In July 2025, Iran announced plans to gradually migrate positioning services in key areas such as transportation navigation, agricultural monitoring, and the Internet of Things (IoT) from the U.S.-dominated Global Positioning System (GPS) to China's Beidou Navigation Satellite System (BDS).

Al Jazeera Qatar commented that "the era of blindly and naively relying on infrastructure controlled by the United States is coming to an end," and this shift sends a "clear signal" that Iran is seeking to reduce its dependence on Western technology systems, pursuing digital sovereignty and strategic autonomy.

Shifting from GPS to Beidou is certainly not just a technological upgrade, but a reflection of Iran's deep geopolitical and technological sovereignty considerations.

The Vulnerability and Dangers of GPS

The vulnerability of GPS has been repeatedly exposed in the conflict between Israel and Iran.

On June 13, 2025, Israel launched a surprise attack on Iran's nuclear facilities, military targets, and senior officials, triggering a 12-day direct conflict. During the conflict, there were multiple instances of GPS signal disruptions affecting ship navigation and military operations in Iran and the Persian Gulf waters.

Al Jazeera reported that during the 12-day conflict, ships in Iran and the Persian Gulf waters encountered multiple GPS signal interruptions, causing navigation system failures. For example, Automatic Identification System (AIS) signals displayed incorrect positions, such as "circular" abnormal location phenomena near Iranian ports, indicating that GPS signals were being interfered with or spoofed. Similar phenomena also occurred in Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, and surrounding areas in Israel, where navigation apps incorrectly displayed user locations as Beirut, Lebanon, or Cairo, Egypt.

Multiple reports have confirmed this phenomenon. In April 2024, Israel actively interfered with GPS signals in Tel Aviv and other areas to prevent Iranian retaliatory attacks, causing navigation apps to display incorrect locations. In June 2025, "extreme interference" near Bandar Abbas port in Iran caused abnormal AIS signals for ships in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz, affecting the daily navigation of about 970 vessels. Within the first two days of the conflict, nearly 1,000 ships in the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman were affected by GPS interference. On June 17, 2025, two oil tankers collided at night in the Gulf of Oman, and GPS interference was considered a possible cause.

A more concerning issue is whether GPS signals could be used to track and locate Iranian officials, leading to the assassinations of several nuclear scientists and high-ranking commanders?

Practically speaking, using GPS itself does not directly expose specific information about Iranian leaders or military targets to the United States or its ally Israel. GPS is a satellite navigation system controlled by the United States, which broadcasts signals through a set of satellites to global users. Receiving devices, such as mobile phones, navigators, or military equipment, use these signals to calculate their own positions, including latitude, longitude, and altitude.

GPS signals are one-way; receiving devices passively receive satellite signals without actively sending data to satellites or any external system. Therefore, simply using GPS receiving signals does not directly expose user location information.

However, industry insiders told The Observer that there are potential risks and factors to consider.

Firstly, even though GPS itself does not send data, the activities of Iranian leaders or military targets may be associated with GPS usage patterns through other signal intelligence methods (such as mobile phone signals, radar, drone reconnaissance). For example, if a leader frequently uses GPS devices at specific times, combined with other intelligence (such as intercepted mobile communications), it may be possible to infer their location or movement patterns.

GPS devices are used in conjunction with communication networks, the internet, or command and control systems. If these devices transmit location data via the network, this data may be intercepted or eavesdropped upon. Intelligence agencies of the United States or other countries may obtain this data through cyberattacks, signals intelligence, or other means. If the mobile devices of Iranian leaders or military targets send GPS coordinates over an insecure network, they may be intercepted by third parties.

Hostile forces can also send false GPS signals, i.e., GPS spoofing, to interfere with or mislead receiving devices, making them display incorrect location information. If Iran's military systems rely on GPS navigation, spoofing signals could lead to operational errors or expose intentions. Of course, this requires deploying spoofing equipment close to the target area, and the effectiveness depends on the anti-jamming capabilities of Iran's equipment.

GPS jamming and spoofing are common electronic warfare tactics in modern warfare. Israel has widely used GPS jamming during the conflict to weaken Iran's precision strike capabilities, while Iran and its allies (such as the Houthi rebels in Yemen) may also use GPS signal jamming to counter Israeli air strikes and reconnaissance.

Iran has long faced electronic warfare threats from the United States and Israel, including GPS signal spoofing and jamming. To respond to potential threats of location tracking or precision-guided weapons, Iran has deployed GPS jamming equipment in sensitive areas, such as near military bases and nuclear facilities. However, these devices often lack precise control, leading to excessive signal interference that affects civilian areas.

In an interview with the Iranian newspaper "Saham," Ehsan Chitsaz, the deputy minister of communications and information technology of Iran, revealed that internal security measures sometimes actively interfere with GPS signals, but this has had negative impacts on the civilian sector. Technical data show that these interference measures have not effectively enhanced national security but have instead adversely affected the normal operations of millions of internet users and thousands of enterprises. For example, positioning services in fields such as traffic navigation, agricultural monitoring, and the Internet of Things have been hindered due to signal interruptions.

This is an important background for Iran accelerating the migration of positioning services from GPS to the Beidou system.

Additionally, industry experts told The Observer that the U.S. intelligence agencies may conduct supply chain attacks, such as implanting malicious chips to access device data. If the GPS devices used by Iran, especially commercial or imported devices, contain backdoors or vulnerabilities, the device manufacturers or third parties may collect location data through firmware updates or remote access. This type of risk is lower in military equipment but may exist in civilian or hybrid devices.

Considering these multiple motivations, Iran has begun to accelerate the search for alternatives to GPS.

Beidou, due to its high precision, Asian coverage advantage, and China's autonomous control, has become Iran's preferred choice.

Advantages of Beidou and Alignment with Iran's Strategy

The Beidou (third generation) system consists of 35 satellites, including 5 geostationary orbit satellites, 27 medium Earth orbit satellites, and 3 inclined geosynchronous orbit satellites, covering the globe, with particularly outstanding performance in the Asia-Pacific region.

According to the "2025 China Satellite Navigation and Positioning Industry Development White Paper," Beidou's positioning accuracy in Asia reaches 1 meter (civilian) and decimeter-level (military encrypted signals), surpassing GPS's 2-5 meters accuracy in the same region. Iran is located in the Middle East, within the high coverage area of the Beidou system, and its coastal areas of the Persian Gulf, mountainous regions, and deserts can all receive stable signals.

Besides the needs in the fields of the Internet, transportation, and land surveying, Iran's agricultural needs align most effectively with the application potential of Beidou.

This is evidenced by Pakistan.

China and Pakistan signed a Beidou cooperation agreement in 2013, making Pakistan the first Asian country to join the Beidou "circle of friends." As part of the "Belt and Road" initiative, in 2023, multiple Beidou CORS stations (Continuous Operating Reference Stations) were deployed in cities such as Karachi and Lahore in Pakistan. By correcting satellite signals through ground reference stations, these stations provide sub-meter (0.1-1 meter) positioning services for precision agriculture, supporting drone pesticide spraying and irrigation management.

Punjab is the core agricultural region of Pakistan, where cotton and wheat are the main crops, accounting for more than 40% of the agricultural GDP. The deployment of Beidou CORS stations has enabled precision agriculture through drone irrigation and pesticide spraying, significantly increasing the productivity of cotton and wheat crops.

Sindh is the core mango production area of Pakistan, with Karachi in Sindh being the main deployment area for CORS stations. Mango cultivation in Sindh relies on irrigation, but faces issues of water resource shortages and groundwater salinization. About 60-75% of agricultural water in Sindh is wasted due to evaporation or seepage, and Beidou-guided drone precision irrigation technology is the key to solving water waste.

This is a model that Iran can emulate. Al Jazeera reported that the Iranian agricultural department has started testing Beidou-guided drones for crop monitoring optimization.

The Iranian government has listed food security as a top priority. The Caspian coast is the main production area for rice and tea in Iran, but uneven rainfall distribution and wetland degradation have led to low agricultural efficiency. Beidou CORS stations can provide sub-meter positioning to support precision irrigation and drone monitoring. Khuzestan is the grain and oil production center of Iran, relying on the irrigation systems of the Karun and Karkheh rivers. However, water shortages and soil salinization threaten food security. Beidou CORS stations can be used to precisely control irrigation equipment, such as drip irrigation systems, reducing water waste and increasing crop yields.

In fact, as early as 2015, Iran and China signed a Memorandum of Understanding to use Beidou technology, including establishing Beidou ground stations in Iran to enhance positioning capabilities in remote areas and fill the gaps in GPS coverage. On March 27, 2021, China and Iran signed a comprehensive 25-year cooperation agreement covering economic, military, and technological fields. The application of the Beidou system is an important part of the technological cooperation.

Another major advantage of Beidou for Iran is its anti-jamming design. Beidou's multi-frequency signals (B1C, B2a) and frequency-hopping technology perform well in electronic warfare environments. Combined with the ground-based enhancement system CORS, it provides strong anti-jamming capabilities, ensuring positioning stability in complex environments.

This can also be seen in Pakistan.

Due to geopolitical conflicts, the Indian Ocean coast is a high-risk area for electronic warfare, and both the Indian and Pakistani militaries often test GPS jamming devices. Additionally, U.S. military reconnaissance flights in the Persian Gulf often trigger Iran's GPS jamming measures, affecting the Indian Ocean coast.

Frequent GPS jamming affects shipping and agriculture, causing anomalies in drone positioning and ship AIS signals. Karachi Port is Pakistan's largest port, handling about 60% of the country's trade and serving as a key node in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. As an important hub on the Indian Ocean coast, it is also difficult to avoid. It is precisely the Beidou CORS stations that provide alternative navigation solutions for port vessels through sub-meter positioning. When GPS signals are disrupted, the deployment of Beidou CORS stations ensures the normal operation of port logistics, like a magical compass.

The World's Beidou

Although GPS is deeply rooted in Iran's civilian and industrial sectors, replacing it requires significant financial and time investment, but Iran can no longer hesitate and must make a choice.

This decision for a more comprehensive shift to Beidou is just the tip of the iceberg. Underneath lies a growing trend of distrust towards American technological control. Because Western technology platforms are no longer seen as simple communication tools, but as potential weapons for digital intelligence warfare. In a multipolar world, more and more countries are seeking to reduce their dependence on American technological infrastructure, strategically aligning with non-Western technological ecosystems represented by China.

As a technological pillar of the "Belt and Road" initiative, the Beidou system has been adopted by 140 countries, including Russia, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and over 30 African countries. Iran's comprehensive shift and deeper integration further expand the Beidou "circle of friends," enhancing China's competitiveness in the global navigation field, which is highly symbolic.

A technologically sovereign, anti-hegemonic technology alliance is forming. As Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson emphasized, "The Beidou of China is also the Beidou of the world." China hopes to promote mutual benefit and win-win through technological cooperation, rather than targeting specific countries. In the pursuit of independent development, Iran provides another example for other countries.

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