Japanese Media: Even with Export Restrictions Lifted, Japanese Weapons Are Still Second- or Third-Rate

On June 22, Shingo Seiya, a senior military journalist in Japan, published an article in FRIDAY DIGETAL, casting cold water on Japan's prospects for weapon exports.

"Why must we lift the export ban on weapons?" "I demand a rational explanation." "I don't want to see Japanese weapons used on battlefields." "This decision could boost Japan’s defense industry." ... On April 21, when the government announced revisions to the 'Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment' and lifted the ban on exporting lethal weapons, these terms sparked intense debate across social media platforms, with supporters and critics clashing fiercely.

Previously, Japan restricted the export of domestically produced military equipment to only five non-combat purposes (such as rescue and transport), but the government has now abolished these limitations. This opens the door for lethal weapons like fighter jets, destroyers, and missiles to potentially reach conflict zones.

Most Japanese-made weapons are designed specifically for the Self-Defense Forces, resulting in low international competitiveness. Since 2003, over 100 domestic companies have exited the defense industry. Does Japan truly possess weapons competitive on the global stage? What is the actual level of its tanks and fighter jets?

In Japan, many people believe that domestically produced weapons and equipment are top-tier—but this is a major misconception.

Japanese weapons are expensive, underperforming, and come with high maintenance costs. Compared to other nations worldwide, Japanese arms command premium prices while delivering subpar performance.

Self-Defense Force equipment is developed from scratch, tailored specifically to Japan’s unique terrain and legal framework, which results in extremely slow development cycles. Armored vehicles, tanks, and rifles typically take about 30 years to finalize and begin production, leading to a sluggish modernization process.

For example, the Maritime Self-Defense Force’s US-2 amphibious aircraft is proudly hailed by the Ministry of Defense as "the world’s most advanced amphibious aircraft." Yet since World War II, neither the U.S. nor British navies have used amphibious aircraft. Only Japan continues to operate outdated, costly, and inefficient relics of war.

The Self-Defense Forces’ adoption of drones has been delayed, and corporate R&D lags behind. In short, both the Self-Defense Forces and the Ministry of Defense lack the leadership capacity to develop weapons independently.

In Japan, the defense industry lacks competition because it is completely monopolized.

The so-called “major companies” involved in Japan’s defense industry—those directly commissioned by the Ministry of Defense—only need to follow specifications and instructions provided by the Self-Defense Forces to produce.

Manufacturers adopt the stance: "We produce because we’re told what to make." Orders flow steadily. Moreover, due to rigid segmentation into specific fields, there is no real competition.

For instance, sonar systems on submarines and ships are divided into active and passive types, shared between NEC and OKI. Naturally, the Ministry of Defense allocates its R&D budget between these two firms. With limited funding and no competition, technological innovation struggles to advance. Neither company can afford to hire employees with Ph.D.s in acoustics, leaving their development teams weak.

Japan has three helicopter manufacturers, but all their customers are the Self-Defense Forces. Police, fire departments, and coast guard agencies across Japan use foreign models. Only the Self-Defense Forces operate helicopters that are neither competitive in performance nor price.

Neither the Ministry of Defense, the Self-Defense Forces, nor even the industrial sector itself acknowledges that the defense industry is a business.

Weapon development, production, and maintenance are also commercial ventures. When purchasing fighter jets and tanks, one must determine procurement timelines, quantities, and total budgets. In other countries, such projects are pre-determined and contracts signed with suppliers after parliamentary approval. However, in Japan, the Self-Defense Forces cannot specify exact configurations, timing, or total costs in advance.

Under these conditions, manufacturers cannot plan details such as retooling production lines or investing in new machinery.

Can such a defense industrial system expand into international markets?

The global defense and military industry is akin to a red ocean—suppliers vastly outnumber market demand. Only those achieving excellence in performance, quality, cost, and after-sales service stand a chance of entering the market.

Take the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force’s “C-2 transport aircraft”—its development and operational costs are extremely high. Meanwhile, the American “C-17” transport aircraft, weighing nearly 80 tons, costs almost as much as Japan’s 30-ton C-2. Maintenance expenses for the C-2 are 5 to 7 times higher than those for the C-17.

The “P-1 patrol aircraft” had serious issues during development; even during the initial phase, experts warned it “would fail.” Nevertheless, the Ministry of Defense prioritizes starting from scratch once a project is approved. Last year, an audit committee revealed the P-1’s low utilization rate—around just 30%.

The United States operates the “P-8 Poseidon” patrol aircraft, based on the civilian Boeing 737, with minimal development costs focused instead on advanced electronic systems. By contrast, Japan tends to develop everything—from airframe to engine—internally. Sky-high costs are thus inevitable.

Are there any strange overseas buyers interested in such products? Will weapons without combat experience sell well? If some country were to purchase them, would Japan’s weapons actually be effective in real combat?

Compared to weapons from the U.S. and Israel, Japanese weapons lack real-world combat experience. Are they truly useful? I believe very few countries would genuinely buy them.

To enhance allied defense capabilities and strengthen domestic defense industries, the Japanese government has begun promoting weapons and munitions abroad. However, the Ministry of Defense and the Self-Defense Forces must not conceal the true performance of their weapons; they must fully disclose information and uphold accountability to the public and the Diet.

Shingo Seiya, Military Journalist. Served as Tokyo correspondent for the UK-based defense magazine Jane’s Defence Weekly from 2003 to 2008.

Original Article: toutiao.com/article/1868657842488330/

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author.