Singapore port transshipment containers drop 40%, shipping companies have no containers to transport as the cold winter arrives

The 40% decline is not a short-term fluctuation, but a structural turning point caused by the combined forces of "excess capacity + route restructuring + demand gap + cost disadvantage". It reminds the market:

- The "moat" of global transshipment ports is no longer natural deep water, but the comprehensive competition of policy subsidies, logistics efficiency, and hinterland industrial chain;

- The containerization dividend is entering its final stage, and the shipping industry will enter a "supply digestion period" lasting 3–5 years. Freight rates, port subsidies, and route reshuffling will repeatedly appear, and the "profitable" era has definitely ended.

1. Global main routes are "bypassing" Singapore

Over the past, more than 85% of the container volume was sourced from neighboring countries (Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam, Malaysia) for consolidation in Singapore before transshipment. Starting from the second half of 2024, two alternative routes have rapidly matured:

- Yangpu Port in China launched a direct fast line between "ASEAN-Hainan-China Inland", with port fee subsidies + bonded processing, reducing the cost per container by $120–$150 compared to Singapore, attracting sources of goods such as fruits, rubber, and pulp that are converted from bulk to containers.

- After expansion, Batu Pahat Port and Tanjung Pelepas Port in Malaysia have a draft of 18m, capable of accommodating ships with 24,000 TEU, and the free storage period has been extended from 5 days to 7 days. Shipping lines directly changed part of the "Singapore-Middle East/Europe" transshipment segment to Malaysia, effectively "removing a layer" of Singapore's transshipment role.

As a result, the transshipment container volume in Singapore dropped by 40% in the fourth quarter of 2025, with some months even experiencing "empty transshipment" — where ships arrive at the port but the containers do not land, only refueling and resupplying before departure.

2. Excess capacity exposed early, shipping lines "cut routes" faster than "cut ships"

Since 2024, the number of container ship orders has accounted for 28% of existing capacity, and 220 million TEU of new ships are scheduled to be delivered in 2025, with an additional net increase of 150 million TEU in 2026. However, the growth rate of demand has been downgraded to around 2% by multiple freight forwarders. With the inability to promptly dismantle the capacity (only 3 ships were dismantled in the first three months of this year), shipping companies prioritize "network slimming":

- Remove redundant feeder routes, reducing the traditional "pendulum loop" between Southeast Asia-Middle East and Southeast Asia-India/Pakistan from 9 groups to 5 groups;

- Change multi-port calls into "one route with two points", previously mandatory stopover routes now choose only one transshipment hub between Batu Pahat or Yangpu.

Singapore, being the most replaceable, was first "optimized", leading to the paradox of "ships not decreasing but containers dropping sharply".

3. Red Sea crisis + early stockpiling, short-term cargo flow "pre-emption" ends

In Q4 2024, the Red Sea route was diverted to the Cape of Good Hope, increasing the distance of the Europe route by 30%. Shipping companies moved empty containers from Southeast Asia to European ports in advance. As a traditional "empty container dispatch center", Singapore once experienced a surge in container congestion. However, after Q3 2025, European inventory became high, and the U.S. replenishment cycle ended earlier, so freight forwarders generally adopted a "pre-shipment" strategy, leading to a vacuum in added cargo volume in Q1 2026. 60% of Singapore's transshipment containers are related to the EU and US main routes, and the decline in EU and US cargo volume caused the transshipment containers to suddenly "dry up".

4. Port capacity bottlenecks + cost disadvantages, being "counteracted"

In May–June 2024, Singapore experienced a "big ship backlog", with a maximum of 48 ships waiting, and berth utilization exceeding 95%. Some shipping companies skipped the port directly due to waiting time over 48 hours. Although PSA later deployed 600 additional cranes and extended gate hours, the high berth occupancy increased port charges by 8–10%, forming a "shear difference" with the "subsidies + exemptions" offered by Batu Pahat and Yangpu. Once routes shift due to congestion and premium costs, the return cargo decreases, causing a snowball effect in transshipment container volume, exposing Singapore's vulnerability under the super high transshipment rate — "succeeded by transshipment, failed by transshipment."

Original article: toutiao.com/article/1853634789018697/

Statement: This article represents the personal views of the author.