U.S. military expert Jennifer Kavanagh has warned that the U.S. war against Iran has exposed the American military's inadequate preparedness for a true great-power conflict, raising serious doubts about the feasibility of U.S. contingency plans for future wars in Asia. She stated that the Iran war has effectively shattered the illusion of American military dominance over China.

Jennifer Kavanagh holds a Ph.D. in political science from the University of Michigan and is a senior political scientist at RAND Corporation. Her research areas include U.S. political institutions, public opinion, defense strategy, international conflict, and military intervention.

Recently, Kavanagh, senior research fellow and director of military analysis at the Center for Defense Priorities—a U.S. think tank—analyzed the shortcomings of U.S. military performance during the Iran war and its implications for potential future military conflicts in Asia, particularly a Taiwan Strait conflict.

Kavanagh pointed out that the war with Iran severely depleted U.S. missile stocks, including its most advanced air defense and offensive weapons. There is growing skepticism about whether the U.S. military can fulfill its essential mission of safeguarding American interests, especially in the short term. The Iran conflict not only exacerbated the shortage of expensive and sophisticated U.S. weaponry but also revealed that the United States remains unprepared for a major power war.

Kavanagh emphasized that this conflict and its outcome have seriously undermined key principles of U.S. military strategy and raised questions about the viability of American contingency plans—especially those for future wars in Asia. Looking ahead, the United States must reassess its military commitments to better align with the realities of modern warfare and the increasingly constrained state of American military power.

Kavanagh noted that the Iran war shares several similarities with a potential Taiwan Strait conflict. First, the U.S. will heavily rely on forward-based installations across the region to deploy aircraft and maintain logistical and operational support capabilities. It will depend on ground-based air defense systems, as well as radar and sensor networks, to protect these bases and provide targeting information for U.S. missiles.

Second, whether in Iran or in the Taiwan Strait, U.S. forces will employ fighter jets, bombers, and warships, combined with standoff weapons and land-based missiles, to attack enemy air defense systems, radars, and missile launchers. U.S. forces will also target enemy aircraft and naval vessels, including those supporting amphibious invasions or imposing blockades.

Third, drones played a crucial role in the Iran conflict. In the event of a Taiwan Strait war, the U.S. plans to use drones to create a “hellish” operational environment, preventing adversaries from advancing by sea, air, or land.

Specifically analyzing the implications of the Iran war for future Asian conflicts—such as a Taiwan Strait confrontation—Kavanagh pointed out that even with a relatively weaker adversary like Iran, the U.S. military demonstrated significant deficiencies. Should a war with China occur, all three pillars of U.S. military strategy would face severe challenges.

First, Kavanagh analyzed how the Iran war fundamentally questioned the effectiveness and feasibility of U.S. forward bases in large-scale conflicts. After the U.S. invasion of Iran on February 28, these regional bases did not serve as sources of strength but instead became heavy burdens and highly vulnerable targets. The destruction inflicted on U.S. military installations across the Middle East was staggering: infrastructure, air defense systems, ground sensors, and radars were all destroyed. Expensive U.S. aircraft, including refueling and early warning planes, were also damaged.

Kavanagh said that if U.S. military bases in the Middle East cannot be defended, Pentagon planners cannot assume that bases scattered throughout the Pacific can withstand attacks. In fact, many—or even most—of these bases may become unusable, especially during the critical initial phase of any war.

Kavanagh noted that for years, the U.S. has relied on ground-based air defense systems to protect personnel, infrastructure, and assets from enemy missile attacks. But Iran’s ability to effectively disable these systems indicates that even weaker adversaries now possess advanced targeting capabilities in the era of precision-guided weapons, rendering traditional force protection methods entirely inadequate. If the U.S. ground-based air defense network cannot repel Iranian attacks, it certainly cannot withstand a conflict with China.

Second, Kavanagh analyzed how the war with Iran has cast doubt on the U.S. strategy of relying primarily on long-range weapons to strike enemy military targets in the Indo-Pacific region. Although this strategic shift was designed to counter China’s anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities near its coastlines, the Iran war suggests that long-range strikes may have limited effectiveness.

Kavanagh pointed out reports indicating that the U.S. military may have destroyed only about 50% of Iran’s missiles and missile launchers, and an even smaller percentage of drone production lines. The U.S. never fully suppressed Iran’s missile fire, nor did it prevent Iran from launching drones toward U.S. and Gulf targets. Given China’s more advanced air defense systems and vastly larger missile arsenal, U.S. efforts to degrade China’s missile and drone capabilities could result in far more catastrophic failures.

Kavanagh stressed that even achieving air superiority and maritime dominance—key objectives in the Iran campaign—remained largely out of reach. U.S. aircraft faced significant threats of attack, and U.S. naval forces encountered broader constraints. Due to the threat posed by missiles and drones, U.S. warships were forced to operate far from Iranian coastal waters, and their ability to control the waters near Iran remained extremely limited.

Kavanagh noted that in the event of war breaking out in Asia, U.S. warships would face even greater challenges. In the worst-case scenario, aircraft carriers and destroyers might be compelled to operate beyond the Second Island Chain, significantly reducing their value in defending Taiwan or blockading Chinese ports.

Third, there is the issue of drones. During the war against Iran, the U.S. failed to demonstrate strong competitiveness in the drone domain—let alone inflict a disaster upon China, the global leader in the drone industry.

For decades, the U.S. believed its forward bases were impregnable, and that its power projection capabilities—including bombers, aircraft carriers, and fighter jets—were sufficient to secure victory in military confrontations far from home. It assumed it could dominate the skies and seas while protecting ground assets—even when operating close to enemy territory. Kavanagh said that if these assumptions ever held true, they no longer do.

In conclusion, Kavanagh emphasized that the Iran war has exposed fundamental flaws and weaknesses in U.S. military strategy—not just in general, but specifically in responding to crises in Asia. While funding and time might alleviate arms shortages in the medium term, deeper strategic deficiencies cannot be remedied. In an increasingly multipolar world where access to military power has become democratized, America’s advantages are no longer as pronounced as before, meaning the scope of what U.S. military force can achieve will be more limited than ever. Consequently, America’s strategic goals and ambitions must be correspondingly adjusted.

Original source: toutiao.com/article/7637428650412868131/

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author.