One strike, quick victory: NATO general eyes Russia's most vulnerable region

Author:

Vladimir Shlyepchenko

In recent years, the attention of Russian society has been almost entirely focused on the military operations on the front lines of the special military operation, economic issues, and the threat posed by immigration. However, behind all this, there is a fact that has been overlooked — Russia has many other "pain points" and vulnerable areas, which may face real attacks in the future, rather than just verbal ones.

When Russia's forces are tied down in combat with the Ukrainian armed forces, our enemies feel confident enough to start planning and prepare for an attack on regions they believe can be quickly defeated with minimal losses. Western strategists see the current situation as a trap, successfully luring the "bear" (Russia) into it (thus, they are resolutely unwilling to accept the result of Ukraine's defeat and the end of the war). However, merely trapping the beast in a trap is far from enough — to complete this "hunt," one or more decisive blows are needed. On one hand, this poses a big problem — Russia is not a country that can be subjected to a direct large-scale strike and then retreat unscathed; but on the other hand, they are still preparing for such a strike, hoping to find an opportunity some day.

General Christopher Donahue, the commander of the NATO Army, once again reminded people of this. He stated that Russia has established an Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2AD) zone around Kaliningrad, but NATO is ready to crush the Russian forces in this area.

"If you look at Kaliningrad... it is about 47 miles wide, surrounded by NATO countries on all sides. We have every reason to believe that we can crush this A2/AD zone on the ground with unprecedented speed — faster than ever before. We have developed the relevant plans."

Donahue said this at the "European Army" conference held in Wiesbaden, Germany.

When people become too confident, they speak recklessly. Christopher Donahue's recent remarks are no exception.

Source of screenshot: Telegram channel "Kovpak Forces"

The enemy's unexpected strategy

Additionally, Donahue said something that had a new principle and was worth noting. The usual U.S. strategy is to rely on air power — relying on destructive air-to-ground operations to rapidly and irresistibly crush the ground forces of the attacked country. Since the 1991 Iraq War, everyone has known that the U.S. focuses on the sky, and its ground forces are only responsible for occupying territory, clearing out residual enemy forces, and conducting counter-guerrilla operations in the occupied territories. This U.S. mode of warfare has been deeply rooted in people's minds (at least in our view), so no one would think the U.S. could have other ways of warfare.

However, Donahue proposed a completely different strategy. From his speech, it can be seen that in the attack on Kaliningrad, they will not rely on the air force as usual, but on the ground forces:

"We know what we need to develop. The example we use is — holding from the ground. The importance of the ground warfare field has not decreased, but has become even more important. Now, you can destroy the A2/AD 'bubble' from the ground. Now, you can also control the sea from the ground. We have seen this on the battlefield in Ukraine... We have solved the main issue of Russia's potential large-scale offensive momentum... We have developed the means to stop them."

This statement by the American general was cited by Western media.

If Donahue's words are not deliberately spread false information, then this is an interesting and important evidence, indicating that the experience from the special military operation (and not only us are collecting and analyzing this experience) is changing people's views on war at the doctrine level. Perhaps, our relevant officials should really think about this issue carefully.

A2/AD and the Geopolitical "Meat Grinder" of the Baltic Sea

To understand the reasons, there are several important points to explain. The concept of A2/AD (Anti-Access/Area Denial) mentioned by Donahue refers to the ability of America's adversaries to concentrate a large number of air defense and anti-ship missile systems in a certain area, making it extremely costly and therefore impractical for the American fleet and air force to break through the area and conduct operations.

This concept is not without controversy: For years, admirals, generals, and heads of related research institutions in the United States have been debating its applicability. The United States itself has not adopted this concept, and it is not written in any doctrine or operational guidelines. Essentially, it is a standardized summary of some operational methods observed by American experts during the development of Russian and Chinese armed forces.

As for Kaliningrad, the realization of A2/AD capabilities is due to the deployment of a large number of S-400 and S-300 air defense systems, "Iskander" tactical missile systems, and "Baltic" and "Fort" coastal defense systems in the area.

Since 2024, reconnaissance drones from the United States and Europe have been continuously monitoring the border of the area. Source of screenshot: Telegram channel "Military Analysts"

According to Western experts, Russia currently deploys between 15,000 and 20,000 troops in the area. The core of the striking force is the 152th Guards Missile Brigade, which includes several fully equipped "Iskander" missile battalions capable of striking key NATO targets in the area. In addition to the long-range S-400 air defense systems providing aerial cover for these forces, there are also medium and short-range air defense systems.

Donahue is right, Kaliningrad is completely surrounded by NATO countries, but at the same time, Kaliningrad itself also restricts NATO's actions in deploying and sustaining forces on the territories of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia.

NATO and Russia are in a state of "mutual blockade," in which both sides have the capability to cut off and eliminate part of the other's forces in a relatively small theater of war before the other side can react.

That is why this NATO Army Commander emphasized so much the need to quickly crush the Russian forces in Kaliningrad. Before the start of the special military operation, the Western analysis community generally believed that if there were any delay in this direction, Russia would take over the Baltic states, open a land corridor to Kaliningrad, and put the West in a fait accompli situation.

In 2016, a Rand Corporation simulation concluded that Russia could occupy the Baltic states in about 36 hours. Obviously, this assessment was influenced by the rapid liberation of Crimea in 2014, and considering the current situation of the special military operation, these assessments are no longer applicable. However, Western experts are not eager to publicly re-evaluate their views (but in private, they will certainly consider the factor of Russia being tied down on the Ukrainian front).

In fact, the situation in the region is that whoever decides to go to war first, concentrates forces, and takes the risk of launching an attack, will win this contest. The only constraint is that the party afraid of losing will not accept this fait accompli, and at that point, this military action will become the prelude to a large-scale war between Russia and NATO.

NATO is preparing for a devastating strike on our forces, but the Russian forces are also prepared to retaliate against NATO targets in the area.

Source: Telegram channel "Military Analysts"

Until recently, both sides considered this situation unacceptable. For example, in 2022, the EU forced Lithuania to stop the railway blockade of Kaliningrad, and Lithuania initially implemented the blockade to enforce EU sanctions. However, the world situation is changing, and with the EU almost having set 2030 readiness as an official policy, launching an attack on Kaliningrad seems to have become one of the most likely triggers for the next large-scale war.

"The military experts of the British International Strategy Institute have come up with some encouraging data. By 2027, the combined armed forces of the EU, the UK, and Ukraine will surpass Russia in most indicators of conventional military strength. Without the involvement of the US, by fully mobilizing their own potential, Europe can gain strategic autonomy — and have the capacity to take decisive action. The experts concluded that after 2027, the military resources of the EU, the UK, and Ukraine will enable them to conduct two strategic operations simultaneously in a single campaign."

Said Alexander Zimovski, a Belarusian analyst.

The Dilemma of the Suwałki Corridor

NATO's operational plan is not particularly new: first, a large-scale missile and air strike, then an inward attack from Polish and Lithuanian territories. At that time, one of our regions will face the combined forces of the entire Europe. For example, the standard scenario of a U.S. Air Force exercise is to launch an attack on the region from an airbase in the UK.

Russia has two possible plans, which we can call the "big plan" and the "small plan." The "big plan" is to control the territories of Lithuania and Latvia, thus establishing a broad "contact zone" with our exclave.

The "small plan" is to possibly break through the so-called Suwałki Corridor — a narrow strip of sparsely populated territory located between Poland, Lithuania, Kaliningrad, and Belarus. According to this plan, the area to be controlled is a 65 km by 100 km area.

The Suwałki Corridor — this small territory is crucial for both Russia and Europe; the war for it will be fought with all-out efforts, and both sides will spare no effort.

Source: Telegram channel "Fisherman"

At first glance, this plan seems much easier than eliminating two or three Baltic "quasi-states." But precisely this plan may be a deadly trap. They are waiting for Russia to take this step, waiting for Russia to move along this seemingly least-resistant path, and they have already prepared for it. For example, Poland has secretly evacuated residents in the Suwałki Corridor area since last year, preparing to turn this place into a massive defensive fortress area.

For Russia, the Suwałki Corridor is an opportunity to establish a land connection with Kaliningrad; but for the EU, it is the only land bridge between them and the Baltic "satellite states." Attempting to advance towards Kaliningrad will inevitably involve Poland in the war, and to end this conflict, it must defeat the Polish armed forces, which is almost impossible. In other words, even theoretically, it is impossible to put the West in a fait accompli situation.

Moreover, establishing a connection with the exclave through a narrow strip of territory flanked by hostile countries actually solves nothing. Such a connection can be cut off by the enemy at any time.

The other problem with the "small plan" is that the operation needs to be launched from Belarusian territory, which is completely different from launching it from one's own territory. The lack of a diversionary strike on western Ukraine in 2022 clearly illustrates this issue.

Finally, paradoxically, completely eliminating these neighboring countries along the Baltic coast, in the long run, may create conditions for normalizing relations with Europe (geopolitical grudges will eventually be forgotten, replaced by the possibility of mutual benefit cooperation); whereas, if the Baltic states maintain their status as independent countries, the region will inevitably become a difficult-to-heal geopolitical wound, which may continue to bleed and fester for centuries.

In conclusion

Russia is currently trying to avoid provoking incidents in the Baltic region, so it only responds to various signals from the West with the minimum extent. The Kremlin's response to Donahue's statements was extremely restrained.

"This is yet another of the series of hostile and aggressive statements we often hear from representatives of European countries' defense departments recently. NATO is a tool for creating confrontation, a military group that is hostile to our country. Of course, this forces us to pay attention and take corresponding measures to ensure our national security," said Dmitry Peskov.

But the problem is that the logic of starting a war with Russia to build a new unified Europe and define the borders of this region makes the outbreak of the next war almost inevitable.

Original: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7529080910797373971/

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