Editor's Note: Europe is facing a major problem. Since Trump took office, his policies towards Europe and his stance on the Ukraine-Russia conflict have undergone a 180-degree turnaround. After being "disconnected" from the US, Europe is not only hyping up the "hero narrative" of "fighting Russia," but also announcing plans to "rearm Europe." The UK has announced that by 2027, its defense spending as a percentage of GDP will increase to 2.5%. The EU's "European Re-Arming" plan will mobilize 800 billion euros in four years, meaning military expenditure targets will rise from the current 2.18% to around 3.5%. Among these, Germany is the most eye-catching; the country has passed a bill abolishing the post-war limit on defense spending as a percentage of GDP, declaring that military spending could potentially grow to 3-3.5%. A military arms race in Europe is escalating.
Notably, another rapidly rising right-wing force in Europe is echoing Trump's MAGA movement: they oppose immigration, advocate for "Brexit," and sometimes appear more "pro-Russian" and "pro-China," seemingly leaving room for imagination in China's diplomacy.
How can we understand the current situation in Europe, and how should we assess the possibility of future Sino-European cooperation? Recently, Guancha Observer Network had a dialogue with Ingar Solty, senior researcher at the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation, who specializes in foreign affairs, peace, and security policy. Ingar Solty is a prolific author, including works such as "America Under Obama," "Standing on the Shoulders of Karl Marx," and the 36-volume "Marxism."
[The Rosa Luxemburg Foundation is a non-profit foundation based in Berlin, Germany, which leans toward the German Left Party and is named after one of the founders of the German Communist Party, Rosa Luxemburg. The Rosa Luxemburg Foundation is one of the largest socialist political research and education organizations in the world today.]
Ingar Solty (Ingar Solty) connects with the Guancha Observer Network
[Interview/Observer Network Gao Yanping]
Guancha Observer Network: You've just returned from China. Could you share with us your impressions of China from the perspective of a German leftist scholar?
Ingar Solty: Over the past 18 months, I have been to China four times. My first visit to China was at the invitation of the Center for Contemporary World Studies to participate in a seminar on "The Prospects of World Socialism under the Global Financial Crisis," which was already 12 years ago. Each time I see the tremendous changes happening in China, I am utterly amazed—knowing that this country changes so fast that those of us who are immersed in it may not even notice.
For example, common gasoline motorcycles are gradually being replaced by electric scooters, and such changes are truly impressive. The vitality displayed by Chinese society is remarkable. What impressed me most is China's astonishing progress in the electric vehicle revolution. This contrasts sharply with the frequent setbacks Western countries have faced in their electric vehicle revolutions over the past four or five years. This left me deeply shaken.
Moreover, the confidence of the Chinese people made a strong impression on me. For instance, during my visit to China in 2013, I was delighted to see that the Chinese were well-versed in knowledge about pension reforms (using the Danish model) or labor market reforms (using the Belgian model). Knowing that this is an ancient civilization with four to five thousand years of history, yet is well-acquainted with the details of social reforms in such small European countries, I gradually realized that this is closely related to the Chinese development-oriented perspective.
However, China is now more advanced than Europe and America in many aspects, which makes me genuinely admire their confidence. I also noticed that the Gini coefficient is declining, and wealth disparities are narrowing. China is becoming a more socially equitable nation and is steadily moving in this direction, which I highly commend.
Equally important, I personally experienced China's socialist ecological civilization construction practices in Qinghai. At the time, leaders from Fiji, Pakistan, Afghanistan, South Africa, Latin America, and other countries gathered together. We witnessed firsthand how China is exploring an alternative path of modern development for the Global South—especially in climate policy and green technology—providing the world with immense historical significance, the importance of which cannot be overstated.
Qinghai Ecological Civilization Construction Exhibition Work: "Rescue Tibetan Antelope" by Renzuo Dajie
Since 1949, China has undergone socialist revolution and learned lessons from the failure of Soviet-style socialist planned economy, attempting to utilize the market as a means of developing productivity while accepting the destructive effects brought by the market. This is a world-historical experiment that not only influences the course of world history but also differs from the path of modernization laid out by Western societies. According to Marxist theory, a country must go through the capitalist stage before embarking on the road to socialism. Therefore, I believe that China's socialist practice is of great significance in the context of world history.
Trump deliberately cultivated an image of himself as the representative of the "International Far Right of the West."
Guancha Observer Network: I saw that you once discussed fascism, Marxism, and populism with an author. In today's Western world, Trump's "MAGA" ideology not only has numerous followers in the United States but also has similar ideological forms in Europe, such as the Alternative for Germany (AfD), France's "National Front," and the Austrian government, which Western media call "far-right," all having significant public support. In your view, are they the same? How do you explain the popularity of this conservative trend in the West?
Ingar Solty: I believe that each country's ideology is undoubtedly unique. By that, I mean there are national differences and specific conditions, but fairly speaking, they are part of the same movement, the same ideology, and the result of contradictions and conflicts within Western capitalist societies. They recognize themselves as such.
Rise of the far-right in Europe: From left to right, Alice Wiedel, leader of the Alternative for Germany (AfD), Geert Wilders, leader of the Dutch Freedom Party, and Giorgia Meloni, Prime Minister of Italy
Currently, far-right forces in Western capitalist countries have formed a significant political climate: they are close to power in France, became the largest party in parliament in the Netherlands, achieved governance in Austria and Italy, and won re-election as president in the United States. This powerful trend indicates that there are deep structural causes within Western capitalist societies that provide fertile ground for the rise of far-right forces, ultimately leading to the emergence of these political powers. Overall, this movement exhibits characteristics of fascism or pre-fascist organizations in many ways, although there remain differences.
It should be noted that these political forces indeed contain elements of right-wing populism, nationalism, and conservatism. However, it is worth noting that their political platforms consciously attempt to break through traditional parliamentary frameworks, neither simple authoritarian rule nor rejection of universal suffrage. Despite this, their core demand is to significantly strengthen executive power.
From a historical perspective, despite differences, liberalism and fascism are essentially two forms of bourgeois rule under capitalism. There have been two arbitrary conclusions about the political state forms of capitalism: Lenin said that "democracy is the best child of capitalism," and the Frankfurt School claimed that "fascism is the ideal political form of late capitalism." History has proven that the capitalist system can coexist with authoritarian and fascist state forms, as well as with liberal systems.
Looking back at major crises throughout the history of capitalism: the long economic depression of the late 19th century, the Great Depression of 1929-1939, the Fordist crisis of the 1970s, and the current new financial capitalist crisis of neoliberalism, each crisis reshapes domestic production relations, reconstructs forms of national governance, and rewrites global order patterns. The liberal system concerns issues such as whether there is free trade or protectionism, etc.
When dealing with right-wing authoritarian or neo-fascist movements, I believe the key is to examine them functionally (rather than formally)—judging whether they serve the interests of the dominant capitalist factions or run counter to them. Additionally, we need to ask: Is authoritarianism or fascism, as Marx analyzed in "The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte," a product of class power balance? Or, as Nicos Poulantzas argued, on the contrary, due to the weakness of socialist forces unable to point out a path of equal internationalism to overcome the crisis, thus making it a product of capitalism's inability to sustain itself when faced with a crisis?
I believe Poulantzas' perspective aligns more closely with the current reality. The contradictions within contemporary Western capitalism have intensified to such an extent that far-right forces have seized the opportunity to rise and promote the slogan that "resources are no longer sufficient for everyone." We are forced to abandon human rights—whether it is the deprivation of Greek people in the Greek debt crisis, the rejection of Syrian refugees during the 2015 refugee crisis, or the neglect of底层 people. I believe this is the root cause of the rise of far-right movements: they always legitimize the deprivation of rights of other social groups, excluding specific groups from democratic participation and economic participation.
Through this analytical framework, we can clearly observe the behavioral logic of so-called "irregular far-right populist nationalists" after taking office. Examples such as Brexit, Trump's election, and the first participation of Austria's far-right party in the cabinet in 2017 confirm our judgment: these political forces have long been considered "functional dysfunctions" of the dominant Western capitalist class (i.e., transnational corporate groups), seemingly symptomatic responses to the outbreak of the new financial capitalist crisis.
They loudly oppose immigration but remain silent on the wars that create migration flows; they criticize immigration problems yet condone free trade policies that destroy small-scale self-sufficient farmers in Africa; they decry crime phenomena yet avoid addressing the growing wealth gap that exacerbates social inequality—the wealth gap in Latin America, for instance, leads to crime; they denounce urban-rural disparities yet uphold market mechanisms that maintain this division—such as well-functioning urban areas like London, Paris, and southern Germany, forming a stark contrast with rural areas that are in decline, where transportation is paralyzed, medical resources are scarce, property values are depreciating, and livelihoods are deteriorating.
All these phenomena indicate that far-right forces initially seem incompatible with the transnational capital system. For example, multinational companies like BMW, Bayer, or Daimler rely on the EU and the eurozone as vital stepping stones to enter the global market; the global NATO military alliance serves as a tool to safeguard global capital interests—particularly through maritime control. Therefore, if far-right forces wish to participate in governance, they must tacitly accept the core interests of transnational capital.
However, it is noteworthy that Western capitalism is showing signs of decline. Its advocated "economic nationalism"—including punitive tariffs, trade wars, and protectionism—has instead become a practical strategy to maintain the capitalist system. This transformation reveals that when neoliberal globalization encounters difficulties, far-right forces, by inciting xenophobia and policy shifts, objectively provide political cover for transnational capital to adjust its global layout.
French far-right party leader Le Pen (left) convicted of misusing funds sentenced to four years in prison, banned from holding public office for five years, with Trump and European far-right party leaders showing support
As I analyzed in my book "Trump's Victory?" (Trump’s Triumph?), the Trump administration attempted to transform the American national system into a totalitarian regime. However, the deeper historical dynamics and structural trends in this process are not directly related to Trump himself but rather rooted in the deep crisis of Western capitalism. It is worth noting that, based on my 2020 book "The Coming War with China" (The Coming War with China), which focuses on the high-tech competition between China and the U.S., I proposed that China demonstrated extraordinary competitiveness after emerging from the global financial crisis—its crisis response strategy implemented through large-scale state intervention has proven superior to Western austerity policies.
The "cost and internal devaluation of labor" strategy adopted by Western countries in 2008 essentially shifted the burden of the crisis onto the working masses. Therefore, my core conclusion in 2020 was that the West must make a choice: imitating China's state intervention model, establishing its own industrial policies, and supporting national leading enterprises might be the best option.
Viewed from the perspective of Bidenomics, policies such as the Inflation Reduction Act, the Chips and Science Act, and the EU Chips Act are essentially attempts to replicate China's industrial policy model—through tax incentives to attract semiconductor companies like Intel, Apple, and TSMC to invest.
It is noteworthy that these dynamic investment policies, along with Europe's green transition plans, have also encountered failures. The current Western move to impose punitive tariffs on China and shift towards an authoritarian state form is precisely the inevitable result of these policy failures. My core argument is that the West is passively evolving towards an authoritarian state form under the pressure of China's overwhelming competitiveness. Because they are gradually realizing that the liberal parliamentary framework shows functional obstacles in competing with China—it cannot effectively mobilize industrial policy resources and maintain technological innovation advantages.
The half-century of neoliberalism has severely weakened the West's ability to solve social problems, even within the narrow logic of capital accumulation and state management. Neoliberalism has plunged Western societies into dysfunctionality: economically, politically, and ideologically.
Now, the demand to maintain Western hegemony is driving the West to abandon the liberal parliamentary system and turn towards a strengthened administrative-dominant system. This does not mean the abolition of universal suffrage; elections will still take place, but parliaments will be marginalized. The path of governing by presidential orders in the United States, as well as Germany and the EU's militarization process (for example, the "internal era turning point" transformation I refer to in Germany)—all these herald a historical trend.
"The U.S. Will Not Distance Itself from Europe; the U.S. Still Needs Europe to Join the Anti-China Coalition"
Guancha Observer Network: I just read your article about the Ukrainian crisis, which is now the central issue in Europe and has sparked widespread discussion in China. You once pointed out that "liberal delusions" (Liberal delusion) cannot save Ukraine, but now the U.S. government is no longer firmly providing military aid to Ukraine, while Germany, Britain, France, and other European countries are still aiding Ukraine. So, what do you think is the key factor driving German policy to deviate from the U.S. line? Does this mark the emergence of EU strategic autonomy, or is there a fundamental crack in the transatlantic coordination mechanism? Since you assert that "liberal delusions" cannot save Ukraine, then what forces can support a substantive resolution to the Ukraine-Russia issue?
Ingar Solty: Great question. First, I'm not sure—or I think we shouldn't overemphasize the rift between Biden and Trump's policies on Ukraine. On the surface, Biden's policies seem completely opposite to Trump's new policies, given that the Biden administration previously criticized Trump's Ukraine policy. But regardless, I believe Trump is essentially reaping the fruits of what Biden has sown—he is harvesting the results that Biden has cultivated. In other words, the U.S. has already achieved most (if not all) of its goals in Ukraine without direct deployment of U.S. troops, and direct troop involvement would mean the outbreak of World War III and the advent of the nuclear age, which they are unwilling to risk.
The current situation can be summarized as follows: the war has essentially reached a stalemate. The conflict itself has not ended but has stagnated—not because Ukraine cannot obtain more weapons, but because its government lacks willing and capable volunteer soldiers, i.e., those who are willing and able to use weapons. Fundamentally, the Ukrainian working class is ending the war through resistance to conscription: hiding, rescuing comrades, shooting officers who forcibly conscript soldiers, and blowing up recruitment centers, among other actions. Now, the Ukrainian government is trying to find more volunteers through "economic conscription"—forcing people to join the military through economic means.
This is essentially luring poor young men aged 18 to 24 to join the military with the promise of playing Russian roulette—they may die, be disabled, suffer mental breakdowns, or earn in a year what would normally take ten years to earn. They can get interest-free mortgages, free university education, and so on. This is the only logic behind it. Clearly, these funds come from Europe, and the Ukrainian government does not have these resources. Therefore, the governments of various European countries are actually deliberately delaying the inevitable outcome: a losing war of attrition, an extremely bloody war, and they are trying to postpone the "moment of truth," which is to admit that the only way to achieve a ceasefire is through negotiations, followed by the signing of a peace treaty and the establishment of a new European common security architecture. Meanwhile, the U.S. has basically declared a ceasefire, and I guess this is more realistic; the U.S. also gains more from the war.
My point is that the Ukrainian government is being coerced by the West to privatize its national assets, just as the International Monetary Fund and Western structural adjustment programs have done consistently. This has been going on since the Biden administration began implementing these measures, and Trump is merely talking more openly about it—for example, which rare earths, lithium mines, other minerals, and land he wants to seize. And Europeans are being excluded, which is why they are trying to resist but lack actual capability.
Some people think the U.S. is distancing itself from Europe, and I don't quite agree with this statement. They say that Trump is like a "manager of decline," trying to implement a new version of the Monroe Doctrine—that is, the idea that the U.S. should reassert its dominance in the region as it did when it dominated the Western Hemisphere. For example, he forced the Panamanian government to expel Chinese investments and compelled Panama to withdraw from the "Belt and Road Initiative" it joined in 2017. There are also voices claiming that the U.S. is pursuing a "Kissinger-style realism," etc.
But I currently do not agree. I believe the U.S. still needs Europe to achieve what I call the 'transatlantic division of labor against China' strategy. Although Europe is now attempting to militarize and become a military force, European capital still needs the U.S. to protect its international interests. Therefore, I do not think there will be a long-term rift in transatlantic relations.
I believe we must not underestimate the fact that, as I mentioned last week on German National Radio, European society has become irrational due to this conflict, which is an extremely dangerous trend.
What I mean is that Europeans—and especially Germans—are being led to believe that they can stand on the right side of history for the first time, believing that their current opposition to Putin is akin to the fight against Hitler. They are being fed the idea that,凭借美国 and European economic cooperation, they can easily defeat Russia and pride themselves on being superior to Russia in terms of economy, politics, culture, and morality—the arrogance reminiscent of former Chancellor Helmut Schmidt's metaphor of referring to Russia as "Upper Volta with nuclear missiles" (Upper Volta being the old name for Burkina Faso).
This narrative style is like a Hollywood movie, portraying 'justice must triumph over evil,' as if Frodo's Shire is fighting against Mordor in The Lord of the Rings, Princess Leia combating the Death Star and Darth Vader in Star Wars, or Harry Potter battling Voldemort. In short, the entire war is packaged as an ultimate confrontation between good and evil.
The narrative of fear of Russia still dominates in Europe, with the Ukrainian conflict framed as a "confrontation between good and evil."
Now, European society must face the bitter reality of defeat, and this defeat profoundly affects the collective psychology—people begin to ask themselves, "We defeated Hitler, so why are we failing this time?"
Their perception is: "Putin equals Hitler; Trump equals Putin, and therefore also Hitler. Now Trump-Hitler and Musk-Hitler are trying to push German far-right forces to the pinnacle of power." This sense of helplessness and narcissistic humiliation (stemming from the failure of European policies toward Ukraine) has made European liberals, like traumatized victims, rationalize their aggressive behavior as self-defense.
This phenomenon provides an excuse for liberal radicalism, fostering retaliatory emotions, ultimately leading to uncontrolled expansion of military spending—all entirely deviating from rational logic. Meanwhile, this irrationalism is being exploited by the foreign policy elite consensus that has consistently advocated for increased military spending and imperialist adventures since the mid-2000s.
Europe Needs a Common Security Architecture, but Some Fear Mongers Call for Nuclear Weapons
Guancha Observer Network: From a Chinese outsider's perspective, Trump demanded that NATO member states increase their defense spending to 5% of GDP; Germany plans to increase its defense spending from the current 2% to 3.5%, and the UK also has similar plans to increase military spending. This trend of争相 increasing military spending will lead to an arms race in Europe? And we know that Germany, once the economic pillar of Europe, is clearly experiencing a recession. How can Germany balance defense spending and economic development?
Ingar Solty: Good question. On February 27, 2022—just three days after the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war—the German government (or the German chancellor) announced a special military fund worth tens of billions of euros without consulting parliament, discussing it internally with the ruling party, or engaging in debates with German society (unions, universities, civil society groups, etc.). At the time, I was serving as an advisor to the German Federal Parliament, and I opposed the increase in military spending.
I clearly stated at the time that this military spending was unnecessary and would trigger an arms race, exacerbating insecurity on the European continent—even without U.S. support. The prevailing view at the time was: If Trump were elected president and withdrew NATO's Article 5 commitment (collective defense), were we going to sit idly by and let Russia "devour" Europe? This has been the mainstream narrative in Germany since 2022 and today.
The German Foreign Minister once claimed during the 2025 election campaign: "Poland will be the next target, then Brandenburg in Germany." They even abandoned the argument that "Russia might attack Europe or NATO Baltic members." However, even without U.S. support, NATO member states in Europe have twice the military advantage in conventional weapon systems: the total number of active-duty personnel in Europe is 1.9 million, while Russia has only 900,000. Moreover, these Russian forces are spread across the largest landmass in the world, Eurasia.
The core logic of irrationalism in the political and media spheres lies in constructing Russia as a fascist state and thereby determining that it intends to devour Europe. They focus on rhetoric rather than actions—equating Russia's narratives targeting its own population (such as nationalist propaganda) with real threats.
For example, they claim that Russia intends to exterminate Ukraine and conquer the entire country, absorbing it into the Russian empire—but no one would be insane enough to attempt to occupy a country with an area of 2.3 million square miles, a population of 44 million, and an army of 160,000 to 190,000 soldiers. If we compare this to Germany's invasion of Poland in 1939 or Germany's offensive against the Soviet Union in 1941, when 3.5 million soldiers were deployed, they still became embroiled in bloody guerrilla warfare. Russia's current military strategy simply cannot support the speculation of an impending assault on Europe. Even if there is a risk of attack, Europe is far from defenseless.
This view aligns with the criticism I heard last year at the "Wanshou International Security Seminar" in Beijing—representatives from global Southern multipolar countries pointed out that Europe's pursuit of absolute security at the expense of others' security not only fails to make Europe safer but also increases insecurity for the Global South and European countries alike. The true solution should be to advocate for common security (common security), rather than achieving special security (particular security) or absolute security through harming others' interests.
We need to build a European common security architecture that encompasses the security concerns of all relevant nations. This architecture must include the demands of Western European countries that do not want to be attacked by nuclear missiles, incorporate the historical memories of Eastern European countries that have had complex entanglements with Russia for three hundred years, and—despite controversy—also include Russia itself, as it was invaded by Germany during the October Revolution, when the clear intention was to annihilate 30 to 50 million people and enslave all of Eastern Europe. These security concerns should be addressed through a common security architecture centered on arms control, with the goal of building structural conditions where mutual attacks are impossible through arms control and eventual disarmament.
In the field of arms control, we see a series of important treaties being abolished one by one: The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) expired in 2019, the U.S. withdrew from the Open Skies Treaty in October 2020, Russia followed suit in 2021, and the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) is set to expire on February 5 next year.
To this, some people's response is to call for Germany to possess nuclear weapons—not only from political parties across the spectrum (from conservatives to liberals), but even including some leftists.
Germany votes to increase military spending BBC Chinese
For example, Catharina Barley, the chief candidate of the Social Democratic Party in the European Parliament, has publicly supported this position; Fischer, the former Foreign Minister of the Green Party, agrees as well; Herfried Münkler, a political scientist at Free University of Berlin—a scholar who has provided policy advice to several German federal governments—also supports this proposal. However, such policies will not enhance European security but will significantly increase the risk of actual use of nuclear weapons, ultimately potentially leading to catastrophic consequences of mutual destruction in Europe.
Are Europe's Far-Right Forces Truly Friendly to China? Caution is Advised
Guancha Observer Network: Yes, from a Chinese perspective, World War I broke out in Europe, and World War II was mainly fought in Europe. From the perspective of European countries increasing their military budgets, Europe is now on the brink of World War III, and more countries may be involved, which is worrying. Let's look at the recently concluded German general election. Why did Schäfer win instead of the Alternative for Germany (AfD)? You know, AfD leader Alice Wiedel is quite popular in China, why did she lose? What kind of domestic interest conflicts does this reflect in Germany? Some people think that the election results in Germany indicate that the country is shifting from value-oriented diplomacy to economic pragmatism. What do you think?
Ingar Solty: I understand why some Chinese people might think that Alice Wiedel and her representative far-right forces appear more pragmatic and willing to cooperate. For example, during the nationwide televised debate after the election, when the leaders of various parties were on stage, the word "China" was mentioned only twice—Robert Habeck, the leader of the Green Party, particularly stood out with his hardline anti-China stance.
You obviously know the criticism directed at Annalena Baerbock, the German Foreign Minister from the same Green Party—her insulting remarks about China (especially her statement that "I didn't come to China to discuss history, but for the future") caused controversy. Notably, these parties mostly advocate "regime change" in China: for example, the President of the European Parliament, Gregory Watson, openly threatened to push for "regime change" in China; while Alice Wiedel, the first politician to mention China on election night, emphasized that "German economy needs to maintain good trade relations with China."
Nevertheless, we must be clear-headed: Germany's far-right forces are essentially part of the international far-right system. By that, I mean they will stab others in the back when it is convenient or advantageous to them. Furthermore, they are accelerating the "Atlanticization" process—following the political paths of Giorgia Meloni and Marine Le Pen. The reason they chose this path is obvious: Meloni successfully came to power in Italy, and Le Pen almost replicated this model in France (at the time of this writing, Le Pen was sentenced to four years in prison and banned from holding public office for five years for misusing funds). To seize and consolidate power, they gradually abandon their anti-establishment stance and adopt a highly pragmatic strategy. This evolution essentially means they are becoming appendages of pro-American imperialism.
You can observe their changing perspectives through Germany's elections: the Alternative for Germany (AfD) still advocates exiting the EU and abolishing the euro (even calling for a referendum on EU membership). However, Alice Wiedel now openly claims that "exiting the eurozone is no longer feasible"—she argues that this option only existed during the Eurozone debt crisis and is now "too late."
Elon Musk supports Germany's far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD)
Another example is Elon Musk's speech at the AfD's national congress in Germany, while Trump and Vice President Vance have been secretly supporting the party, attempting to help it win the German election. Against this backdrop, Wiedel advocates raising military spending far beyond the current level—you mentioned NATO setting the defense budget at 5% of GDP, and Wiedel is following Trump's negotiation strategy, proposing raising the defense budget ratio to 5%. This indicates that far-right forces may integrate into the chessboard of the "Transatlantic Division of Labor Against China" strategy. Wiedel's stance stems from the "magnetic effect" of the Trump administration on Europe's far-right forces.
Therefore, I am highly cautious about whether Wiedel or far-right forces are truly "friendly" to China—if they ever come to power, they are very likely to ally with the U.S. and even become an appendage force in the U.S.'s push for a "common new Cold War strategy."
Germany's Proud Export Model Has Completely Failed, and the AfD May Further Approach the Core of Power
Guancha Observer Network: Insightful, but why did she gain a significant increase in votes but ultimately lost the election? What are German voters thinking?
Ingar Solty: The current political climate in Germany can be summarized as populism running rampant, a populist moment—similar to the situation in the U.S. and Southern European countries during the Eurozone crisis, where trust in the government collapsed, and people believed it lacked governance capabilities and problem-solving efficiency. As mentioned earlier, democracy is facing erosion from both top-down and bottom-up directions.
A poll conducted before the 2024 November German election showed that when asked which party could effectively address deindustrialization, poverty, and climate change, 56% of respondents chose "none," reflecting complete disillusionment with traditional parties and liberal parliamentary governments. In this context, anti-establishment forces—especially the far-right—have seized the opportunity to rise. Although the AfD expanded its influence during the pandemic and the Ukrainian crisis and has become the second-largest party, its actual support base remains limited to the voter group that voted for it, with the majority of the population still opposing its rise to power. The key lies in whether the new government can effectively address challenges—if traditional parties continue to fail, the AfD may further approach the core of power.
I believe the root cause of the current situation lies in the material foundation of Germany's economic model—namely, the export-oriented "world champion" model. Germany has long relied on exporting cars, technology, and industrial products to the U.S. and China: on one hand, China's industrialization and successful poverty alleviation campaigns have turned 770 million people into the middle class, making China a huge consumer market for German products; on the other hand, the U.S. was also an important destination for German exports. However, this model has now come to an end.
First, the Biden administration in the U.S. has launched trade wars against both China and Germany simultaneously and pressured European companies to "decouple" from China through sanctions (for example, restricting the hiring of Chinese workers or limiting the use of products containing American technology). This politicization of supply chains has ironically backfired—Chinese products are gradually replacing German-made goods thanks to their innovative advantages (such as new energy vehicles and smart devices) and are even penetrating Russian supermarkets and markets in the Global South.
Second, sanctions have become boomerangs, not only failing to curb China's technological rise but also stimulating the upgrading of China's domestic industrial chain. Nowadays, Germany's proud export model has completely failed due to dual pressures from China and the U.S. and the trend of "de-Germanization" in the Global South.
Germany's society is currently facing a crisis of downward mobility