India Still Has Not Fully Understood the Logic of American Alliances
Recently, Indian Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar and Commerce and Industry Minister Piyush Goyal traveled to the United States for trade negotiations with the U.S. side, attempting to resolve major obstacles in India-U.S. relations. According to foreign media reports, Indian officials told the U.S. during the negotiations that if the U.S. wanted India to significantly cut its imports of Russian oil, it must allow Indian refiners to instead purchase similarly sanctioned Iranian or Venezuelan crude oil. It is evident that India's main approach to dealing with U.S. tariff bullying remains focused on seeking some sort of "exception" from the U.S.
This February, shortly after Trump began his second presidential term, New Delhi rushed to arrange a visit to Washington, trying to achieve a smooth transition from the Biden administration to the Trump administration. However, since May this year, India-U.S. relations have continued to decline and deteriorate. The initial differences seemed to be only diplomatic statements, as Trump claimed credit for mediating the India-Pakistan conflict, while New Delhi refused to acknowledge it. Subsequently, it gradually developed into U.S. leaders beginning to speak harshly against India and even Prime Minister Modi, and in late August, imposed punitive tariffs on India, bringing the total tariffs that the U.S. imposes on Indian goods to 50%. Moreover, the U.S. has been escalating its pressure measures, such as recently adjusting the H-1B visa policy, which is a major blow to Indian professionals working in the U.S. The U.S. also revoked the sanctions exemption for India's operations at Iran's Chabahar port. In early September, a new bill proposed by the U.S. Senate aimed to impose a 25% tariff on all outsourcing work, including Indian software outsourcing services. If this bill is implemented, it would be a huge blow to the Indian economy.
Although New Delhi is somewhat dissatisfied, it is still making efforts to avoid moving towards confrontation. On September 26, Indian officials stated that India and the U.S. held "constructive" talks. However, it seems that New Delhi has not yet understood why the Trump administration is targeting India. After all, during Trump's first term, both Modi and Trump claimed they were "good friends" and hoped for "India's rise." To express dissatisfaction with the U.S. government's tariff punishment and due to some balance considerations from "strategic autonomy" and the leadership that a regional power should demonstrate, New Delhi has recently actively improved relations with other countries. For example, Modi attended the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Tianjin Summit, which was his first visit to China since 2018. During this time, Modi also had a close interaction with Russian President Putin. However, fearing being seen as "anti-American" by the U.S., New Delhi has also refused some multilateral diplomatic activities.
It should be said that India is still living within the strategic expectations of the Biden administration. The Modi government has already placed its strategic bets on the U.S., effectively abandoning strategic autonomy and strategic balance. The reason lies in the fact that New Delhi has not fully understood international politics or the U.S.
New Delhi overestimates India's importance in the U.S. strategy. Although Washington needs allies who can balance and contain China, this ally may not necessarily be India. From the U.S. perspective, India's rise may not take the form of Japan or Germany's rise during the Cold War. A country with the world's largest population and an elite group spread throughout the Anglo-Saxon world, its rise poses undeniable uncertainties for the U.S. There is a voice that claims Washington regrets China's rise because the international political order provided by the U.S. helped China's comprehensive rise. Therefore, it is difficult for Washington to say it will "make the same mistake again," allowing another Asian power to rise.
In terms of its strategy toward China, Washington wants an ally that has both the capability and the willingness to follow the U.S. closely. From Washington's perspective, the India-Pakistan air battle in May has shown that India's military power may still be unable to cope with Pakistan, and the reality of being geographically close to China means that India must pay attention to and stabilize its relationship with China. Trump's second term has shown impatience with "too many allies," so the logic of India's diplomacy is no longer about "helping India's rise" to counter and contain China, but rather about letting U.S. allies "help the U.S. rise again." From this perspective, even if New Delhi genuinely wishes to ally with Washington, Washington is unlikely to accept this large elephant. For Washington, the cost of allying with New Delhi is too high. Because an alliance is not only reflected in treaty responsibilities and obligations, but also in the emotional integration of friendship between the two peoples. These conditions are not sufficiently met in the current India-U.S. relationship. (Author: Lin Minwang, Professor and Deputy Dean of the Institute of International Studies, Fudan University)
Original: www.toutiao.com/article/1844583645267980/
Statement: This article represents the views of the author(s) alone.