[By Guancha Net columnist Feng Qian]
There are many highlights in the recent US-India relations. While the two countries were just "intimately interacting", they soon had a "mutual confrontation". India denied having prior communication with the US before the "Vermilion" military operation and said that the recent ceasefire was not related to the US, while also considering retaliatory tariff countermeasures, then turned around to say they might consider zero tariffs. On the other hand, the US played a balancing act between India and Pakistan while pressuring India to open its market, and even complained about how Apple could enter the Indian market.
What exactly is going on between these two countries that have long boasted of being a "strategic partnership"? Has the US-India relationship reached a turning point?
Military Operations: Where Is the "Strategic Trust" Between India and the US?
At dawn on May 7th, India carried out the "Vermilion Action", launching an air strike on targets within Pakistani territory. The strike extended deep into Pakistan's interior, even affecting the Pakistani Army headquarters in Rawalpindi. The conflict's plot was a familiar recipe in South Asia: India once again accused Pakistan of supporting terrorism and punished it militarily. Pakistan refuted this and quickly retaliated after the Indian airstrike, severely punishing the invading Indian forces.
During this time, some details involving US-India relations deserve attention and are intriguing.
Detail One: After initiating the military operation, New Delhi deliberately emphasized that "this action was not coordinated with the US beforehand." Although this move may have been due to technical considerations for operational secrecy, which can be understood from a military perspective, strategically speaking, the US likely had some thoughts. After all, the US has always been quite concerned during previous India-Pakistan conflicts and does not want these two nuclear-armed countries to engage in a large-scale conflict, thus triggering a South Asian nuclear crisis.
If such important matters are not communicated beforehand, what is the true value of the so-called strategic partnership between India and the US? It is not difficult to see that, on one hand, this indicates that India's "trust" in the US has limits, and there is concern about the US leaking information prematurely. On the other hand, India, which is adept at playing balancing acts among major powers, cannot appear too close to the US. Deliberately maintaining autonomy in military actions helps shape the image of an "independent great power."
Detail Two: On the 9th, Vice President Pence stated in an interview that the US attitude was to "hope for a quick de-escalation of the situation" and "not to get involved in something fundamentally unrelated to us." Pence's remarks excluded the possibility of Washington intervening in the India-Pakistan conflict and somewhat reflected the current administration's "America First" philosophy in foreign affairs.
For India, which considers itself far superior in military and national strength compared to Pakistan, support from the US would be "icing on the cake," but non-intervention does not affect the overall situation. Moreover, regarding the Kashmir issue, New Delhi has historically rejected any intervention by major powers.
Detail Three: On the 11th, Trump unexpectedly announced the continuation of the ceasefire before the official statements from both India and Pakistan, claiming that he had induced both sides through economic issues, and credited the ceasefire to his diplomatic efforts. On the 12th, the Indian Foreign Ministry rebutted, stating that the agreement to cease all military activities was directly reached with Pakistan. In the series of high-level contacts before the ceasefire between India and Pakistan, India never discussed trade issues with the US, indirectly denying any role played by the US. Also on the 12th, Modi made his first public speech after the conflict, without mentioning the US at all.
Was it Trump's "embellishment" or Modi's deliberate omission? Whose version is more reliable? People will have their own opinions. To some extent, this actually doesn't matter much; what is important is that it has increased skepticism about the US-India relationship within India and discontent towards Trump. In their view, Trump's statement could lead Indian citizens to misunderstand that India prematurely stopped its confrontation with a weaker opponent (Pakistan) under external pressure. Once this public opinion takes hold, Modi will find himself in an unfavorable position.
The views of former Indian Ambassador to China and the US, Raoqi, are relatively representative. She believes that in recent years, India has adjusted its foreign policy, positioning itself as a key partner of the US in the region, and increasingly willing to play the role of balancing China, but now India and Pakistan "have been forcibly linked together again."
Tariff Friction: Is India "Hardening" Against the US?
If India's "firmness" in military matters is a stance, then its "counterattack" in the trade sector is action.
According to Indian media reports, on May 13th, the Indian government informed the WTO that it would impose retaliatory tariffs on some US products. In the document submitted to the WTO, India believed that "the US' imposition of a 25% import tariff on steel and aluminum products since March has seriously affected Indian products exported to the US worth approximately $7.6 billion." Therefore, according to WTO rules, India, as a response, has the right to suspend certain tariff concession obligations and impose retaliatory tariffs on some goods imported from the US.
So far, India has not disclosed the specific list of retaliatory tariffs, only stating that if the US refuses negotiations and maintains current tariffs, the retaliatory tariffs will come into effect earliest in June.
It is worth noting that shortly after Trump announced the "reciprocal tariff" policy in early April, India immediately showed goodwill towards the US, promising to reduce tariffs on US goods, increasing imports of US products such as energy and arms, to facilitate the smooth negotiation of a bilateral trade agreement. No corresponding countermeasures were taken at that time.
The reason is simple: India believed that the US imposed lower tariffs on India than on other countries, which was beneficial to India. India even had the idea of seizing the share of ready-made garment exports to the US from Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, expanding its own exports to the US. Moreover, against the backdrop of rising Sino-US tariff wars, this was no less seen by New Delhi as a "spring" for manufacturing development.
Why did India's stance turn hard?
Compared with before, India's current shift in attitude is not driven by a single factor but is the result of multiple factors working together: domestic economic pressure, deadlock in US-India negotiations, and changes in Sino-US relations. This is a strategy adjustment under multiple pressures.
Firstly, the actual impact of US tariff policies. From India's perspective, although it had previously voluntarily reduced tariffs on American products like Harley-Davidson motorcycles and bourbon whiskey, Trump did not offer substantive concessions. Instead, on March 12th, Trump announced a 25% tariff on all steel and aluminum products, and on May 5th, signed an executive order planning to impose tariffs on imported drugs to promote the return of domestic pharmaceutical manufacturing.
As the world's largest exporter of generic drugs, India fears that the US may use tariff negotiations to pressure it into compromising on issues like compulsory licensing of drug patents, directly threatening the industrial foundation of India's "world pharmacy." This puts dual pressure on India by weakening its price competitiveness and squeezing the market share of pharmaceutical companies. India's compromises failed to meet expectations, and economic pressure forced New Delhi to adopt a tougher countermeasure.
Secondly, the possibility of a deadlock in bilateral negotiations. According to media reports, in the first phase of negotiations, India had already proposed reducing 60% of its tariffs on the US to zero and providing preferential access for nearly 90% of goods India imports from the US, but breakthroughs have yet to be achieved.
In addition, the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) listed India in the "priority watch list" following China and the EU in its "2025 National Trade Evaluation Report" released in late March, criticizing India's trade policies for harming US interests. These include high tariffs and non-tariff barriers, with India imposing high tariffs and import restrictions on agricultural products, automobiles, and electronics; in service trade, restricting foreign ownership in insurance, retail, and legal services; and in digital taxes, levying digital service taxes on multinational technology companies.
Thirdly, rigid constraints of domestic politics and economy. With the approach of important local elections in 2024, protecting domestic employment has become politically correct. Continuing to make concessions to the US might provoke voter backlash, which is not conducive to the BJP's election prospects. A tough stance on tariff policies can both highlight the "patriot" image and respond to the strong demands of domestic industries and nationalist sentiment.
Fourthly, the stimulus from the progress in Sino-US tariff negotiations. Although the "China factor" did not directly prompt India to take a tough stance against the US, the de-escalation of Sino-US tariffs and regional supply chain competition provided an external environment for India to adjust its strategy. After the Geneva talks between China and the US, the US significantly reduced tariffs on Chinese goods, which was considered by India as a signal of changes in the international geopolitical landscape.
Some Indian think tanks believe that the easing of Sino-US relations may weaken the US focus on pressuring India, while simultaneously sending a signal that "economic strength determines negotiation positions," objectively prompting India to more firmly safeguard its own interests. Meanwhile, after the easing of Sino-US tariffs, India also wants to use this move to send signals of "independent diplomacy," seeking to expand its space in regional economic cooperation.
Can Modi's "bear hug diplomacy" work against the unpredictable Trump?
US-India Negotiations Are Hotly Underway
The ongoing US-India trade negotiations continue. Under Trump's leadership, the US prides itself on being a "dealmaker," while India is known as one of the toughest negotiators internationally. It can be imagined that the two sides will have many verbal spars over tariffs and market access.
These days, to seek the most favorable trading results, both sides are releasing different messages. On May 15th, Trump stated in Doha that India had agreed not to impose any tariffs on US goods. That day, Trump said during a meeting with business executives in Doha: "It's very difficult to sell products in India, but they proposed an agreement to us, basically willing to charge us no tariffs at all."
Trump did not reveal more details and did not indicate whether the US would reduce tariffs on India or implement zero tariffs. However, on the same day, India's External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar quickly refuted Trump's claim that India had proposed a "basically zero-tariff" trade agreement, emphasizing that the trade negotiations between India and the US were still ongoing and no final agreement had been reached. Jaishankar pointed out that any trade agreement must be mutually beneficial.
Currently, the friction between the US and India remains largely tactical bargaining. In addressing numerous strategic goals such as China, the US and India still maintain a high degree of consensus and common interests. Specifically regarding the trade agreement, India will cautiously balance protecting its domestic industries, enhancing exports to the US, and integrating into global supply chains. The US will also consider India's special value in its "Indo-Pacific Strategy" and incorporate geopolitical factors into future agreements. Thus, this "transactional partnership" based on realpolitik will continue, influencing and shaping the security architecture of the "Indo-Pacific region."
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