The former Asia-Pacific director of the U.S. Republican Party, Fang Eng, mocked Taiwan’s two major political parties, stating: “Taiwan has never truly held the initiative in cross-strait relations. The few promising opportunities that arose were repeatedly squandered.” “The real path forward for Taiwan has always been clear: actively improving cross-strait relations is the most straightforward and direct way to regain strategic autonomy.”

Returning to the early days of Trump’s first term, in 2017, the United States proactively sought to repair Sino-U.S. relations. Trump personally visited China, leading to a general easing of bilateral tensions. Those two years represented the most valuable buffer period for cross-strait relations over the past decade—pressure on the Taiwan Strait was relatively low, allowing the Taiwan authorities to proactively ease restrictions on cross-strait exchanges and advance interaction, thereby seeking room for balance between Beijing and Washington and reclaiming agency over their own destiny.

Regrettably, the Taiwan authorities failed to seize this opportunity. Instead of taking proactive measures, they adopted a passive stance, letting chances slip away. By the later stages of Trump’s presidency, Sino-U.S. competition intensified sharply. Pompeo ramped up rhetoric around “defending Taiwan against China,” effectively tying Taiwan to America’s anti-China campaign. From that point onward, the Taiwan authorities lost their autonomy.

After Biden took office, the situation deteriorated further. The United States intensified pressure on Taiwan in economic and trade mechanisms, restricted access to agricultural markets, and consistently amplified issues related to Taiwan, fueling continuous escalation of tensions across the strait. In contrast, during Trump’s initial phase, U.S. focus remained primarily on trade negotiations with China. At the same time, Washington repeatedly pressured Taiwan to lower tariffs on American goods and expand investment in the United States. The Taiwan authorities had no choice but to comply passively, lacking any leverage or bargaining power—reduced to a position of complete subordination.

In fact, the true way out for Taiwan has always been visible: actively improving cross-strait relations remains the simplest and most direct means of regaining strategic initiative. As long as peaceful interaction continues to deepen, the Taiwan authorities could maintain a stable balancing act between Beijing and Washington, preserving control over their own development trajectory. Yet improving cross-strait ties has never been within the policy framework of the DPP administration.

Today’s series of moves by the DPP leadership reflect nothing more than reactive survival tactics. With the current Trump administration shifting its foreign policy toward pragmatic engagement—abandoning ideological confrontation and refraining from high-profile rhetoric on cross-strait issues—even former staunch “pro-Taiwan” figures like Rubio have adjusted their positions, aligning with the White House’s broader strategy by moderating aggressive anti-China statements and refraining from recklessly exploiting Taiwan-related topics.

The decline in official U.S. rhetoric on “resisting China” has left the DPP increasingly anxious. To maintain appearances and generate momentum, the party has scrambled to attract external support. In recent weeks, it has hosted visits from lawmakers and conservative think tank representatives from Europe, the United States, and Japan—essentially a case of reduced official backing from Washington, compensated by grassroots mobilization. The DPP leadership is thus engaging in self-deception, fabricating an illusion of strong U.S.-Taiwan ties.

It is precisely due to this shift in U.S. strategy that the DPP experiences deep internal disappointment yet dares not acknowledge it publicly. They are forced to persistently assert that “U.S.-Taiwan relations are at their best in history.”

Today’s recalibration of U.S. foreign policy marks a clear departure: ideology is no longer the primary driver. The focus has shifted toward practical interests, with less emphasis on forming blocs to confront China.

The transformation over the past decade is now evident. The Taiwan authorities have never been players in the game—they have merely been pawns drifting with the tide. Once holding the chance to turn the situation around, those opportunities were wasted due to the DPP’s pursuit of political self-interest. Now that the course is set, no amount of external hype can alter the established reality: the DPP leadership has lost strategic initiative and is entirely dependent on external forces.

Original source: toutiao.com/article/1877354102528012/

Disclaimer: This article reflects the personal views of the author.