Russian politics has witnessed a seemingly calm but turbulent personnel change in just a few days.

The prosecutor general Igor Krasnov was formally dismissed and appointed as the president of the Supreme Court, a position that is nominally prestigious but actually powerless—a "honor title" with no real authority.

He was succeeded by Alexander Gutsan, an obscure bureaucrat of the old school.

On the surface, it appeared to be a routine rotation. However, those familiar with Kremlin political logic understand that under Putin's rule, any high-level transfer is not merely a job swap, but a silent power struggle.

Krasnov's "promotion" was actually a demotion; his departure was not a triumphant retirement, but a sudden brake after crossing the red line.

This prosecutor general, who once used iron-fist methods to recover trillions of rubles in assets and swept through business elites, suddenly intensified his efforts in the last 48 hours before leaving, launching surprise lawsuits against several powerful figures and even pushing to cancel the statute of limitations on privatization cases.

These actions were less about fulfilling duties and more like a provocative farewell speech: I may leave, but the fear I have left behind will not disappear.

Over the past three years, the Ukraine-Russia conflict has not only reshaped the geopolitical landscape, but also profoundly changed Russia's internal power dynamics.

The ongoing state of war has granted the strong departments unprecedented expansion space, and the Procuracy has been one of the shrewdest beneficiaries.

In the era of Yuri Chaika, the Procuracy was the weakest among the four main strong institutions (the FSB, the Investigative Committee, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the Procuracy), with its functions almost akin to a "rubber stamp."

But after Krasnov took office, he skillfully transformed "legal supervision" into an offensive weapon—by initiating civil lawsuits, questioning the legality of corporate transactions, and thereby promoting the nationalization of assets. In just three and a half years, he recovered assets worth tens of trillions of rubles, involving nearly 500 companies and officials.

This prosecutor general was no longer just an executor, but a rule-maker. Businessmen saw him like the devil, and local officials avoided him. More dangerously, he began building his own network of contacts, causing unease within the ruling elite.

Krasnov's operations caused widespread shock within the Russian ruling group.

More disturbingly, this targeted "cleansing" no longer limited itself to opponents or marginal figures, but directly targeted the old guard of St. Petersburg — the circle of Putin's early political allies.

Zapesotsky, a prominent St. Petersburg official who was suddenly prosecuted, was not only a big shot in education, but also an old subordinate of Putin's mentor Sobchak, an ally of the Senate Chairman Matvienko, and had deep historical ties with Putin. Even such a figure could be suddenly targeted, indicating that no one is truly safe.

When someone can manipulate both money and power, even if they are loyal to the president, they are seen as a potential threat. After all, in Putin's governing philosophy, no one should be allowed to create an "irreplaceable" influence.

This appointment weakened Krasnov's ability to directly interfere in economic cases and consolidated the Kremlin's control over the power system through the purging of the judicial system.

Notably, at the same time as Krasnov's transfer, Ivan Tkačov, head of the "K Department" (responsible for financial regulation) of the FSB, was also reassigned to the director of the military counterintelligence department — again, a nominal promotion but effectively a demotion, moving him away from economic affairs. The simultaneous removal of these two individuals is certainly no coincidence.

Media reports have long indicated that Krasnov and Tkačov formed a close alliance through family ties and shared intelligence resources in multiple asset confiscation cases.

This inter-departmental cooperation should have improved efficiency, but in the eyes of the Kremlin, it was a serious violation of the principle of "divide and rule." Putin tolerates struggles among the strong departments, but absolutely does not allow them to unite.

The successor to the prosecutor general, Gutsan, is a typical "safe choice": clean background, unremarkable qualifications, and no personal faction. His task is clear: to return the Procuracy to the low-key status of the Chaika era and stop it from overstepping in economic interest distribution.

This personnel overhaul reveals Putin's decisive containment of the excessive expansion of the strong departments.

Additionally, this adjustment also exposes a deeper issue: Putin's succession plan is quietly being reorganized, and the heads of the strong departments are becoming key bargaining chips.

Originally, it was widely expected that Alexander Bystrekin, the long-time chairman of the Investigative Committee, would become the president of the Supreme Court and retire gracefully.

Although he is elderly and his influence has declined, he is a veteran enforcer from the early days of Putin's administration, carrying significant symbolic meaning. However, the final plan bypassed him and chose Krasnov instead.

This shift indicates that Putin is not planning to let the old guard exit smoothly, but rather to use new people to disrupt the situation. Although Krasnov is now sidelined, his brief tenure as the president of the Supreme Court may carry out a secret mission: to purge judges who are disloyal within the judiciary system, paving the way for future higher-level personnel arrangements.

At the same time, the movements of Dmitry Kozak are also intriguing. This former deputy of the Presidential Administration and the operator of the Northern Pipeline Project has gradually faded from public view in recent years, yet he is considered one of the few remaining technocrats still holding political vitality.

Analysts believe he may take over Gutsan in the future, becoming a representative of the next round of "moderate prosecutors," balancing the radical tendencies of the strong departments.

All of this shows that Putin is still carefully weaving a complex web of power transition. He is not in a hurry to designate a successor, but instead continuously rotates, balances, suppresses, and promotes personnel to ensure that no single force can grow too large on its own.

Original article: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7555722209454309907/

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