The market had just taken a breath, but a few words pulled the mood back to its previous state: there will be another chance to sit at the negotiation table after a year, and uncertainty has become the norm. Former U.S. Trade Representative Lai Xie directly stated that the consensus to withdraw some retaliatory measures would not last long, only a few months to a year; he believed in "strategic decoupling," cutting where necessary and preserving what needs to be preserved, avoiding mutual destruction and not taking a step back, gradually cutting at the opponent's vital points.

Grace Gao from the German Marshall Fund called it a "fragile truce," reminding that the current calm is just a thin layer of cellophane paper. Although agricultural products and Alaskan oil and gas purchases, cooperation on fentanyl, the final TikTok deal, and the postponement of new regulations on rare earths seem quiet, the real innovation and technological applications have just begun.

The drama came from U.S. Treasury Secretary Biden: after the negotiations, he immediately changed his tone, pointing out key minerals and stating that China's space to "coerce" with rare earths would not last long, and that within 12 to 24 months, the U.S. could offset the impact, and he asserted that China using rare earths to threaten the U.S. was "wrong." He bet that the U.S. would return to the negotiating table after a year, and he even threw out the idea of extending the negotiations, saying in one sentence that "China, which controls rare earths, cannot withstand Trump's tariffs," linking the gun, tariffs, and minerals together. Trump himself also said that the agreement would be "negotiated annually," using frequent renegotiations to create bargaining power, turning uncertainty into a tool.

Before the trade negotiations, the White House signed a key mineral cooperation agreement with Australia, directly targeting the assurance of sufficient Australian minerals and rare earths for the U.S. Then, the U.S. led the G7 energy ministers at a meeting in Toronto to announce 26 plans: mobilizing private capital, establishing capacity outside of China, and reshaping the entire supply chain from minerals to magnets in another space. U.S. Energy Secretary Rite made a tough statement, saying that non-market means would be used to counter China's dominant position—limiting investments, exclusive procurement, financial tools, and standards rules, among other non-tariff measures, would all be used.

Offensive actions and internal gains are being carried out simultaneously. High-end chips remain under control; the abuse and expansion of penetration rules for export controls continue; the Entity List keeps adding more items; Section 301 investigations can be opened at any time; and additional tariffs remain a common deterrent. The truly deadly aspects are the first two: high-end chips block future applications, and if they are not promoted within a year, the Trump camp may push this card to its maximum; penetration rules become more detailed, and thresholds for related ownership, shares, or control may be redefined, making it unsafe even if shares are below 50%. Once the rules change, the path narrows.

Two cards in the sleeve are also ready to use: one is alliances, as the U.S. has already sorted out trade agreements with Japan and South Korea, reducing communication costs, and the G7 key mineral alliance effectively gives the alliance card a propulsion system; the second is Taiwan, which the Trump team has touched upon multiple times during negotiations but hasn't put on the table due to high risks and high prices that could lead to a collapse. However, after the new "Defense Strategy" and large-scale arms sales to Taiwan were advanced, any progress on bills such as the "Porcupine Act," "Deter China's Aggression Against Taiwan," "U.S.-Taiwan Americas Partnership," and "Taiwan International Solidarity" would change the atmosphere, and it is likely that the Taiwan card will come to the table in the next round of negotiations.

The withdrawal of some retaliatory measures brought a brief sense of peace and breathing room to our lives: orders stabilized, shipping became smooth, and the prices of oil, salt, sauce, and vinegar slightly decreased. However, we should not relax our guard, as the other side's chips have not yet been recovered, but rather are being sharpened. From the corporate level, it's about the fluctuations in cash flow and the opening and closing of production lines.

Terms like "high-end chip replacement," "industrial software adaptation," and "equipment localization" actually correspond to jobs, orders, and livelihoods. Although key minerals may seem far away, they are actually integrated into electric vehicle drive motors, wind turbine permanent magnet generators, and mobile phone vibration motors. What Biden referred to as "12-24 months" is a line; time is limited, and we need to act quickly. Those who understand it don't just focus on a single shipload of goods, but also on the full chain over three years.

The other side's rhythm is clear: negotiate, sign, leak information, coordinate with allies, then build the market, attract capital, and establish rules—a coherent set of actions. We cannot just stay at the level of slogans. Improving weaknesses is not just checking off items on an industry list, but drilling holes and filling sand in core areas; improving the supply chain is not just about domestic support, but also considering the quality of the "friend supply chain"; geographically, it's not just about reasoning in the public sphere, but also about positioning in production capacity layout, logistics channels, and offshore platforms. Holding key mineral resources in hand, we must maintain the threshold, not be led by "non-market means," and not lose our own strength.

Is the withdrawal of some retaliatory measures worth it? In the short term, it can maintain flexibility; in the medium term, it depends on whether this momentum can break through bottlenecks. After a year, when the discussion resumes, the situation will have changed: if old problems persist and nothing changes, the benefits gained from negotiations will be quickly offset by new restrictions; if core technologies, key materials, and industrial organizations can advance two steps further, then the negotiation posture will be different, and we can stand tall.

"Strategic decoupling" is popular because it directly targets the division of interests: the other side keeps high-value and high-control parts in their hands, pushing more volatility, risk, and cost to the other side. To withstand it, we must have pricing power, iteration power, and substitution power; lacking any of these will be uncomfortable. From a practical perspective, more and more "traps" appear in contracts: new clauses, new standards, and new compliance requirements keep emerging. Before signing, ask more questions; before production, calculate more carefully; before expanding production, prepare several contingency plans, breaking down uncertainty into manageable small pieces—not cowardice, but calculating the accounts more carefully.

One thing is certain: the situation after a year will definitely not be as it is now. The other side's methods are more mature, and their tactics are deeper. We don't need to consider who will flip first, but rather ensure that we are not afraid when it happens: the key valves are in our hands, key nodes can be controlled, and key alliances can be maintained. How long the rare earths card can be played depends on the hand on the card and the situation behind it.

Original article: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7567729603507274267/

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