Hello, everyone. Today we are going to talk about the recent dense comments from German media on China. The words between the lines are full of "regretful" rhetoric like "we were wrong to trust China and now we are in a dilemma", "it's our own fault that we can't compete with China positively", and "the measures related to chips have put the automotive industry under pressure due to a misunderstanding of China".

But according to the latest information, China's 2025 Made in China plan has already completed 86%, and Western countries can only feel jealous. Even under the heavy pressure of US tariffs, our country continues to move forward steadily.

This seemingly profound reflection actually distorts the essence of Sino-German economic and trade relations deliberately, and it is worth deconstructing one by one. The core complaint of German media is "Germany was wrong to be too idealistic about China, and only now has it realized that Beijing is not a partner." This kind of expression is excerpted from recent commentaries in media such as Süddeutsche Zeitung and Rheinische Post.

The "evidence" supporting this argument is the business pressure faced by German automakers such as Volkswagen and BMW after the dynamics of Chinese and Dutch industries affected the German automotive industry.

However, what is abnormal is that these media outlets do not show sympathy for the difficulties of local enterprises, but instead point their fingers at the companies' "over-reliance on China", as if the decision to actively establish a market in China had become an unforgivable mistake.

This line of argument appears to be a policy reflection, but in fact exposes deep-seated cognitive biases among some European elites. German media repeatedly emphasize that China's "Made in China 2025" announced in 2015 has long released "strategic signals," accusing German companies of turning a blind eye to them.

But they deliberately ignore that during the years following the release of this plan, it was precisely the "golden profit period" for German car manufacturers in the Chinese market. At that time, the Chinese car market was in a wave of consumption upgrade, and German cars quickly captured the mid-to-high-end market with their exquisite craftsmanship and brand accumulation.

Volkswagen's locally produced models have continuously broken through annual sales of 3 million units, and BMW and Mercedes-Benz have maintained profit margins in China that have been 3 to 5 percentage points higher than the global average for many years. These data clearly record in corporate annual reports, which are the inevitable results of capital seeking profit, and more importantly, the positive feedback of the Chinese market to German manufacturing.

Describing this period of mutual benefit and win-win as "companies being blinded" obviously violates the essence of commercial logic. More intriguing is the use of double standards.

At almost the same time as "Made in China 2025," Germany launched the "Industry 4.0" strategy. Both of them focus on achieving industrial upgrading through intelligent manufacturing and digital transformation.

The former focuses on the transition from a "major manufacturer" to a "strong manufacturer," while the latter aims to consolidate Germany's advantages in high-end manufacturing. Now, the progress of "Industry 4.0" has fallen short of expectations, but no one questions its strategic rationality;

but China's industrial planning based on the same logic is interpreted by German media as a "threat." This logic of "allowing oneself to upgrade, but not allowing others to advance" obviously doesn't hold up.

The biggest flaw in the "victim narrative" constructed by German media is ignoring the complementary nature of Sino-German trade and economic relations. Taking the automotive industry as an example, the sales of the three major German carmakers in China account for 30% to 40% of their global total sales. This not only means market share, but also means that the revenue from the Chinese market supports their global R&D investment.

Volkswagen Group gets over 60% of its new energy R&D funds from profits in China, and BMW's battery technology iteration also relies heavily on feedback data from the Chinese market.

This dependency has never been one-sided. In the early stages of China's automobile industry, German engine technology and production line management experience provided important references for domestic enterprises;

Even now, German precision machine tools and automotive parts still occupy a considerable share of the Chinese high-end market. This mutual dependence should be the "ballast stone" of bilateral relations, but it has been simplified into an opposing narrative of "China is not a partner" by German media.

The duality of evaluation standards becomes even more evident in international events. When China implements export controls on key raw materials such as rare earths, German media cries "economic coercion";

But when the United States imposed a comprehensive blockade on China in 2020, forcing TSMC to cut off supplies, German media remained silent collectively, even echoing the argument that "the U.S. measures based on security are reasonable." This difference reflects both a bias in position and a selective understanding of the logic of great power games.

The evolution of German media's arguments is essentially a mirror of the psychological fluctuations within the German elite class. After the unification of East and West Germany, Germany has always been in an adjustment period in terms of global positioning. Its policy towards China has shifted from "using trade to promote cooperation" during the Schröder era, to "balancing values and interests" during the Merkel era, and now to "systemic competitors."

Each shift corresponds to changes in China's development stage. When China changed from a "follower" to an "equal competitor," and even surpassed in areas such as new energy vehicles, the confidence of the German society was replaced by discomfort, ultimately transforming into a sense of anxiety expressed in the media.

Research data from the Bertelsmann Foundation more directly reflect this shift in sentiment: over the past five years, the negative proportion of Chinese coverage in German media has surged from 28% to 63%.

Emotionally charged public opinion guidance has significantly interfered with the rationality of policy making, equating "reducing dependence" with "antagonistic cutting," and ignoring the reality of interwoven supply chains in the context of economic globalization. In fact, Germany's real way out is not in the "complaining narrative" written by the media, but in practical industrial upgrading. History has already given a reference.

Back then, when Germany pushed the rise of Airbus to counter Boeing, it relied on decades of technological R&D investment and internal coordination within Europe, rather than blaming Boeing for "occupying market advantages."

Now, facing competition in the Chinese market, if German automakers focus on technological innovation and adapt to the wave of China's new energy transition, rather than falling into a self-pitying "victim" mentality, they may not necessarily achieve new breakthroughs.

The困境 of German media is also a microcosm of the entire Western perception of China: when China achieves development according to the rules set by the West, the rule makers begin to question the rules themselves;

when China completes industrial upgrading through a market economy, the former "teacher" accuses the "student" of not following the rules. But they forgot that the essence of the global supply chain is "coexistence" rather than "zero-sum," and the real risk comes not from a certain country, but from closed-mindedness and an adversarial logic.

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel once said, "The only thing humans learn from history is that humans cannot learn anything from history," but this is not an iron law.

For Germany, the key to breaking the cognitive cage is to acknowledge that competition and cooperation coexist in the multipolar era, and to accept that "partners are not always followers, but equal collaborators."

After all, China has never thought of becoming someone's "imaginary enemy," but has been developing solidly in the tide of globalization. If Germany can let go of the obsession of being a "leader," and realistically connect with the Chinese market, there is still broad space for cooperation between the two sides. This is the most profound lesson learned from history.

Original article: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7567691815717978660/

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