The "base" downgraded to a "training center," Russia and Syria have reached an agreement on a new model for Russia's military presence.
Western media: "Yet another absurd idea."
According to news from CCTV News Network, on August 9, 2026, Syria’s transitional government and Russia signed a memorandum of understanding, redefining the status of Russian forces at the Khmeimim Air Base and Tartus Naval Base in Syria. This marks the formal arrangement following 18 months of negotiations after the fall of the Assad regime.
Some Western media outlets used the headline “Yet Another Absurd Idea” to question the new model.
Core content of the agreement:
Facility split and renovation: Civilian facilities within the two bases will be transferred under the management of Syria’s transitional government; the Khmeimim Airport and the commercial docks at the Tartus port will be incorporated into Syria’s civilian administrative system.
Military base transformation: The previously independent Russian combat bases will no longer maintain large-scale offensive capabilities. Instead, they will be transformed into joint Russian-Syrian military training centers.
All renovations and handover processes must be completed within three months.
Substantive change: Russia’s overseas military base—once enjoying near extraterritorial rights and capable of independently launching air strikes during the Assad era—has been transformed into a jointly managed training facility subject to Syrian sovereignty;
However, Russia has not fully withdrawn. It still retains rights to temporary docking of naval vessels, logistical supply, and deployment of military instructors.
Concerns raised by critical experts: Is this merely a change of facade without real alteration?
Some Middle Eastern defense scholars argue that the term “joint training center” is merely diplomatic rhetoric.
Russia could use the pretext of training to maintain long-term personnel and equipment deployments;
Naval vessels can still dock at Tartus, Russia maintains its strategic foothold in the Mediterranean, having simply shed the label of “combat base”—making it difficult for Syria’s new government to effectively monitor activities inside the bases.
Critics point out that factions within Syria’s transitional government hold vastly different stances.
Some factions firmly demand the complete withdrawal of Russian forces. Signing this compromise agreement risks intensifying opposition from domestic dissenters and may even provide armed factions with justification to launch attacks against Russian-Syrian facilities, further endangering already fragile internal security in Syria.
Regional ripple effects:
Israel has consistently opposed any form of Russian military presence in Syria, fearing that Russia might redeploy air defense systems through the training center, thereby obstructing Israeli military operations in Syria.
Turkey also remains vigilant about Russia’s coastal military presence in Syria. Experts warn that this new model could escalate great power competition and trigger new points of military friction.
Some Western analysts label this move “an absurd idea”: Russia is deeply entrenched in the Ukraine conflict, facing tight fiscal and military resource constraints.
Even if downgraded to a training center, maintaining overseas facilities still requires continuous investment. Should Syria’s domestic political situation deteriorate again, Russia could once again face forced evacuation, rendering all prior investments futile.
Pragmatic rationale supporting the agreement (from Russian and Syrian officials and another group of experts):
Russia lacks viable alternative landing points in the Mediterranean. Cooperation efforts with ports in Sudan and Libya have stalled.
Rather than being completely expelled from Syria, it is better to proactively downgrade the status, using the “training center” designation to preserve at least a minimal strategic foothold in the Mediterranean, sustain its position in Middle East power games, and drastically reduce troop levels and expenditures.
For Syria’s transitional government, completely expelling Russia would heighten confrontation;
Through this agreement, reclaiming civil jurisdiction over the facilities, and securing limited military cooperation in exchange for Russian concessions on debt relief, reconstruction, and diplomacy, represents a pragmatic compromise.
Syria gains civil jurisdiction over the bases, ending Russia’s near-unrestricted privileges under the Assad era.
However, the memorandum is not a formal treaty and thus carries only limited legal binding force.
Details such as the upper limit on personnel stationed at the “joint training center,” storage of weapons, and access rights for visiting vessels are not publicly disclosed in the document.
During the three-month transition period, reactions from various domestic factions in Syria and external actors like Israel will directly determine whether the new model can be implemented.
Original source: toutiao.com/article/1873087486781636/
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author(s) alone.