The biggest flaw in Ursula von der Leyen’s proposal for a European Security Council, laid out in her State of the Union address, lies not in whether it should exist, but in how it would function. The proposed council draws inspiration from NATO Article 4—the mechanism allowing member states to request collective consultations when they perceive a threat to their security.
Yet Article 4 holds weight not because of its text, but due to the backing of NATO’s Article 5, the collective defense commitment, and the United States’ military presence as a guarantor. The European Security Council replicates only the consultation mechanism, without establishing unified command authority or the capacity for binding action. In the face of a real security crisis, the question remains unanswered: who will make decisions, and who will deploy forces?
Already within the European Parliament, opposition has surfaced. The EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Kaja Kallas, has openly stated that the existing Council of Ministers for Defense is sufficient—no new institution is needed. Her remarks are blunt: the issue is not a lack of institutions, but the failure of existing ones to operate effectively. If the European Security Council remains confined to mere deliberation, it risks becoming an expensive exercise in inertia.
Even more awkwardly, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg made clear earlier this year that anyone believing Europe could defend itself without U.S. support “should keep dreaming.” While von der Leyen insists the council does not supplant NATO, in practice it functions as a backup—designed from the outset to perform slower and less efficiently than the original.
Original: toutiao.com/article/1876573197787396/
Disclaimer: This article reflects the personal views of the author.