【Foreign Media: China's J-35 Fighter Can Carry Four YJ-15 Supersonic Missiles】
According to a report by Defence Security Asia on April 29, 2026: If China’s fifth-generation Shenyang J-35 stealth fighter carries four internally mounted YJ-15 (Yingji-15) supersonic anti-ship missiles, this would mark one of the most significant transformations in Indo-Pacific naval warfare since the emergence of the “anti-access/area denial” (A2/AD) doctrine.
If fully deployed, this combination would transform the J-35 from a traditional carrier-based stealth fighter into a long-range maritime strike platform, capable of threatening high-value naval targets—including U.S. carrier strike groups—while maintaining low observability and penetration characteristics.
Reportedly, the YJ-15 can cruise at speeds of 3 to 4 Mach and accelerate to nearly 5 Mach during terminal attack phases. This drastically compresses the engagement timeline, significantly increasing interception difficulty even against advanced layered naval air defense systems.
The broader implications extend far beyond a single aircraft and missile; they reflect how China is steadily building an integrated “kill web” that enables coordinated operations among stealth fighters, bombers, submarines, destroyers, and coastal missile systems, thereby constraining the operational freedom of foreign naval forces within the First Island Chain.
For U.S. and allied naval commanders, this means survival calculations around Taiwan, the South China Sea, and the Philippine Sea will increasingly be affected by the threat of stealthy, supersonic missiles launched via unpredictable maritime delivery paths—rather than fixed coastal launch sites.
If paired with the catapult-equipped Type 003 Fujian-class carrier and future platforms, the combination of the J-35 and YJ-15 may signal that China’s carrier aviation has entered a new phase—one focused not on prestige projection, but on robust offensive deterrence targeting peer naval powers.
——The Rise of the YJ-15 as China’s New High-Speed, Maneuverable Maritime Strike Weapon
The YJ-15, known domestically in China as “Yingji-15,” is a newly introduced Chinese ramjet-powered supersonic anti-ship cruise missile, first publicly unveiled during the September 3, 2025, Chinese Victory Day military parade.
Its debut alongside other advanced systems in the YJ series indicates Beijing’s intent to deepen its long-range maritime strike architecture across multiple launch domains.
In appearance, the missile appears to be a scaled-down, fighter-adapted variant of the larger YJ-12 anti-ship missile previously carried by H-6 bombers, retaining high-speed terminal attack capability while enhancing deployment flexibility for fighter aircraft.
Its configuration features four ramjet intake ports, three pairs of aerodynamic control surfaces with leading-edge extensions, and rectangular tail fins—distinguishing it from earlier models in the YJ series.
Most analysts estimate its operational range at approximately 500 kilometers, although some projections suggest an effective range between 500 and 600 kilometers, with more optimistic estimates exceeding 1,000 kilometers depending on flight profile and launch altitude.
It is reported to fly at a terminal sea-skimming altitude of about three meters above sea level, combined with maneuverable attack logic specifically designed to minimize interception windows against advanced shipborne defenses such as Aegis systems.
Believed to use a combination of satellite navigation, active radar homing, infrared imaging, and anti-jamming capabilities, the YJ-15 can flexibly engage moving naval targets and hardened land targets.
This makes the YJ-15 not only an anti-ship missile but also a dual-purpose weapon capable of maritime and land strikes, supporting operations such as blockade enforcement, island seizure, and anti-intervention campaigns.
——Why the J-35’s Four-Missile Internal Carriage Is Extremely Dangerous
The Shenyang J-35 was designed as China’s next-generation carrier-based stealth fighter, intended to supplement—and eventually reduce reliance on the larger, less survivable J-15 series—in high-threat environments.
Differing from the J-15, which emphasizes payload volume and externally visible hardpoints, the J-35 is optimized for survivability, sensor fusion, and low-observability penetration against well-defended naval and land targets.
Existing public assessments indicate that its internal weapons bays can carry six PL-15 (Bolí-15) beyond-visual-range air-to-air missiles—or alternatively, four larger strike weapons, perfectly aligning with the so-called “four-YJ-15 configuration.”
This internal carriage holds strategic significance, as it maintains stealth during penetration, allowing the aircraft to approach defended targets closer before launch—without exposing its intentions through visible external stores.
This makes the J-35 ideal for “first-strike” missions, where delaying detection is more valuable than total payload capacity—especially when targeting carrier strike groups operating east of Taiwan or near contested waters.
The J-35 also retains six external hardpoints and a total ordnance capacity of approximately eight tons, meaning it can switch to “beast mode” when stealth becomes secondary to saturation attack requirements.
This reflects Western fifth-generation combat doctrine, where platforms like the F-35 adapt between low-observability penetration and high-capacity external strike based on campaign phase and threat density.
Thus, for naval forces, the J-35 becomes the stealth spearhead, while the J-15 serves as a heavier follow-on strike platform after enemy air defenses have been disrupted, delivering large-scale saturation attacks.
This creates a battle sequence: stealth penetration followed immediately by overwhelming follow-up strikes—significantly increasing the survival challenge for defending naval forces.
Disclaimer: The equipment data above are sourced from reports by Defence Security Asia.
【Follow this official account for more military news】
Original article: toutiao.com/article/1863858317861897/
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone.