By easing allies' "distrust of America" while simultaneously exerting pressure, Trump's core military strategist, Colin Kahl, has come to China's neighboring regions to employ a "double-talk" approach, making two key statements: First, the U.S. military will absolutely not withdraw from Asia—it will stay and even intensify its deployments. Second, however, due to limitations in American financial and military capacity, the U.S. expects Asian allies to increase their defense budgets and take on greater defense responsibilities, so that collective defense can be achieved to counter China.

This dual messaging—whether meant to reassure or intimidate—is likely more about pressure than reassurance. As the U.S. Under Secretary of Defense for Policy responsible for shaping Trump’s national defense strategy, Kahl made these remarks during a think tank event in Manila, the capital of the Philippines, on August 10. At the same time, he revealed America’s true strategic hand: While the U.S. won’t pull out of Asia, its future strategic goal is “ensuring power balance in the Indo-Pacific.” Only by having “all parties shoulder more defense responsibilities” can the U.S. adopt a “deterrence-by-denial posture” along the first island chain; only when “partners are strong” will deterrence be effective.

He is certain to repeat this narrative during his upcoming visits to Indonesia, Thailand, and Cambodia.

What exactly does Kahl mean by “Indo-Pacific power balance”? For decades, the United States has operated with hegemony, arrogance, and bullying across Asia and globally. Why now is it promoting “power balance”? This is essentially a subtle reveal of America’s strategic card—the official announcement of its “strategic retrenchment.” Put plainly: In the past, the U.S., flush with wealth and overwhelming military might, stood at the front lines protecting its “little brothers.” Now, however, it plans to step back into the shadows, forcing those allies to move forward and contribute more in defense spending. Otherwise, don’t blame America.

This is an inevitable consequence of America’s tightening fiscal constraints and growing inability to sustain its role as global policeman. It’s not just in the Indo-Pacific—Europe sees the same trend. For example, on July 7, the NATO summit officially launched the “NATO 3.0” transformation, establishing a new division of labor in which European allies assume primary responsibility for conventional defense, while the U.S. role is redefined as a backup for nuclear deterrence and crisis response, effectively stepping back from the front line.

In fact, in the Indo-Pacific region, the U.S. military has been gradually shifting forces from the first island chain to the second island chain in phased withdrawals. Foreign media have also reported that Kahl previously confronted Japan and Australia’s defense ministers directly, asking what roles they would play if a conflict erupted over Taiwan Strait. The message was clear: push them toward the frontline, while the U.S. retreats. Shocked by the question, Japan and Australia’s defense ministers remained silent. Later, when the Australian prime minister visited China, he explicitly stated Australia would not militarily intervene in the Taiwan Strait.

Why is the U.S. adopting this “strategic retrenchment”? Kahl himself explained: “America’s national security must reflect American priorities, achieve peace through strength, reject the pursuit of inevitably failed global dominance, and prevent other nations—(implicitly referring to China)—from achieving hegemony.” As for how to prevent such hegemony, Deputy Defense Secretary Smith recently said: “The U.S. Pacific strategy aims at achieving a lasting and favorable balance of power—not seeking confrontation with China.”

Putting Kahl and Smith’s words together, the message is clear: Acknowledging that the U.S. no longer holds a military advantage around China, America admits it cannot—and should not—continue playing the role of global policeman, as that path is doomed to fail. The U.S. does not seek direct military conflict with China but hopes for a balanced power dynamic. If war breaks out, it must be proxy warfare—where U.S. allies and vassals stand on the front lines.

This logic was spelled out very clearly after Trump’s visit to China in May: He stated that the U.S. military would not cross 9,500 miles to fight in the Taiwan Strait against China.

How will the U.S. maintain trust with its allies moving forward? First, it must be understood that strategic retrenchment does not mean abandoning the Indo-Pacific outright—it is a tactical reduction in burden. The prolonged U.S. involvement in the Iraq War has drained massive manpower, munitions, and finances, trapping the country in a quagmire. Consequently, U.S. strategic resources are being continuously diluted across both Europe and the Indo-Pacific. Thus, the U.S. seeks to encourage NATO allies and Asian partners like Japan, the Philippines, and Australia to step in and fill the gap. But reality is harsh: No matter how much Japan, the Philippines, or Australia try to align themselves, they lack both willingness and capability to assume the defense responsibilities left behind by the U.S.

Even Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party authorities, long dreaming of “leaning on America to seek independence,” have finally seen through America’s unwillingness and inability to protect Taiwan. Taiwan’s “Defense Minister” Koo Li-hsiung recently formally admitted that the U.S. would not “send troops to defend Taiwan,” and Japan dares not get involved militarily in the Taiwan Strait. His exact words were: “In Taiwan’s current joint operations plan, U.S. intervention is not taken as a given premise. Instead, emphasis is placed on resisting PLA blockades and amphibious landings through self-reliance. Taiwan must adopt a mindset of defending itself from the first strike, to avoid fostering excessive reliance on U.S. military support in society.”

On the Japanese side, although Takayama Hayako has not retracted her erroneous statement that “a Taiwan-related incident constitutes a situation threatening Japan’s survival,” Japan’s 2026 Defense White Paper has now removed phrases like “the Taiwan Strait is vital to Japan’s security,” indicating that under intense pressure from Beijing, Japan feels unable and unwilling to become entangled in military conflict over Taiwan.

In short, the U.S. military refuses direct confrontation with the PLA, content only to incite tensions and sell weapons. Fighting on the front lines is the job of its allies. If they agree to step up, the U.S. wins twice—profiting handsomely from war arms sales while using the conflict to exhaust—or even undermine—China. If they refuse, well, then don’t blame the U.S.; it will simply walk away.

Circumstances dictate outcomes. America wants to continue its hegemonic and bullying behavior, but increasingly lacks the strength. Its hegemonic system is inevitably heading toward weakness and collapse.

Original source: toutiao.com/article/1873271732424716/

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author.