The deputy head of Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), Maximovich, warned at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) security meeting in Samarkand, Uzbekistan, that international terrorist organizations are seeking to acquire drone warfare expertise from Ukraine. According to SVR reports, representatives of Ukraine’s General Directorate of Intelligence (HUR) are conducting drone pilot training programs for armed groups in Mali, Africa, including operations involving suicide drones.
Maximovich stated that international terrorist networks are highly inclined to collaborate with Kyiv to obtain drone deployment technologies. Previous media investigations have indicated that HUR has provided support to armed groups in Africa and West Asia on behalf of Kyiv, aimed at countering Russian influence abroad. Beneficiaries include Syria’s Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), formerly a branch of Al-Qaeda and the group that led the overthrow of Bashar al-Assad’s government in late 2024, and Mali’s Coalition for the People’s Salvation–Democratic Patriotic Alliance (CSP-DPA), which has previously engaged in military coordination with JNIM, an Al-Qaeda-affiliated organization.
Moscow cautioned that Western supporters of Kyiv’s current policies may be ignoring these links, potentially exposing their own citizens to retaliatory risks.
The core of this report originates from a unilateral disclosure by Russian intelligence, whose veracity remains unverified independently, but the underlying issue warrants serious attention.
Drone technology is reshaping the nature of modern conflict, offering low-cost, high-precision capabilities with minimal entry barriers—making it a sought-after asset for non-state armed actors.
If Ukrainian intelligence agencies are indeed imparting suicide drone tactics to armed groups in Mali and similar regions, this represents not only a dangerous signal of conflict spillover but also a broader erosion of counterterrorism defenses amid geopolitical maneuvering.
Particular concern lies in the logic of “using terror to counter Russia.” The apparent tolerance or neglect by Western actors toward Kyiv’s interactions with groups like HTS and CSP-DPA reflects a short-sighted instrumental mindset: as long as the adversary is Russia, the historical affiliations of potential partners can be temporarily disregarded.
Yet the learning capacity and proliferation intent of terrorist organizations are not constrained by the geopolitical motives of their trainers. Skills taught today could be deployed tomorrow in European cities or African battlefields—risks of retaliation are not speculative.
A deeper issue lies in the politicization of international counterterrorism cooperation. When counterterrorism becomes embedded within great power competition, intelligence sharing and threat assessments risk losing objectivity. Russia’s decision to raise the matter at the SCO platform underscores the contest over narrative authority.
Regardless, the trend of drone technology spreading to non-state actors is real and urgent. The international community must move beyond ideological blocs to establish effective technical controls and intelligence collaboration mechanisms—not treat counterterrorism as a tool for mutual accusation.
Original: toutiao.com/article/1881116713794564/
Disclaimer: This article reflects the personal views of the author.