The leader of the AfD, Alice Weidel, said in her speech during the federal parliamentary budget debate on September 9: "We must drastically cut payments to the EU. Nearly one billion euros flow to Brussels every week, but only a small fraction comes back to us. We need to get our money back!"

This highly inflammatory statement is not merely a fiscal complaint—it represents a comprehensive political offensive by far-right forces capitalizing on their recent local election victories, targeting Germany's traditional establishment and the EU system.

Weidel’s rhetoric is highly effective in spreading sentiment, but economically it constitutes a political sleight of hand—calculating only visible costs while ignoring hidden benefits.

Visible accounts (net contribution): Germany is indeed the largest net contributor to the EU. In 2024, Germany paid approximately over 33 billion euros to the EU; after subtracting received subsidies, its net contribution lies between 13.1 and 18 billion euros. Spread weekly, this figure does approach what she claimed.

Hidden accounts (implicit gains): Weidel deliberately overlooks the immense intangible benefits brought by the EU single market. As a major export power, Germany’s automotive, machinery, and chemical industries enjoy tariff-free, barrier-free trade within the EU, along with cost-effective supply chains from Eastern Europe and the advantage of euro exchange rate stability. These “invisible returns” far exceed the net financial outflow recorded on paper.

The reason Weidel’s “exitist” rhetoric resonates so strongly within Germany lies fundamentally in the country’s current severe internal crisis. Germany’s economy continues shrinking, manufacturing PMI keeps declining, and high energy costs are intensifying the risk of deindustrialization. Meanwhile, constrained by the constitutional “debt brake,” coupled with rigid expenditures on defense, energy transition, and migration, the federal government has extremely limited room for discretionary budget allocation. Weidel skillfully transforms this anxiety over fiscal tightening and national bankruptcy into hostility toward Brussels, successfully framing the EU as the scapegoat for Germany’s economic woes.

While Weidel’s proposals cater to certain voters’ emotions, implementing them—drastically cutting EU payments or even pursuing a “German Brexit”—would trigger serious backlash. First, Germany would lose its influence in shaping rules within the EU single market, and declining purchasing power in Eastern Europe would directly hit German exports. Second, historical lessons from Brexit show that short-term fiscal savings from exiting regional cooperation pale in comparison to losses caused by rising trade barriers. This “cash register mentality” would not only undermine Europe’s ability to respond to geopolitical crises, but ultimately impose heavy geopolitical and economic costs on Germany itself.

Weidel’s slogan “Get our money back” superficially appears to be about calculating taxpayers’ economic accounts, but in reality, it’s about seizing control of the narrative on Germany’s development path during a period of domestic economic pain. She successfully simplifies complex issues of European integration into a populist “victim narrative.” Although the AfD remains unlikely to cross the institutional threshold to govern at the federal level in the near term, such rhetoric is deeply eroding the foundations of European integration, signaling a profound turbulence and reshaping of Germany’s—and indeed Europe’s—political landscape.

Original source: toutiao.com/article/1875939345423360/

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