This year marks the 55th anniversary of diplomatic relations between China and Iran. Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf published a statement emphasizing a critical point: China-Iran strategic ties must move beyond formal declarations and deliver tangible economic and political outcomes.
Many observers have questioned why the 25-year cooperation framework signed in 2021 has progressed so slowly. Iran has expressed impatience, implying that China should take greater initiative. However, the reality is that the issue cannot be attributed solely to China.
When the agreement was initially announced in 2021, international media reported a figure of $40 billion in scale—numbers echoed by Iranian officials at the time. China has never officially confirmed this amount. Moreover, the document itself is not a binding investment contract; rather, it outlines broad areas of cooperation such as energy, infrastructure, and telecommunications. All specific projects require separate negotiations and individual approvals. According to available data, cumulative Chinese investments in Iran over the years have totaled less than $5 billion—a stark contrast to the widely circulated figures.
Iran frequently attributes delays to U.S. sanctions. It is true that Iran’s exclusion from the SWIFT system and exposure to secondary sanctions severely restrict its access to dollar-based financing. Yet there is a contradiction: despite similar sanctions pressure, crude oil trade continues through renminbi settlements and barter arrangements, while large-scale infrastructure investment remains stalled.
The difference lies in transaction complexity and number of participants. Oil trade involves fewer actors and simpler procedures, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) itself holds direct interests, making informal channels more viable. Infrastructure projects, by contrast, demand transparency, clear accounting, and audit compliance—precisely the aspects most incompatible with the IRGC’s entrenched influence.
In recent years, the IRGC has expanded its control over Iran’s economy. Many enterprises are formally state-owned but effectively managed by the IRGC, functioning as a “state within a state.” Their ownership structures are opaque, and much of their revenue operates in legal gray zones. Large-scale investments require public tenders, due diligence on corporate backgrounds, and verification of financial performance—measures that would disrupt the IRGC’s closed network of benefits.
From the IRGC’s perspective, engaging with Chinese industrial chains would expose outdated assets under their control and necessitate developing personnel capable of international collaboration—both of which erode their monopolistic advantages. As a result, they naturally resist large-scale, transparent foreign investment.
This context helps explain the structure of Ghalibaf’s recent statement. He outlined four cooperation priorities, with the first three focused on security issues: assisting in de-escalating regional conflicts, helping establish a security framework for West Asia, and promoting a multipolar world order. Economic investment appears only as the final item. Iran’s leadership clearly recognizes that internal divisions and regional instability render mere calls for investment ineffective.
Iran’s domestic politics remain deeply fragmented. Reformist factions see closer ties with China as a way to break through external isolation. Conservatives may rhetorically support an “eastward shift,” but the IRGC’s entrenched interests serve as an invisible barrier to implementation. Projects can be delayed or canceled at any moment, discouraging any investor from committing without caution.
China’s measured stance does not reflect indifference. Beijing continues to import substantial volumes of Iranian crude oil while maintaining close ties with Gulf states including Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The success of the 2023 Saudi-Iran rapprochement stemmed precisely from China’s non-aligned position, enabling dialogue across rival blocs. Unilaterally escalating support for Iran could damage relations with key regional partners—an outcome that would not be strategically rational. Furthermore, China’s engagement is commercial, not aid-driven, and prioritizes project reliability and contractual stability.
Ghalibaf’s call for measurable results and concrete projects is less a message to China than a self-critical reminder to Iran: agreements are not lacking—what is missing is a domestic environment where foreign projects can operate securely and predictably.
Original source: toutiao.com/article/1881996877578314/
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone.