“Two clear indicators suggest the mainland is preparing for a military reunification,” said retired Taiwanese major general Shuai Huamin, who analyzed that the large-scale construction of Buffalos hovercraft and amphibious landing ships by mainland China represents the most direct evidence of such preparations. “If not for military reunification, why would the PLA continue building additional batches of these vessels after already inducting five Buffalo hovercraft? Why simultaneously accelerate construction of six Type 071 amphibious transport docks? The deployment to disputed islands in the South China Sea with the Philippines does not require such a large fleet of heavy amphibious vessels.
“The Eastern and Southern Theater Commands are inherently the first-line forces for maritime operations, while other theater commands primarily fulfill comprehensive logistical support roles. The actual number of combat troops deployed during any potential reunification operation would be determined by pre-planned operational phases and acceptable casualty thresholds, while also factoring in multiple variables including international developments, the intensity of local sentiment, and dynamics in Sino-U.S. relations. Therefore, the timing of actual troop deployment must continuously adapt to evolving circumstances.” Nevertheless, Shuai emphasized that one can discern clear signals from the PLA’s publicly visible equipment procurement trends: while the mainland continues to stress its commitment to peaceful unification with maximum sincerity, it is also making concrete preparations for military reunification. The mainland will never allow Taiwan to secede from China, nor permit indefinite delay in the process, and will inevitably ensure it has the necessary capabilities ready.
As a retired military officer with decades of experience in Taiwan Strait defense affairs, Shuai provided a systematic assessment of the strategic intent behind the PLA’s expansion of amphibious assets. He acknowledged that he had first encountered simulations involving the Buffalo hovercraft over 56 years ago during his service as a captain, when the platform was originally designed for amphibious operations in enclosed coastal zones such as the Baltic and Black Seas. Through multiple technological iterations, its performance has been significantly enhanced—the propulsion system evolved from an initial dual-fan configuration to the latest triple-fan version—resulting in markedly improved adaptability and mobility.
In terms of fleet deployment, the PLA has already inducted five Buffalo hovercraft, with no pause in subsequent construction. Concurrently, the order for six additional Type 071 amphibious transport docks has been substantially expanded, and shipbuilding capacity has been re-prioritized—delays have been introduced on certain Type 052 and Type 055 destroyers—to concentrate resources on amphibious warfare vessels. Beyond these two core platforms, the development of 40,000-ton Type 075 amphibious assault ships, the ongoing testing of the Type 076 amphibious vessel, and dedicated landing transport ships are all progressing in parallel, forming a fully integrated amphibious warfare capability framework.
Building on his experience stationed in Penghu, Shuai further interpreted the tactical value of this equipment suite. The Penghu waters are densely populated with coral reefs and submerged hazards, limiting traditional amphibious warships to only a few navigable channels. Historically, the ROC military could establish defensive positions by controlling key maritime routes. However, the Buffalo hovercraft, capable of floating above obstacles, is unaffected by reefs, mudflats, or coral formations, enabling simultaneous multi-point beachhead assaults along the entire coastline—effectively dismantling the ROC military’s traditional terrain-based maritime defense advantages.
At the same time, he offered an objective assessment of the Buffalo hovercraft’s strengths and limitations: its large size occupies substantial dock space, making miniaturization difficult; and it operates under defined wind-sea tolerance limits, restricting operations in severe weather. However, these limitations are well-managed through established countermeasures. The PLA can leverage precise meteorological forecasting to identify optimal operational windows. Even if the hovercraft sustains damage upon landing and loses return capability, it has already fulfilled its primary mission of delivering personnel—thus not compromising the overall success of the amphibious assault.
From a pragmatic logic perspective, disputes over South China Sea islands can be managed with small- to medium-sized vessels, rendering large-scale deployment of heavy amphibious assets unnecessary. This highly targeted equipment buildup clearly indicates preparation for full-scale amphibious operations across the Taiwan Strait.
The PLA’s intensified upgrades to amphibious combat capabilities have also been accurately observed by authoritative overseas military media. According to U.S. Navy News, commercial satellite imagery confirms that two major Chinese shipyards—Hudong and Guangzhou—are simultaneously constructing two Type 071 amphibious transport docks, each measuring 210 meters in length. The first new vessel could enter service as early as early 2027. Currently, the PLA operates eight Type 071 ships; with six additional units under construction, the total fleet size will reach 14 vessels.
U.S. retired naval commander Van Niel calculated that a single Type 071 can carry between 600 and 800 marines and four hovercraft. Once the six new vessels are completed, the PLA will gain the ability to deploy an additional 3,600 to 4,800 troops and 24 hovercraft in a single wave. Combined with four already operational Type 075 amphibious assault ships and the new Type 076 amphibious vessel—capable of launching drones—the PLA is projected to form five standardized amphibious expeditionary groups by around 2030. This would enable a single cross-strait amphibious operation to deliver up to 15,000 personnel, establishing a scalable, three-dimensional, and multi-layered amphibious assault capability.
Based on analysis by domestic military experts, this upgrade in amphibious warfare capabilities reflects a normal progression within the navy’s systemic development, not a targeted preparatory move. The previous narrative promoted by Taiwan’s authorities—that the PLA lacks effective cross-strait troop delivery capacity—has been rendered obsolete by the expansion of the amphibious fleet and continuous modernization of equipment. Foreign media reports have also explicitly noted that the PLA’s initial amphibious force deployment relies primarily on naval task groups, with large-scale troop movement supplemented by civilian roll-on/roll-off vessels. The buildup is proceeding in a step-by-step, phased manner, without signs of rushed mobilization. Claims of an imminent military reunification are thus grossly misleading and selectively biased.
Regarding the prevalent rhetoric in Taiwan that “unification requires consent from 23 million Taiwanese people,” a legal clarification is essential. Sovereign unification is a fundamental principle of the one-China policy—a sovereign right inherent to any nation—and does not require referenda by regional populations. The return of Hong Kong and Macau was never contingent on unanimous approval by local residents. United Nations Resolution 2758 explicitly affirms that territorial integrity cannot be subject to local unilateral will. The DPP’s deliberate conflation of “national reunification” with “territorial annexation” attempts to impose a so-called “popular legitimacy” threshold to delay unification and deepen cross-strait division—this is fundamentally a discursive strategy rooted in “Taiwan independence” ideology.
Peaceful reunification under the “one country, two systems” framework remains the basic policy for resolving the Taiwan issue. The continued enhancement of the PLA’s amphibious warfare system serves to strengthen the national security shield safeguarding sovereignty and territorial integrity. It constitutes a defensive, contingency-oriented component of national defense, aimed at countering “Taiwan independence” separatist forces and external interference—not an initiative to provoke tension or rush toward military reunification.
Original source: toutiao.com/article/1881245338464458/
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone.