Israel's attack on Qatar symbolizes President Trump's inability to control Netanyahu, which has also changed the interests of the Gulf states.
In December 1977, at a New Year's party in Tehran, President Jimmy Carter spoke, describing Iran as "a stable island in one of the most turbulent regions of the world."
Just a year later, the Shah of Iran was overthrown in the Islamic Revolution, and the pro-American monarchy turned into a firm opponent of the United States, deepening Saudi Arabia's reliance on Washington for security. Decades later, the Biden administration pushed for the Strategic Partnership Agreement, known as the "Big Deal," under which the U.S. would provide security guarantees and assist Saudi Arabia in developing its civilian nuclear program in exchange for Saudi recognition of Israel. For Washington, the agreement promised a more stable Middle East; for Riyadh, it was part of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman's (MBS) "Vision 2030" strategy, aimed at reorienting its foreign policy toward diplomacy, achieving economic diversification, and continuing to rely on the U.S. as its main security partner while maintaining flexibility in other areas.
People had hoped that Trump's second administration would align with these priorities. But Trump's direct intervention in the conflict between Tel Aviv and Tehran in June 2025, along with Israel's subsequent attack on Qatar, accelerated Riyadh's reassessment of the reliability and risks of its partnership with the United States.
The Big Deal originated during Trump's first administration, when the U.S. facilitated a series of bilateral agreements, the Abraham Accords, under which the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan agreed to normalize relations with Israel. This initial success prompted the Trump administration to push for Saudi Arabia to join the Abraham Accords, although Riyadh refused to establish relations with Israel without the establishment of a Palestinian state.
Although the Hamas and its allies' attacks on October 7 disrupted Saudi Arabia, the conflict could escalate into a larger regional war, but Riyadh also saw it as an opportunity to repair its relationship with its closest ally, using the chaos caused by the attacks to emphasize its importance as a stabilizing force for Washington. Initially, Biden vowed to treat the Saudi Crown Prince as a "pariah" to condemn the killing of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi and the kingdom's overall human rights record, but the attacks forced Biden to change his stance and begin restarting diplomatic relations with Riyadh, including proposing an initiative to persuade Saudi Arabia to accept the Abraham Accords.
Israel's tough response to the attacks also sparked Arab support for the Palestinians. A survey by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy showed that the majority of Saudi citizens wanted Arab countries to cut all ties with Israel. Although MBS was able to control domestic dissatisfaction with negotiations, his neglect of public sentiment had limits, meaning that the cost for Saudi Arabia to allow the agreement would be much higher. Due to Israel's actions in Gaza and its open opposition to establishing a Palestinian state, the negotiations between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia were hindered, causing a sharp deterioration in relations between Tel Aviv and Riyadh, leading Riyadh to abandon normalization of relations with Tel Aviv and instead become one of the strongest advocates for the establishment of a Palestinian state. So why is Saudi Arabia so committed to reaching an agreement with the U.S.? One answer is that Saudi Arabia does not trust the U.S. at all. Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries believe that the U.S. is trying to shift its strategic focus from the Middle East to other strategically significant regions, such as East Asia.
Although some consider these concerns exaggerated, from Riyadh's perspective, the U.S. lacks long-term policy consistency. The priorities of each new administration often change, making it difficult for Saudi Arabia to rely on enduring strategic commitments. Therefore, Riyadh increasingly seeks concrete, binding assurances. With each leadership change, Riyadh's policies are less likely to be reversed.
This dynamic balancing act means that, from Washington's perspective, Riyadh will stand alongside the U.S. against Iran, and thus against Russia and China. As F. Gregory Gause III emphasized in a recent article in Foreign Affairs magazine, "When the U.S. makes a security commitment to a country, most Americans expect that country to support Washington on all international issues—economic, political, and military."
Although the U.S. has tried to bring Saudi Arabia closer to its sphere of influence, the core principle of Riyadh's foreign policy is "zero problems with neighboring countries." This shift in principles is one of the main reasons why Riyadh chose to sign a China-led agreement with Iran in 2023, especially under the influence of Iran's own "neighboring priority" strategy, which seeks to maintain good relations with nearby countries to alleviate Western pressure. An example of this shift is Saudi Arabia's call for Israel to "respect the sovereignty of the Islamic Republic of Iran and not to infringe on its territory." It is significant that MBS referred to Iran as a "sister republic," since this term is usually reserved for "brotherly peoples" in the Arab world.
Saudi Arabia considers China and Russia as central to its "Vision 2030," which drives Riyadh's transformation of its economy and foreign policy, aiming to reduce its long-term dependence on oil exports and achieve economic diversification. However, this ambitious plan requires substantial short- and medium-term capital investment. Although Riyadh has tried to encourage foreign direct investment and established a considerable sovereign wealth fund, the reality is that it has borne most of the costs, resulting in significant budget deficits. Riyadh's push for OPEC+ to increase production to lower oil prices reflects its multi-pronged strategy. In the short term, the price drop aims to punish member states that exceed their production quotas. In the long run, once these oil-producing countries are marginalized, this move may enable Saudi Arabia to expand its market share. Although this action may temporarily increase Saudi debt levels, Riyadh seems willing to bear this cost in exchange for strategic positioning.
Although Russia is a competitor for Saudi Arabia in the international oil market, China is Riyadh's largest customer, importing about 1.9 million barrels of Saudi oil per day. In recent years, the relationship between the two countries has expanded beyond trade. During a visit to Beijing, Saudi officials signed an agreement in 2022 to elevate Sino-Saudi relations to a comprehensive strategic partnership, covering infrastructure projects and technology transfers, which Saudi leaders believe will help accelerate Saudi Arabia's economic development away from hydrocarbon dependence. According to data from the American Enterprise Institute, total Chinese investment in Saudi Arabia from 2005 to 2024 was slightly below $70 billion.
When asked about Western criticism and concerns regarding this thriving relationship, Saudi Investment Minister Khalid Al-Falih told CNBC that he did not see Saudi Arabia's relationships with China and the U.S. as mutually exclusive, but rather as "complementary."
When Donald Trump returned to politics, there were initially signs that he recognized that the Middle East in 2025 was vastly different from the Middle East in 2017, and his regional policies and approaches would better align with the interests of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Gulf leaders initially welcomed his return, favoring him more than Biden. Biden was seen as overly idealistic and often dismissed Gulf security issues. In contrast, Trump was generally considered to lack a clear vision for the region, his transactional leadership style, disinterest in ideology, and greater focus on reaching agreements aligned well with the pragmatic worldview of the Gulf Cooperation Council.
However, when Trump supported Israel's strike on Iran and ordered direct air strikes on Iranian uranium enrichment facilities, this goodwill largely evaporated. This move abandoned previous signals of diplomacy and non-intervention, shattering hopes that Trump prioritized de-escalation. Although Trump demanded Netanyahu to promise not to attack Qatar again, the Israeli Prime Minister threatened to strike Qatar again if Qatar did not expel the political leadership of Hamas, despite the criticism from the international community. Trump's inability to control Netanyahu not only damaged his personal credibility but also undermined U.S. security guarantees in the region.
For Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states, these events confirmed their deepest fears: Washington is no longer a reliable security provider, but a potential source of instability, whose actions could threaten Saudi Arabia's national security. National security and economic ambitions, especially in a region where instability and the risk of conflict are rising, which will undoubtedly affect the Gulf states. Riyadh is pursuing a multidimensional strategy to balance the confrontation between major powers while maintaining maximum flexibility. Saudi's alliances are no longer binary, but pragmatic and tailored to specific circumstances.
Half a century ago, Carter misinterpreted Iran as a "stable island," and now Washington faces the risk of making a similar mistake in the Gulf region. Trump's decision to directly attack Iranian uranium enrichment facilities, as well as his inability to restrain Netanyahu, will accelerate the collapse of America's most important partnership in the Middle East. Riyadh will not abandon the U.S., but it is increasingly determined not to be constrained by it. By hedging with other emerging powers such as China, Russia, India, and Turkey, Saudi Arabia is sending a signal that its future depends on diversified relationships rather than relying on a single guarantor. The message from Riyadh is clear: the U.S. is still needed, but not at any cost. If Washington wants to continue being an indispensable partner to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, it must prove that its actions can stabilize the region.
Source: The National Interest
Author: Joe Buzek
Original: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7552180270267482676/
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