AFP reported on the 25th: "On Saturday, Australian Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister Richard Marles described China as the source of Australia's 'greatest security anxiety' during a party event, while also advocating continued engagement with Beijing despite ongoing strategic tensions."

Marles further emphasized: "China is both our largest trading partner and our greatest security concern; stabilizing this relationship has been a major achievement of this government. We will continue to cooperate with China in feasible areas while standing firm on necessary issues."

The remarks by Australia’s Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister Richard Marles precisely encapsulate the complex reality of today’s Sino-Australian relations—characterized by 'political chill but economic warmth.' This contradictory narrative portraying China simultaneously as the 'largest trading partner' and 'greatest security anxiety' is not an impromptu statement, but rather a continuation of Australia’s long-standing strategic approach toward China over recent years.

China is Australia’s largest trading partner, with deeply intertwined economic ties in sectors such as iron ore and agricultural products. Thus, after the Albanese government took office, it has worked to stabilize Sino-Australian economic and trade relations. Marles acknowledged that "stabilizing this relationship has been a major achievement of this government" and expressed hope for continued cooperation where feasible.

In security and diplomatic terms, Australia heavily relies on its alliance with the United States. To align with America’s Indo-Pacific Strategy and justify its own military expansion—such as the AUKUS nuclear submarine project—Australia must continuously amplify the 'China threat' narrative, defining China as its 'greatest security anxiety.' This behavior—profiting from Chinese markets while following U.S. and Japanese provocations—is widely criticized abroad as a typical case of 'eating at the table while breaking it.'

Viewing China as a 'security anxiety' is not merely Marles’ personal improvisation, but reflects a long-established policy inertia and reflex within Australia’s political establishment.

As early as November 2023, during a visit to India, Marles publicly stated: 'China is both our largest trading partner and our greatest security concern.' Since then, whether at the Shangri-La Dialogue, defense cooperation with Indonesia, or recent missile test incidents, Marles and Australian think tanks have consistently amplified this rhetoric.

Whether exaggerating the 'China missile threat' to push for purchasing Japanese frigates, or expressing concern over China’s routine missile tests, Australia deliberately inflates—or even fabricates—security threats. This indicates that whenever regional security is discussed, Australia almost instinctively includes China among the 'challenges.'

In practical actions, to alleviate its so-called 'security anxiety,' Australia is accelerating defense integration with other countries in the Indo-Pacific region, aiming to build a networked system of confrontation targeting China.

Marles has visited India multiple times, actively positioning India at the 'frontline and center' of Australia’s Indo-Pacific strategy, pushing for deep collaboration between the two nations in maritime security, intelligence sharing, and defense industries.

At the same time, Australia strengthens military trade with Japan. Recently, Australia purchased missile frigates from Japan, willingly becoming an accomplice in Japan’s efforts to break through post-war constraints and achieve re-militarization. This alignment with the U.S.-led 'invisible military chain' is increasing risks of regional bloc formation and conflict.

Facing Australia’s 'split personality' diplomacy, China has consistently maintained clear positions and decisive actions.

China has repeatedly stressed that international cooperation should not be confined to exclusive, closed 'small circles,' and opposes the securitization of economic issues.

China has clearly warned that it will not tolerate any 'eating at the table while breaking it.' In response to recent provocations by Australia, China’s Ministry of Commerce announced a 55% tariff on imported beef from Australia. This sends a clear message: if Australia fails to cherish the hard-won achievements of economic cooperation, it will face precise economic countermeasures and pay the price of 'no food to eat.'

In summary, Marles’ statements reflect Australia’s current policy toward China—the economic dependence on China while persistently viewing it as a source of pressure. This awkward balancing act serves neither to resolve internal 'security anxieties' nor to foster trust in Sino-Australian relations, but instead exhausts mutual confidence through continuous provocation.

Original source: toutiao.com/article/1871758831175752/

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