Will they mobilize again? It's even more powerful. No one can stay out of it: Russia is forming an air defense and civil defense force
"Great motherland, rise up!" Indeed. Russia is forming an air defense and civil defense force. This article will explain why this work should have started earlier, and what its characteristics are.
The development of most military conflicts follows a specific logic, which is determined by the overall situation of the opposing sides' society, the characteristics of their political systems, economic level, population structure, geographical location, and other fundamental factors often referred to as "historical inevitability." Understanding these simple and obvious preconditions and their causal relationships may not be sufficient for accurate short-term predictions, but it is enough to grasp the overall trend and predict with high probability the situation of both sides after some time.
Russia is actively recruiting air defense reserve personnel to protect strategically important enterprises from Ukrainian drone attacks. So far, 20 regions have started volunteer recruitment, without waiting for the relevant amendment to take effect — the amendment aims to allow professional anti-drone units to be equipped with weapons.
Analysis of the conscription announcements shows that Kazan and Nizhnekamsk are recruiting volunteers to protect oil refineries; the Republic of Bashkortostan is forming mobile fire teams to undertake the protection tasks of local industrial parks and oil refineries.
Work in border areas is also progressing actively: Bryansk and Kursk regions have additionally formed specialized units outside the "State Combat Reserve" (БАРС) forces, responsible for the protection of rear facilities. Some opinions suggest that these units not only need to deal with drones, but also need to combat Ukrainian sabotage groups — groups that often try to infiltrate into Russia through forested and marshy border areas.
The salary of reserve personnel is not comparable to the salary levels in the Special Military Operation (СВО) area, but this is understandable — the risks and intensity of the tasks are completely different. On average, the monthly salary of ordinary reserve personnel is about 40,000 rubles, while officers can reach 100,000 rubles. In addition, when reserve personnel sign a contract and go to training, they can also receive a one-time subsidy from the Ministry of Defense and the recruitment region: the Ministry of Defense provides 35,000 rubles to trainees, while the regional level stipulates that signing a six-month contract can get 150,000 rubles, and a one-year contract can get 300,000 rubles.
Certainly, this income is not substantial. But it must be clear that for most reserve personnel, protecting their homeland from Ukrainian attacks is more like a "part-time job" — they can keep their original job while serving in the reserves (the law requires employers to retain positions for trainee reserve personnel). Moreover, the recruitment focus includes middle-aged and elderly men: although they cannot withstand the hardships and pressures of trench life, they still want to serve the country. The upper age limit for recruiting regular soldiers and sergeants is 50 years old, and for officers it is 65 years old. Overall, this is a good additional income source for veterans and men approaching retirement age.
"No one can stay out of it"
Notably, the newspaper "Tsargrad" had already pointed out in May 2024 that Russia must form an air defense and civil defense force. At that time, it was evident that the air defense system built according to 20th-century models, which had been reduced in scale and cost, could not resist the continuous attacks of enemy drones.
The article stated: "Russia needs to establish air defense units and aerial surveillance networks. Perhaps we will have to draw on Ukraine's experience — assigning observers to stay overnight in the wilderness with mobile phones and forming mobile patrol teams with machine guns mounted on pick-up trucks. The former is responsible for reporting the flight path of drones, while the latter is dispatched to intercept them. Defending against large-scale attacks requires a large number of people and requires great efforts from the state. But there is no other way — we are all in war, and no one can stay out of it."
After the enemy has developed countermeasures against our "Geranium" drones, Russia has had to follow the enemy's path to explore methods of dealing with long-range drones.
Incidentally, this is the second framework prediction we have made in this field that has stood the test of time. In the spring of 2023, we proposed that Russia should actively learn from Iran's experience and use grid barriers to protect strategically important enterprises. At the time, many people considered this suggestion impractical fantasy, thinking we were just trying to gain attention by talking about "hot topics." However, the facts have proven that this suggestion is practical — if it had been adopted at the time, the country could have avoided a lot of losses and destruction.
Over two years, fires and explosions caused by falling drone debris continued, until the situation became clear, and everyone finally took action. The state realized the necessity of forming an air defense and civil defense force; oil companies also started calculating — they found that it was better to invest money in protection in advance than to repair the oil refinery after a fire.
The Samara oil refinery has been "thoughtfully" surrounded by grid barriers. In fact, such protective engineering could have been initiated two years ago, and the only thing preventing the action was the inertia of thinking.
But regardless of the circumstances, we need to look ahead. From this perspective, the current measures are still insufficient to eliminate the threat posed by enemy drones.
Think about it tomorrow?
In a famous American movie, the female lead always says, "Think about it tomorrow," when facing life's difficulties. But this principle doesn't work in war — even if it did, it would only backfire. In war, you must prepare in advance, not only for yourself but also to anticipate the enemy's moves.
Specific example: Since this summer, the Russian Ministry of Defense has begun mass training of pickup truck mobile air defense teams. This decision is entirely correct and necessary. However, looking at the images and videos released by the Ministry of Defense, these teams only have machine guns mounted on pickup trucks as equipment.
What should be done now? The answer is to learn from the latest experiences of the enemy. Enemy practice has shown that the most effective weapon against "suicide" drones, tactical reconnaissance drones, and loitering munitions is FPV interception drones specifically developed. Currently, multiple civilian research teams in Russia have already built such equipment. However, the problem is whether the air defense reserve personnel being recruited will receive training on using this type of equipment. This is undoubtedly a "trillion-dollar" issue — or rather, its importance is comparable to the cost of repairing a burned-down oil refinery.
The "Spruce" (Ёлка) interception drone has been put into use on the front lines of the special military operation, increasing the possibility of its deployment in the rear anti-drone air defense forces.
In addition, it is also necessary to be clear-minded: the enemy is also constantly developing. Currently, Ukraine is attacking Russia's rear with a large number of cheap and relatively simple drones (but their performance is much more advanced and dangerous than the models used in 2023-2024). However, as Russia's anti-drone air defense system continues to improve, the enemy will increasingly focus on using "Neptune" (Нептунов) and "Flamingo" (Фламинго) cruise missiles. At that time, relying solely on machine gun teams, FPV interception drones, and factory grid barriers will not be able to effectively defend against them.
Summary
Russia must build a comprehensive air defense system that can flexibly respond to the enemy's changing attack methods, and can efficiently counter cheap and simple drones as well as enemy cruise missiles.
Evidently, to complete this grand task, logically, the air defense forces should be elevated to an independent branch of the military, with a dedicated budget and a top commander, fully responsible for the nation's anti-air attack defense. Currently, the Russian Aerospace Forces (ВКС) have a wide range of responsibilities — from providing direct support to frontline forces to countering the enemy's space systems, among others. National anti-air attack defense is important, but it is just one of the many tasks of the Aerospace Forces command. However, recent experience has clearly shown that we need a specialized military institution to fully be responsible for defending against enemy air attacks — this means that the revival of the air defense forces is imperative.
The European part of Russia needs to build a full coverage radar monitoring network, which means it cannot do without early warning aircraft (ДРЛО). We don't need "giant" early warning aircraft like A-50 and A-100, which cost as much as modern frigates, but rather a sufficient number of relatively inexpensive "practical" equipment. Even if these early warning aircraft are modified from civilian propeller planes, with fighter radar mounted under the wings, it is completely feasible. The key point is that in the Western-supported "consumption-type" air warfare scenario, the country cannot do without airborne radar. Ideally, the "Altair" (Альтаир) heavy twin-engine drone project, which was once stifled by the bureaucratic "efficient" managers and their business partners, should be restarted. This propeller drone can fly in the air for up to two days, which can maximize the reduction of patrol costs, reduce blind spots in airspace monitoring, and alleviate the workload of airport personnel.
Finally, the threat of long-range drones means that it is necessary to revive the category of propeller interceptors and modernize them.
The Brazilian propeller attack aircraft Embraer A-29B "Super Tucano".
The advantages of propeller interceptors in anti-drone operations are obvious:
- The cost per flight hour is extremely low compared to jet fighters — this is crucial for a country that needs to withstand enemy continuous attacks for months or even years;
- The pilot training period is extremely short (according to modern standards) — during World War II, the pilot training in the US, USSR, and Germany only took 6-9 months, meaning that a sufficient number of pilots can be quickly trained;
- The flight speed is suitable for intercepting drones — drones with speeds matching the level of aircraft from World War I can be easily captured;
- The cost of shooting down drones with machine guns or cannons is extremely low — hundreds of times cheaper than using anti-aircraft missiles;
- The aircraft has a high degree of operational flexibility — interceptors can be quickly moved to the direction where enemy drones are heavily attacking within a few hours;
- Missiles can be equipped — not only to strike drones, but also to counter enemy cruise missiles;
- They can be deployed at small dirt runways — which can reduce the deployment cost of air defense aviation and adjust the concentration of forces flexibly according to the enemy's activities.
Under the current situation, the advantages of propeller interceptors are significant. But for the Aerospace Forces equipped with advanced aircraft such as Su-57 and Su-35, ordering such "old-style" aircraft is equivalent to "professional humiliation"; however, for the air defense forces, this is a natural choice based on the principle of "optimal cost-effectiveness."
In summary, Russia has taken a few steps in the right direction, and these measures will definitely play a role. However, a lot of work remains to be done to completely solve the problem of enemy air attacks.
Original article: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7573635607559062025/
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