed out: "India has no interest in dismantling the dollar-dominated system," compared to other currency systems, India tends to maintain the current financial order.
Although the two countries have indeed shown converging positions on issues such as promoting reforms of international institutions, increasing the voice and voting rights of emerging economies in institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank, upon closer examination of the underlying strategic paths, these initiatives are basically results of the two countries' own efforts, rather than outcomes of in-depth strategic trust and policy coordination.
(4) Competition for Leadership in the Global South
The report points out that the deep logic of the complex geopolitical rivalry between China and India actually stems from both sides' common pursuit of leadership in the Global South. China positions itself as a "comrade-in-arms" of the Global South, while India boasts itself as the "spokesperson" of the Global South.
This subtle difference in wording also indicates the deep strategic competition between the two countries in this field. Tracing back, this struggle for influence can be traced back to the Cold War era, when the two Asian civilizations actively sought an important position in the "Third World" bloc. This historical accumulation and contemporary geopolitical competition have become another important dimension for understanding the complexity of Sino-Indian relations, and also provides a historical depth analysis perspective for interpreting the interactions of the two countries in Global South affairs.
With the increasing economic strength and geopolitical weight of the two countries in the international system, this strategic competition and cooperation relationship that has lasted for decades has taken on new vitality and connotations. The African continent has become an important window for observing the strategic rivalry between the two countries. In 2023, India, as the rotating chair of the G20, successfully promoted the African Union's formal membership in the G20, which was seen as a landmark achievement in India's deepening relations with Africa. Now, India has firmly established itself as the second-largest bilateral lender to Africa (after China) and the third-largest trade partner (after China and the EU), an important position. India's strategic layout in Africa has received solid support from three million Indian expatriates on the African continent, providing it with a unique advantage for regional influence.
This systematic advancement of India's strategic layout in Africa is both an inevitable choice for its pursuit of global power status and an important strategic chess move in China's competition in the Global South. However, despite China's adjusted pace of overseas investment, its core position as a provider of funds to the Global South remains stable, with its overseas financing scale far exceeding that of India. Especially in the field of large-scale infrastructure construction, Indian companies often find it difficult to compete with Chinese companies that enjoy policy support and financial advantages due to objective conditions such as funding strength and state support. Data show that China's total outward direct investment (ODI) reached nearly $180 billion in 2023, while India's overseas investment during the same period was approximately $110 billion, with a noticeable gap remaining.
Nevertheless, the investment strategies of the two countries have followed different developmental trajectories: facing the increasingly tightened investment review mechanisms and access restrictions from Western countries, China is gradually adjusting its strategic focus, shifting its investment gaze from the West to the Global South, while Indian companies continue to actively seek investment opportunities in the West.
On the practical operation level, Indian companies enjoy a relatively relaxed external environment in the international investment market, facing less intense politicalized scrutiny pressure. However, the investment model of Indian companies also has its limitations. Compared to China's coordinated planning, Indian projects often lack overall coordination and long-term strategic planning, with many cases of individual efforts. This commercially oriented investment model, while avoiding geopolitical controversies in the short term, may lead to an uneven pace in India's systemic expansion of global economic influence, making it difficult to form a cohesive effort.
(5) South Asia: The Core Area of Sino-Indian Rivalry
The strategic competition between China and India in South Asia is the most direct and intense. For India, as the only regional superpower that borders all countries in South Asia, India regards South Asia as the key barrier to its national security and prosperity. China, on the other hand, views South Asia from multiple strategic perspectives: on one hand, it pays attention to border stability, especially the security of border areas with neighboring countries such as Bhutan and Nepal; on the other hand, it emphasizes the strategic points in the region's maritime trade routes, including the Maldives, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh. Pakistan, as a long-time important partner of China, plays a key role in all aspects of China's South Asian strategy, and the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor initiated in 2015 is an important embodiment of this special relationship.
China has become an important trade partner and source of investment for countries in South Asia, constituting a key factor in the regional economic structure, while India strives to shape a "reliable neighbor" strategic image in the South Asian region. In fact, apart from Pakistan, which has long had structural differences with India, the countries in the region generally adopt a strategic balancing act, seeking to maximize national interests between the two major neighbors, China and India. Take Sri Lanka as an example, the country has reaffirmed its neutral stance in geopolitics while gradually adjusting its restrictive measures against Chinese research ships' visits, demonstrating a typical small country balancing strategy. Similarly, although the current government of the Maldives raised the campaign slogan of "India's forces leaving" during the 2023 presidential election and strengthened strategic interactions with China in the early stages of its rule, its foreign policy orientation has gradually shifted to a pragmatic approach of balancing between China and India as its domestic economic difficulties have intensified.
Four, Sino-Indian Relations and Western Strategic Interaction
The report believes that Western countries need to understand more deeply the complexity of Sino-Indian relations and its strategic impact when dealing with China and India. It is interesting that when Western countries formulate their policies toward China, they rarely consider the Indian factor, and their policies toward India are largely influenced by the Chinese variable.
Especially for the United States, if it wants to reasonably position India's role in the strategic rivalry with China, it must accurately grasp the essence and subtleties of Sino-Indian relations. One of the strategic pillars of the development of India-U.S. relations is the U.S. view of India as an important partner to balance China's regional influence. The U.S. government believes that as the relationship between the U.S. and China simultaneously cools down, this strategic perception becomes more deeply rooted. The report points out that the U.S. hopes to build a balance of power against China by strengthening strategic cooperation with India.
In recent years, India has no longer hesitated to join U.S.-led regional and global collaborations, whereas in the past, Indian officials often worried that such collaborations would affect their relationship with China. After the 2020 border conflict, India became active again in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD), consisting of Australia, India, Japan, and the U.S., and successfully held the first summit of the four leaders in 2021, elevating the mechanism to the highest level of strategic dialogue. At the same time, India has actively expanded its bilateral and multilateral cooperation with the U.S., including but not limited to the Critical and Emerging Technologies Initiative (later renamed TRUST Program by the Trump administration), the Global Mineral Resources Security Partnership, and the Artemis Lunar Exploration Cooperation Agreement, among other cutting-edge fields.
However, as India strives to enhance its position in the global supply chain, its economic dependence on China may become a potential "obstacle" in the India-U.S. relationship. This contradiction is particularly evident in the clean energy sector - in August 2023, the U.S. Customs and Border Protection agency seized solar panels worth over $40 million manufactured in India. Although this action targeted China, it directly affected the interests of Indian companies.
Facing this challenge, India has implemented a series of industrial policies such as the "Production Linked Incentive Scheme" to vigorously promote the domestic production of key industries like solar panels, striving to achieve self-reliance in the industrial chain and supply chain. However, the reality is that Indian companies still highly depend on Chinese suppliers in core components and raw materials such as photovoltaic cells and polycrystalline silicon, and this deep-seated supply chain dependency is unlikely to be fundamentally changed in the short term.
This complex situation poses a challenge to the India-U.S. relationship - unless policy exemptions are secured through diplomatic channels for specific industries, India's structural economic dependence on China will inevitably become a strategic friction point in the India-U.S. relationship. More profoundly, once China gains the initiative in key areas of India's economic development, the ability and willingness of India to coordinate positions with the U.S. will inevitably be constrained when Sino-U.S. relations are tense.
Another important variable influencing the deeper direction of the India-U.S. relationship is the enduring tradition of strategic autonomy in India's foreign policy. This core concept rooted in the process of independent nation-building makes India highly vigilant about participating in any U.S.-led security architecture with military alliance characteristics. This fundamental strategic orientation also leads to a confusing role for India in potential Sino-U.S. conflicts. China has always encouraged India's strategic autonomy. As one Chinese scholar said, "If the EU and India can maintain their strategic autonomy, their influence on the international stage will surely increase, and the world will be more likely to turn toward a truly multipolar structure."
India's foreign circle's deep-rooted distrust of the West has become another obstacle in the India-U.S. relationship. In recent years, the tension between the West and India has been very intense, mainly due to the West's questioning of India's democratic status, criticism of "crony capitalism," and accusations that India secretly planned to assassinate exiled Western political dissidents. These frictions have caused strong resonance in India, with many people believing that the West is "suppressing India's rise" deliberately.
A former Indian foreign official even openly stated, "India's real survival threat comes from the West, not China." A scholar studying Sino-Indian relations bluntly pointed out, "Some vested interest groups in the West are 'fanning the flames' to keep Sino-Indian relations in a state of tension." Another former official believed that the complex relationship between India and the West actually creates conditions for Sino-Indian reconciliation. He especially emphasized that "the delicate state of India-U.S. relations is precisely the catalyst for resolving the Sino-Indian border dispute."
Under this background, the danger of strategic miscalculation in the India-U.S. relationship is quietly rising. For example, if either India or the U.S. shows a gesture of goodwill toward China, both sides may fall into strategic anxiety: India worries that the U.S. and China may repeat the historical script of a great power sharing dominance, while the U.S. fears that China's "Asia for Asians" concept is a threat. This mutual suspicion will inevitably cast a shadow over the India-U.S. relationship.
(1) The Future of Sino-Indian Relations Under Trump's Second Term
The report points out that Trump's second presidential term is likely to add new variables to Sino-Indian relations. Both China and India have a certain degree of expectation for Trump's return to the White House from their own strategic perspectives. In a world where the U.S. is gradually stepping back from global leadership, China and India will undoubtedly gain a broader strategic space, which is conducive to achieving their strategic goals of seeking a more influential position in a multipolar international system.
In this potential geopolitical新格局, any criticism from the U.S. regarding the actions of China and India will lose its weight and be accused of being hypocritical, because both countries will directly point the finger at the U.S. for deviating from the global system it once established itself.
At the same time, both countries will worry about Trump's more utilitarian and capricious foreign policy under his administration. This policy will make the relationship between the two countries and the U.S. as well as each other more complicated.
India is particularly concerned that, although there is competition between China and the U.S., Trump's preference for "transactional diplomacy" may cause him to adjust his policy toward China at any time, easing the tension with China. Additionally, Trump's pragmatic foreign policy, which is less driven by values, has raised concerns among India's strategic circles, worrying that the ideological bond and strategic trust between the world's largest democracy and the oldest democracy may be affected.
Meanwhile, China is concerned that Trump's cabinet appointments include not only "hawks" on China but also "doves" on India. The most prominent example is National Security Advisor Mike Waltz, who previously served as the head of the Congressional India Caucus, and Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who pushed for deepening U.S.-India defense cooperation during his tenure as a senator. This possible "hardline on China, friendly toward India" policy orientation within the Trump administration will undoubtedly bring new variables to the strategic balance between China and India.
Theoretically, the common concerns that may arise from Trump's second term in the U.S. strategic landscape could potentially open up broader strategic communication, even potential cooperation between China and India. The border agreement reached by the two countries in October 2024 can be seen as a positive adjustment made by both sides based on their shared considerations of changes in their relations with the West. However, the long-standing strategic mistrust and lack of trust between the two countries will inevitably limit any in-depth strategic collaboration between them in reality. Trump's second term will undoubtedly open up greater space for the two countries on the international stage, but it will also intensify the hidden competition for control of this space between the two countries.
(2) Sino-Indian Relations from the European Perspective
Compared to the U.S. emphasizing the strategic competition with China in the Indo-Pacific, European countries handle Sino-Indian relations more rationally and practically. The notion of shaping India as a strategic pawn to counterbalance China is not as prominent.
However, due to strategic concerns about the rising influence of China, some European countries have begun to see deepening cooperation with India as part of their strategic plan, aiming to diversify risks, expand markets, and enhance the resilience of their own industrial and supply chains. The German government explicitly stated in its latest India strategy document that strengthening economic cooperation with India will help German companies enhance their ability to withstand external shocks.
The EU has also advanced its institutional integration with India through multilateral mechanisms such as the EU-India Trade and Technology Council (EU--India Trade and Technology Council) and Free Trade Agreement (FTA) negotiations. However, whether India is capable of becoming a genuine "alternative to China" remains questionable: its manufacturing base needs to be strengthened, its industrial chain structure is not yet complete, and it has a clear reliance on China in key raw materials and components. At the same time, Europe's intricate trade dependencies with China are also restricting the further development of EU-India relations. A typical example is Germany's plan to export tunnel boring machines to India, but the deal ultimately failed because the equipment was manufactured in China. This shows that "supply chain diversification" faces practical challenges when it comes to the structural realities of the supply chain.
Britain has shown a clear strategic position in handling Sino-Indian relations: on one hand, it is actively promoting a "Comprehensive Strategic Partnership" (CSP) with India, expanding cooperation in areas such as economy, security, and technology; on the other hand, it is conducting a thorough review of its China policy. On the surface, these two measures seem independent, but upon closer inspection, they are closely related. Through the CSP framework, Britain aims to strengthen its comprehensive cooperation with India with a more systematic and strategic approach. In practice, however, the "China factor" has always been an important consideration, shaping the deeper logic of UK-India cooperation.
In October 2024, the UK announced the transfer of sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago to Mauritius. This move superficially responded to the call for decolonization, but in reality, it also affected the geopolitical landscape of the Indian Ocean. As a regional power, India welcomed this decision, but at the same time, it also paid attention to the possible changes in regional strategic balance. India is trying to strike a balance between morality and strategy, acknowledging the UK's transfer of colonial heritage while maintaining strategic attention on the regional power structure. This case reflects the multi-layered considerations of India-UK relations: on one hand, the UK uses India to deepen its strategic position in the Indo-Pacific; on the other hand, India uses cooperation as a means to maintain the strategic balance in the South Asia-Indian Ocean region. The interaction between the two countries is no longer limited to bilateral affairs, but is embedded in a broader geopolitical framework.
(3) India: Non-Western but Not Anti-Western
Although China and India show some similarities in terms of sovereignty concepts, narratives of the Global South, and the restructuring of the international order, there are still differences in their deeper political ideologies and institutional preferences. Both emphasize historical continuity and cultural subjectivity, and this identity provides the foundation for their unique views on the international order.
On the international stage, both countries seek to represent the "Global South" and advocate for a shift toward a multipolar international system. However, compared to China's emphasis on institutional change, India prefers rule adjustments and norm reconfiguration. This "internal reform" mindset makes it a bridge between the North and the South, and also provides the West with a potential strategic lever.
China challenges the existing international norms through a systematic strategic approach, while India adopts a more strategic way to express its institutional demands, neither completely accepting the West nor directly opposing it, but focusing on gaining bargaining space within the rules framework. Superficially mild, but in reality, it is carefully planned and executed.
The report analysis points out that India is striving to build an international positioning of "non-Western but not anti-Western," playing the role of a "balancer" in platforms such as the BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), maintaining cooperation with China while avoiding single dependence.
This is a typical "balancing strategy": not refusing China, but not completely agreeing; not relying on the West, but not rejecting cooperation. In the process of restructuring the global power structure, India seeks to obtain the maximum autonomy space with the least cost. For the West, how to understand and respond to this "flexible diplomacy" will affect its strategic effectiveness in the multipolar competition.
(4) Technological Cooperation: A New Field of Strategic Interaction
The report points out that if the West genuinely expects India to shoulder the responsibility of countering China's rise, it must fully assist India in摆脱 its dependence on China in key frontier technology fields. Around this strategic goal, India has already actively laid out in multiple cooperation mechanisms: collaborating with the U.S. on the "Trust Initiative," building the "Trade and Technology Council" with the EU, and launching the "Technology Security Initiative" with the UK, with multiple approaches, initially showing scale.
However, India has always adhered to "strategic autonomy," emphasizing independent decision-making and multilateral balance. This basic position determines that it will not easily bind itself to any party in the technology field. India still maintains energy, military, and geopolitical interactions with countries like Iran and Russia, with whom the West has tense relations, aiming to avoid being drawn into the Sino-U.S. confrontation framework.
This strategic logic determines the practical difficulties that the West faces in advancing high-tech cooperation. In the future, cooperation in core technology transfer, sensitive equipment joint production, and intelligence security connection may encounter policy obstacles. At the same time, Western countries may set stricter technological firewalls in areas such as end-user regulation and export control clauses, ensuring that core technologies are not indirectly transferred to other directions.
Five, Conclusion
From the perspective of the evolution of the global power structure, Sino-Indian relations may have a more profound impact on the future world order. In the context of the relative decline of the United States and the eastward shift of international power, China and India are engaged in a hidden and prolonged strategic competition over regional dominance and global institutional reform.
For a long time, Western media has tended to limit Sino-Indian relations to the perspective of border disputes and military friction, ignoring the systemic strategic tensions carried by Sino-Indian relations. With a combined population of nearly 40% of the world, any developments in bilateral interactions will inevitably have a ripple effect on the global political, economic, and security landscape.
The fundamental obstacle facing Sino-Indian relations is not short-term misunderstandings, but structural contradictions: imbalance in the power structure and lack of strategic trust. The fundamental differences between the two countries in terms of national identity, global positioning, and regional order views constitute an implicit barrier that has long prevented the bilateral relationship from breaking through.
The core issue is the "asymmetry" in the relationship that has never been reconciled. India has always been worried that China cannot treat it as an equal strategic partner, and there is a strategic anxiety of being marginalized. At the same time, China remains vigilant about India's global aspirations, fearing that it may become a "proxy" manipulated by the West. The continuous friction between the two countries in various affairs forms a low-intensity but high-risk confrontation pattern.
If the West wishes to maintain its institutional dominance in this context, it not only needs to put aside the Cold War mindset framework, but also truly understand the complex and dynamic competitive relationship between China and India, rather than simply categorizing the two countries into the "pro-China/ pro-Western" camps. The report emphasizes that the West should not shape India as a geopolitical force to counter China's rise, but should regard it as a "third pole force" with independent value orientations and institutional goals.
Translator's Comment:
Looking back at the historical trajectory and current situation of Sino-Indian relations, it is clear that the evolution of this complex relationship not only concerns the two countries themselves, but will also profoundly affect the future direction of the Asian and even global order.
The border agreement in October 2024 has opened an important window for the improvement of bilateral relations, but the reconciliation process still faces many challenges. The fundamental solution to the border issue requires the leaders of the two countries to demonstrate a high level of political wisdom and strategic determination, and this process will inevitably be gradual and long-term, not a matter of a single stroke. At the same time, the structural contradictions in the bilateral relationship - especially the lack of strategic trust and cognitive differences - also need to be gradually alleviated through continuous dialogue and practical cooperation.
In the broader context of global governance and the international order, China and India have both cooperation space and significant differences in strategic positioning. China tends to enhance its influence by establishing new multilateral mechanisms and proposing global initiatives, while India more often chooses to seek greater voice within the existing framework, while maintaining strategic cooperation with Western countries. This difference makes it difficult for the two countries to form a true strategic synergy in the process of promoting international order reform, and instead shows parallel rather than joint progress.
Looking ahead, Sino-Indian relations may continue to present a complex situation of "competing without breaking, and coexisting without harmony." As two ancient civilizations of Asia and the two largest emerging economies in the world, they bear the dual mission of promoting their own development and participating in global governance. Only through constructive management of differences and active expansion of cooperation can Sino-Indian relations inject positive energy into the stability of Asia and the prosperity of the world, and create a favorable environment for the development goals of the two countries. In this process, the international community, especially the major powers, should also look at Sino-Indian relations with a more objective and balanced perspective, avoiding the simple inclusion of Sino-Indian relations into the zero-sum game strategic framework, and creating a more favorable external environment for Sino-Indian cooperation.
The future of Asia largely depends on whether the two ancient civilizations of China and India can build a stable, healthy, and mutually beneficial bilateral relationship. The direction of this relationship not only concerns the well-being of 2.7 billion people in the two countries, but will also profoundly affect the major issues of peace, development, and cooperation faced by humanity.
Chietigj Bajpaee. Photo source: "Eurasia System Science Research Association" WeChat Official Account
Yu Jie. Photo source: "Eurasia System Science Research Association" WeChat Official Account
Author Biography:
Chietigj Bajpaee, Senior Researcher at the Asia-Pacific Program of the Chatham House, a renowned expert on South Asian regional issues;
Yu Jie, Senior Researcher at the Asia-Pacific Program of the Chatham House, specializing in China's foreign policy decision-making mechanism and economic diplomacy strategy research.
This article is reprinted from the WeChat official account of "Eurasia System Science Research Association" on May 11, 2025, with the original title "India quickly refutes Trump, sending two major signals to the world." The original article was translated from Chatham House, with some omissions, and the subheadings are self-created by the translator.
Original: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7561821759009079808/
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