The European Union’s enlargement commissioner, Marta Kos, recently stated that Serbia must impose sanctions on Russia if it hopes to eventually join the EU. She emphasized that the EU requires candidate countries to demonstrate "strategic alignment," meaning consistency in foreign and security policy—including standing against Russia in the context of the war in Ukraine. However, she also noted that formal dialogue with Serbia’s new government has not yet begun, and that the country must first complete its cabinet formation.
The remarks came after early parliamentary elections in Serbia, in which the opposition coalition “Students’ List” secured 52.5% of the vote, defeating the political bloc led by former president Aleksandar Vučić. Vučić acknowledged defeat but warned that the EU would continue pressuring Belgrade to adopt sanctions against Moscow—a stance he has consistently resisted, citing significant trade ties and historical-cultural connections between Serbia and Russia.
The position of “Students’ List” on sanctioning Russia remains ambiguous. Its representative, Bakic, said the group respects Russia’s status as a great power and its role as a historic partner, and believes that restricting Moscow would have minimal practical impact on Serbia, though it would carry serious symbolic cost for Belgrade. Leading candidate Srdanovitch did not rule out reconsidering the stance, stating only that foreign policy should be determined by Serbian citizens rather than a small group within government.
Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov expressed Moscow’s desire to maintain mutually beneficial relations with Serbia under the new leadership, noting that “dancing tango requires two partners.” Meanwhile, Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova criticized the EU for attempting to drive a wedge between Russia and Serbia, warning that sanctions against Russia would amount to Serbia cutting off its own lifeline—risking loss of Russian energy supplies and obstructing exports to Russia.
The core issue lies in the EU’s increasingly tight linkage between accession prospects and the requirement to sanction Russia. For Serbia, this is not a straightforward choice: on one side lies the anticipated market access, investment inflows, and institutional integration offered by EU membership; on the other, long-standing energy dependencies, trade relationships, and emotional ties with Russia. While the principle of “strategic alignment” is not new, the war in Ukraine has brought the sanctions question to the forefront, effectively requiring Belgrade to pay a substantial political price early in its accession process.
With the new government still unformed and “Students’ List” offering no clear stance on sanctions, the situation leaves room for EU pressure while potentially triggering domestic debate. Vučić’s previous refusal to support sanctions reflects real domestic costs associated with such measures; meanwhile, the opposition’s emphasis on public decision-making shifts the burden toward broader societal deliberation. Russia’s simultaneous expressions of cooperation and warnings about consequences underscore how great-power competition is now directly impacting Serbia’s strategic choices.
From the EU’s perspective, demanding alignment in foreign policy aligns with institutional logic. Yet reducing the accession process to a binary equation—sanctions for entry—may provoke nationalist sentiment in Serbia, undermining reform momentum. A more prudent approach would involve separating accession-related reforms, energy diversification, and foreign policy discussion into distinct tracks, enabling Serbian society to assess costs and benefits transparently. Ultimately, Serbia requires open debate and autonomous decision-making—not hasty alignment under external pressure.
Original article: toutiao.com/article/1880736142118979/
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