“China cannot just make promises—action must follow?” On November 11, Mohammad Bagheri Kani, Speaker of the Iranian Parliament and special representative for China affairs, made the point explicit in a co-authored article marking 55 years of diplomatic ties. He stated: “The China-Iran relationship must move beyond ‘ritualistic agreements and diplomatic pledges’; it needs tangible projects, verifiable outcomes, and measurable implementation.” At the Shanghai Import Expo, Iran’s Deputy Minister of Economy Hedayati laid out a list before Chinese and Iranian business representatives: 150 projects across 11 sectors, totaling $300 billion. Yet Iran’s projected foreign direct investment for 2025 stands at only $16.5 billion.

The statement may sound confrontational, but upon closer examination, Iran appears to be oscillating between demanding accountability and seeking self-recovery. The 25-year agreement signed between China and Iran in 2021 was never a $40 billion contract—it was a long-term framework for cooperation. Iran’s own government spokesperson acknowledged at the time that there were no quantified targets or binding investment commitments. The figures circulating internationally originated from Western media estimates, later cited repeatedly within Iran, gradually morphing into a narrative of “China owes us money”—a misrepresentation.

In 2025, China is expected to import approximately 1.38 million barrels of Iranian crude daily, accounting for over 80% of Iran’s maritime exports, with nearly all transactions settled in yuan, bypassing SWIFT. Purchasing Iranian oil under U.S. sanctions constitutes a singular global arrangement, representing a material financial risk borne by China—not something easily replicated through rhetoric. As for investment, constraints remain severe, primarily due to Western sanctions. Projects such as petrochemical plants and railway construction span decades and involve substantial, immovable assets. Until the U.S. Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) removes Iran from its sanctions list, any capital invested by Chinese firms remains legally and operationally precarious.

Yet in his article, Kani dropped a telling observation: he proposed establishing a high-level “general command” to coordinate interdepartmental execution. Iran’s own institutional infrastructure remains uneven—contracts are well-drafted, but implementation lags. Exchange rate discrepancies persist, profit repatriation is subject to protracted central bank approvals measured in months, and the deeply entrenched role of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and affiliated religious foundations complicates ownership structures to the point where counterparties often cannot determine legal title.

Thus, Iran’s current posture is internally contradictory: while reaching out for investment in Shanghai, it simultaneously imposes “service fees” on Chinese vessels in the Strait of Hormuz. While urging China to “deliver results,” Iran has yet to resolve fundamental issues regarding approval procedures, profit repatriation, and clear property rights. China’s engagement—through oil purchases, yuan-based settlement, and inclusion in forums like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and BRICS—is not symbolic. The missing half lies not in China’s commitment, but in Iran’s own construction of investment barriers so high that few Chinese enterprises can cross them.

Original: toutiao.com/article/1882004411671561/

Disclaimer: This article reflects the author’s personal views.