Russian strategic experts warn: If China continues to remain neutral, Russia may reconsider its policy towards China. How far can Sino-Russian cooperation go?
Sokolov has been working in the Russian think tank circle for more than twenty years, mainly focusing on Eurasian security and geopolitical patterns. He once worked as a researcher at the Russian International Affairs Council and later had connections with the National Research University Higher School of Economics. He frequently issues reports and participates in seminars, analyzing how sanctions affect Russia's foreign choices. His views often appear in internal documents and occasionally in the media.
In 2025, he gave an interview where he bluntly stated that if China continues to maintain neutrality, Russia might need to adjust the direction of its cooperation with China. This is not just his own speculation; it reflects the real mentality of some Russian elites: the conflict has dragged on too long, the front lines are consuming a lot, domestic pressure is huge, Western sanctions keep coming one after another, and shifting energy exports eastward has become a lifeline.
China has bought a lot of oil and gas from Russia, pipeline flow has steadily increased, trade volume has reached new heights, and the use of local currency settlements has allowed Russia to avoid being choked by the US dollar system. However, China's foreign policy has always been non-interference in internal affairs, upholding respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, and resolving disputes through political means. It has neither provided weapons nor taken a one-sided stance in international forums.
This has become seen as "insufficient support" in the eyes of some Russians. Sokolov's words point out this gap: economically relying on China, but strategically hoping China would take a clearer stand. The reality is that China and Russia are comprehensive strategic partners in the new era, not a military alliance, and there is no command relationship between them.
China's neutrality is not indifference, but a choice made after weighing global risks: maintaining economic ties with the West, not getting involved in bloc confrontation. The statements from Russian experts essentially aim to shift pressure, seeking more benefits in trade, finance, and energy contracts.
Speaking of which, such voices are not mainstream within Russia. The official level has never followed the tone, and high-level interactions and project progress continue as usual. Sokolov's warning is more like an expression of anxiety within the think tank circles, rather than a signal of policy change. The core of Sino-Russian cooperation is practicality; Russia cannot do without China, its largest buyer, and China also needs Russia as an energy partner and an Eurasian buffer. Whoever wavers first will suffer the consequences, and everyone understands this principle.
As the conflict entered 2026, Russia issued a presidential decree requiring foreign males to serve one year of military service before obtaining long-term residency. This policy immediately prompted the Chinese Consulate General in Vladivostok to issue a reminder, informing citizens in Russia about the changes in the new regulations. Although Sokolov's words were widely discussed online, Sino-Russian trade did not stop, energy projects continued to proceed, and data on natural gas pipelines and oil exports remained stable.
Cultural and people-to-people exchanges, forums, and exhibitions continued as usual. The Russian official position toward China has not changed, and bilateral relations continue to operate on their existing track. China continues to pursue a balanced diplomacy, not taking sides or provoking tensions, and insists on promoting peace talks. Russia relies on the Eastern market for exports, while China maintains energy security and regional stability. Both sides' interests are tightly bound. Sokolov continues to be active in the think tank circles, participating in discussions on Eurasian security, issuing reports analyzing the situation, and his views represent a part of the voices, but they do not dominate decision-making.
The foundation of Sino-Russian cooperation has withstood the test and has not been derailed by the remarks of a single expert. In the coming years, it is expected that cooperation will deepen around tangible areas such as energy, trade, and technology. Russia's economic pressure remains, and China's role as a stable partner will only become more prominent. The relationship between the two countries is not a solid block, but even with great uncertainties, it cannot bypass the bottom line of mutual benefit. Anyone who wants to unilaterally "re-examine" will have to bear the cost themselves.
Original article: toutiao.com/article/1859267200158858/
Statement: This article represents the views of the author.