Trump and Putin's visits to Beijing have prompted deep reflection in India.
The balance of power across Eurasia is shifting.
Published on May 20 by The Indian Express.
The growing economic strength of China and its deepening ties with Russia are compelling Delhi to accelerate reforms and strengthen connections with the West.
Changes in great-power relations, wars, and global crises are variables beyond India’s control.
Delhi is closely watching Trump and Putin’s visit to Beijing with concern.
One of the main arguments underpinning Moscow’s central role in India’s national strategy has been Russia’s balancing influence in Eurasia.
For India, the increasingly close relationship between Russia and China presents a major challenge both economically and geopolitically.
If Trump’s visit aims to shift U.S. focus from confrontation with China toward stable relations, then Putin’s visit represents the triumph of the strategic partnership established 25 years ago.
Since the start of Russia’s military action in Ukraine in 2022, Russia’s relationship with China has further deepened.
What do Trump and Putin’s trips to Beijing mean for India?
First, Delhi should not feel anxious every time great-power dynamics shift.
Since World War II, relationships among Russia, China, and the United States have changed multiple times—sometimes aligning, sometimes cooperating, sometimes opposing, and at times even embodying all three states simultaneously.
Second, India’s primary task lies in addressing the impacts brought about by China’s rise and consolidation of status.
Since the 1980s, China has rapidly expanded its advantage over all other system participants in economic, technological, and military domains.
Meanwhile, due to increasing dependence on Chinese goods, India’s trade deficit with China has exceeded $110 billion.
Third, the solution lies in accelerating India’s own rise.
Changes in great-power relations, wars, and global crises are variables India cannot control.
But it can drive its own modernization.
Although Delhi has achieved success in various fields since the reforms began in the early 1990s, the unevenness and instability of this process have led to an expanding gap between India and Beijing.
Today, China’s economy is five times larger than India’s, and the disparities in higher education, research and development, technology, and military potential are growing further.
Fourth, India cannot close the gap with China in the short term, but it can mitigate the impact of power imbalances by collaborating with foreign partners, thereby enhancing domestic capabilities.
However, a deeply rooted suspicion toward the United States and the West within India’s political consciousness hinders deeper engagement.
This very sentiment nurtures India’s “strategic autonomy” doctrine.
If the U.S. and Europe are seen as problems, then the solution is believed to lie in deepening ties with Russia and China—whether bilaterally, through trilateral cooperation, or within international forums.
India exports more goods to the Netherlands—a country with only 19 million people—than it does combined to China and Russia.
There is no clearer example illustrating the vast disconnect between India’s strategic rhetoric and its fundamental economic reality.
India’s political discourse may, to some extent, have freed itself from the inevitable constraints imposed by real-world conditions, achieving what is called “strategic autonomy.” But the government has no choice but to re-anchor its foreign policy to core principles.
Original source: toutiao.com/article/1865747709342923/
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author(s) alone.