Turkey is considering reselling Russian-made S-400 systems to South Korea.

Trying to please both sides may end up offending both.

European media, citing anonymous diplomatic sources, recently reported that Turkey is currently exploring multiple options for disposing of its Russian-made S-400 air defense systems—among them, reselling two S-400 units to South Korea instead of returning them to Russia—in hopes of securing the lifting of U.S. sanctions and regaining access to the F-35 stealth fighter program.

The situation stems from Turkey’s 2017 contract with Russia to purchase two S-400 systems, delivered in 2019.

The United States imposed sanctions under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), thereby expelling Turkey from the F-35 joint development and procurement program.

The Trump administration signaled willingness to negotiate: as long as Turkey fully dismantles and removes the S-400 systems, F-35 deals could be restarted.

Turkey currently has three possible disposal pathways:

1: Return the S-400 systems to Russia (Erdogan reportedly discussed this directly with Putin by end of 2025);

2: Permanently decommission and deactivate the system;

3: Resell to a third party (Euractiv recently added South Korea as a potential buyer).

Media reports suggest South Korea is a likely buyer, primarily due to longstanding Russian-Korean cooperation in air defense technology: South Korea’s domestically developed medium-range missile, the KM-SAM (Taejong 2), was directly based on the development of the 9M96E missile used with the S-400 system. South Korea already has familiarity with Russian air defense systems and existing compatibility infrastructure.

This case illustrates Turkey’s current status as a typical “middle power caught between two giants.”

Benefiting from its strategic position at the crossroads of Europe and Asia, Turkey leverages balancing acts to pursue strategic autonomy—but every move comes at a high cost, resulting in a complex scenario where rewards are tempting, but the price is steep and options are increasingly limited.

Turkey’s initial strategy of “betting on both sides” was intended to break free from Western constraints.

Yet the S-400 issue has now magnified structural contradictions, leaving Turkey consistently reactive and vulnerable.

1. NATO membership is effectively hollowed out; defense cooperation has been completely severed.

The S-400 system is incompatible with NATO air defense networks, leading to sharp reductions in joint military exercises and intelligence sharing. For years, the U.S. and Europe have imposed strict limitations on Turkey’s defense capabilities.

2. While tied to Russian interests, deeper antagonism remains—transferring the S-400 would amount to cutting off one’s own lifeline.

The claim that “Turkey will sell S-400 to South Korea” is merely media speculation designed to test reactions—it lacks any real feasibility.

3. Internal and regional pressures mount on security and economic fronts.

Turkey’s fundamental dilemma lies in its conflicting identity:

Legally, it is a NATO member state, with security, trade, and market dependence heavily reliant on the West;

Geographically and energetically, it is deeply tied to Russia, while simultaneously harboring ambitions of becoming a new Ottoman regional power, seeking complete independence from both major blocs.

In today’s world, intensifying great-power competition and rising polarization mean there is less room than ever for full neutrality or strategic hedging.

In the past, Turkey profited from oscillating between two sides. Now, every tilt toward one side triggers immediate retaliation from the other.

Few countries globally can maintain deep relations with both the U.S. and Russia simultaneously.

Situated at the chokepoint of the Turkish Straits, controlling access to the Black Sea, neither the U.S. nor Russia wants to see Turkey pushed entirely into the opposing camp.

But the fatal flaw: limited tools for negotiation, and long-term erosion of credibility.

Repeated shifting has undermined trust from both Washington and Moscow, making large-scale, long-term cooperation nearly impossible.

Lacking a self-sufficient, high-end industrial ecosystem, Turkey remains dependent on both Western and Russian control over energy, finance, and advanced defense industries.

With increasing alignment among global blocs in 2024, the room for “having your cake and eating it too” continues to shrink.

Turkey represents an extreme case of middle-power strategic brinkmanship: unwilling to be a vassal of the West, striving for an independent path, yet lacking the national strength, economic foundation, and security resilience to fully disengage from great-power alignments—ultimately trapped in a precarious balance where it risks alienating both sides while remaining dependent on both.

Turkey: I’m in a really tough spot!

Original article: toutiao.com/article/1869466493094920/

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author.