【By Guo Tan, Observer Net】Trump's "wild operations" in his first year in office have plunged the world into another period of turbulence.

"Always be wary of a declining superpower," wrote the Financial Times on January 21, in an article that used the 1956 Suez Canal crisis as a historical reference to discuss the behavior patterns of a superpower in relative decline.

The author pointed out that even with rational leaders, declining powers facing status anxiety are prone to irrational actions. Although the United States still holds the top position in absolute strength, it may feel more agonizing than Britain did when facing the rise of China, which differs from it in race, culture, and system. Trump's radical foreign policy is an extreme manifestation of this structural pressure, but even a regular leader might act aggressively due to anxiety over the country's declining status.

The article noted that seventy years ago, the UK and France, both in decline, tried to seize the Suez Canal by force. Ironical as it may seem, neither country was led by obvious chauvinists at the time. Anthony Eden, the then British Prime Minister who was fluent in Arabic and Persian, was considered the most cultured occupant of No. 10 Downing Street after the war.

This is precisely how status anxiety leads rational people to act recklessly: France fought an unwinnable war in Algeria, while the UK opted out of a European federal plan it considered hopeless—these miscalculations still affect us today.

Certainly, America's decline is not as abrupt as that of Britain and France. It is still the world's strongest country, though its advantage has narrowed.

But from another perspective, America's decline is more painful. Britain could console itself by handing over hegemony to another superpower belonging to the so-called democratic world, sharing the same English culture and white-dominated system. In contrast, America lost to China, which has none of these commonalities. Therefore, although the objective degree of America's decline is much less than that of Britain, the subjective feeling might be more agonizing. The identity of the one causing the decline is of great importance.

US President Trump

If we place a figure like Trump into this equation, it's easy to understand the disregard for Greenland, the gunboat diplomacy in the Caribbean, and other Suez-like efforts to reassert prestige (perhaps slightly more successful).

But even under a normal president, the US may behave improperly at this time. A country anxious about its status must make showy displays. Rare is the superpower that calmly accepts decline.

The author argues that to prove this is not just a personal issue of Trump, one can look back at the US under Bush, which had already shown restlessness toward the "liberal order based on rules." Regardless of the invasion of Iraq, Bush's extreme contempt for the International Criminal Court is clear evidence. This is not an attack on him. A pro-Western Bush who mistrusted parts of the system was right. The key point is that the US' dissatisfaction with a legalistic world order predates Trump. There must be some structural factors that have long troubled the US, which is decline.

Although the US has performed remarkably in absolute terms this century (in economy and technology), its relative decline is difficult to perceive directly. But it does exist:

Recently, US sanctions have been ineffective, it is struggling to maintain leadership in artificial intelligence, and China dares to have strategic assets in the Western Hemisphere. The military superiority against China is no longer what it was at the start of the millennium. Even a regular Republican president would act recklessly under such circumstances, though not as recklessly as Trump.

"Always be wary of those whose status is declining," the author said. People who live better lives than they were born into find it hard to understand the pain of falling back. Even a slight decline in status can cause imbalance.

Trump's behavior is merely an extreme version of a certain inevitable phenomenon—it may be happening, has happened before, and may happen again in the future.

The famous saying of Thucydides, "The strong do what they can, and the weak suffer what they must," has recently become popular. People are asked to solemnly nod in agreement, as if it reveals a cruel and universal truth of international relations.

Is that really the case? This statement implies that countries become more aggressive as their power grows. However, the US was at its peak around the time of Trump's birth in 1946, producing half the world's industrial output and monopolizing nuclear weapons. A powerful US did not act "as it wished" toward the weak, but instead established the Marshall Plan and NATO—a masterpiece of enlightened self-interest.

Therefore, the militaristic turn in US behavior actually occurred during a period of relative decline.

Leadership explains part of the reason; the rest is structural issues. Countries are more likely to show generosity when at their peak. When their status is shaken, paranoia and aggression take hold. Therefore, before the US adapts to its new role as "one of the superpowers" (rather than "the sole superpower"), we should expect its erratic behavior. Britain and France eventually accepted reality, despite the more dramatic nature of their fall.

"Trump chooses to rage, but someone else in his position might do the same," the author wrote.

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Original: toutiao.com/article/7598017904793190927/

Statement: The article represents the views of the author alone.