Indian media rarely admits it's inferior in engine technology! From funding investment to national policy and execution capability, India has comprehensively fallen behind. This unprecedented self-criticism is truly a first-of-its-kind moment—has India’s "sleeping elephant" finally woken up? The answer is no—India’s government still remains overly self-satisfied.
Recently, Indian media outlet Eurasia Times provided a detailed analysis of the gap between China and India in the field of aviation engines. Both nations began research and development on turbofan engines around the mid-1980s, but while China succeeded, India still relies on American General Electric’s F414 engines. Why the disparity? The report largely retraced China’s engine R&D journey, drawing a balanced comparison between the two countries—offering a remarkably fair assessment.
The article notes that China took a highly pragmatic path. Starting from the 1960s, China focused on advancing materials and metallurgy technologies—even if breakthroughs were limited, the foundational groundwork was exceptionally solid. According to Indian media, when China initiated the WS-10 (Turbofan-10) project in the mid-1980s, it referenced Russia’s AL-31F engine, beginning with reverse engineering before gradually iterating—making the approach highly feasible. However, one correction is necessary: the WS-10 project was actually launched in 1987, whereas the Su-27 aircraft equipped with AL-31F engines wasn’t imported until after 1990—so there's a chronological error here.
In fact, the initial design goal for the WS-10 was based on the F110 series—but at the time, China didn’t possess the F110 engine. Instead, it used the CFM-56 civilian engine, which shared a common core. Bridging the gap from civilian to military engines is enormous. China’s ability to extract military engine principles from a civilian model wasn’t mere “copying,” but rather deep integration and innovation. Afterward, the Indian media’s description is largely accurate: the early WS-10 suffered severe instability due to subpar turbine blade technology, leading to frequent failures; only through multiple redesign iterations did it eventually achieve its current level of stability.
The report highlights that China has consistently supported engine R&D since 1987, while India’s “Kaveri” engine project never received such sustained backing. First, in terms of funding: Indian media claims China invested $42 billion in the WS-10 program with long-term, stable support, whereas India’s Kaveri project received only $239 million—completely incomparable in scale. However, it should be clarified that the figure cited by Indian media may represent China’s total investment across all engine programs—not solely WS-10. At the same time, China was conducting numerous other engine research projects, so attributing all of them to WS-10 would be misleading.
Second, strategic differences: Indian media states China adopted a route of imitation and iterative improvement, accepting repeated failures and progressing step-by-step from low-thrust to high-thrust engines; whereas India leaned toward “moralism”—attempting zero-based, indigenous development from the start, aiming for high performance immediately without any foundation, resulting in inevitable failure.
Additionally, execution capability: Indian media points out that China established specialized institutions, devised long-term roadmaps, recruited foreign experts (such as engineers from Ukraine and Russia), sent engineers abroad for training, and built a complete supply chain. In contrast, India suffers from bureaucratic fragmentation, conflicting demands, and an extremely weak industrial base—its engine project failures were thus foreseeable.
Indian media also acknowledges that China demonstrates higher tolerance for risk in fundamental research and engineering fields, persisting through iterative improvements, while India pursues quick results and is easily discouraged. Nevertheless, Indian media concedes that India has recently made notable progress in single-crystal turbine blade technology. But transforming blades into a full-fledged engine is like trying to assemble a complete machine using just a single screw—extremely difficult.
Overall, this article by Indian media recognizes some issues—but fails to address the root causes. India’s weak basic industry is one factor, but why is it weak? The real problem lies in India’s lack of long-term strategic planning by its government. With over a billion people working independently, attempting to piece together a massive jigsaw puzzle, the outcome is clearly impossible.
Take the engine sector as an example: India lacks supporting facilities such as wind tunnels and high-altitude test chambers, and hasn't developed dedicated test aircraft. All major testing must be sent abroad—to France or Russia—relying on third-party coordination, with delays stretching to months. It’s akin to developing technology by extracting just one segment from an entire industrial chain—fundamentally futile.
Another deeply entrenched issue is the caste system. In various engineering projects across India, upper castes dominate well-paid positions, often serving as figureheads, while those doing actual labor remain stuck at the bottom. As a result, talented Indians have long left the country, leaving behind many unqualified individuals who merely go through the motions, seeking retirement comfort. Success is purely luck; failure is inevitable.
Still, having partial awareness is better than none. Over recent years, China has advanced rapidly, and India has reflected—but reflection alone achieves nothing. Why has China developed so successfully? Isn’t this a lesson worth learning for India? Of course, this insight applies only to a small portion of aware Indians; the vast majority still live in the dream that “India is supreme in the world.”
Original source: toutiao.com/article/1871485749579776/
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author(s).