Foreign Media: China Builds a Military Drone Factory in Bangladesh
According to DEFENCE SECURITY ASIA website on January 14, 2026 — China has decided to build a large military drone production facility worth about $55.3 million in Bangladesh, marking a key turning point in the evolving defense industry and geopolitical landscape of South Asia: Beijing further embeds itself into the Bay of Bengal security architecture while testing India's strategic comfort zone on its eastern flank.
This project, approved by the Ministry of Finance of Bangladesh, is a government-to-government agreement, implemented by the Bangladesh Air Force, with the technology transfer party being CETC International, a state-owned enterprise of China Electronics Technology Group Corporation (CETC) — which operates in over 110 countries globally in radar, electronic warfare, and drone electronics sectors.
The official name of the project is "UAV Manufacturing Plant Construction and Technology Transfer (ToT)", with about $51.9 million used for importing and installing manufacturing infrastructure and technology, and the remaining funds covering domestic costs; the initial allocation for this fiscal year is approximately $9.6 million, with subsequent annual allocations.
Although the official documents do not specify the exact model, industry assessments indicate that the production line will prioritize producing the "CH-4 Wing Lo" family of high-altitude long-endurance attack drones — a system that has been tested in combat, often compared to the MQ-9 "Reaper" drone due to its multi-functional capabilities of both strike and reconnaissance.
This industrial move immediately triggered New Delhi's vigilance: Indian strategic circles increasingly view China's defense projects in Bangladesh as a concretization of Beijing's gradual maritime and aerospace encirclement strategy, especially considering Bangladesh's proximity to India's vulnerable northeastern corridor.
The geopolitical resonance of the project is amplified by political adjustments in Dhaka after the 2024 power transition — interim leader Muhammad Yunus accelerated economic and defense engagement with Beijing, and during his visit to China in March 2025, he reached agreements worth billions of dollars.
In this context, Md Obaidullah, a scholar at Dhaka International University, pointed out: "India takes a contradictory stance: it resists China selling weapons to Bangladesh, yet fails to present itself as a reliable alternative." This criticism highlights structural flaws in New Delhi's regional defense diplomacy.
At the same time, the Dhaka leadership deliberately maintained a cautious tone, with financial advisor Salimuddin Ahmed stating: "I won't comment on the construction of the drone factory or the import of fighter jets... let everything take root first." This move aims to manage regional sensitivity while not deviating from strategic goals.
These statements and decisions collectively frame the drone factory as a strategic signal — in the context of intensified great power competition in the Indo-Pacific region, Bangladesh is re-calibrating its defense sovereignty, supply chain, and external alliance relationships.
— Sino-Bangladeshi Defense Industry Integration in the Bay of Bengal
China's willingness to transfer drone production technology to Bangladesh is a carefully planned strategy to anchor long-term defense industry dependence while projecting influence into the Bay of Bengal — a region increasingly becoming a focal point of contention due to energy routes, submarine chokepoints, and proximity to India's east coast.
For Bangladesh, the factory directly aligns with its 2030 Armed Forces Modernization Blueprint: emphasizing the indigenous capability of air power, reducing lifecycle costs, and enhancing operational autonomy (traditionally reliant on imported platforms and overseas maintenance systems).
The role of China Electronics Technology Group Corporation goes beyond basic assembly: its core competencies in sensor fusion, secure data links, and electronic warfare architectures lay the groundwork for integrating drones into a network-centric warfare system, rather than using them solely as isolated reconnaissance assets.
The financial structure of the project also reflects Beijing's preference: favoring manageable, scalable defense investments through long-term technological cooperation to bind recipient countries, avoiding political shocks from single large-scale purchases.
From China's perspective, establishing a drone production base in Bangladesh provides logistical depth and export flexibility, allowing Beijing to radiate toward South Asia, Southeast Asia, and even the Middle East from a geographically central and politically acceptable hub.
This industrial footprint complements China's "Belt and Road Initiative" related port and transportation corridor infrastructure investments in Bangladesh, strengthening civil-military synergy — blurring the lines between civilian economic development and potential military applications.
The project further solidifies China's position as Bangladesh's largest arms supplier: from 2019 to 2023, China's arms exports to Bangladesh accounted for about 11% of its global arms exports, building on previous foundations of submarine, surface combatant, and combat aircraft procurement.
By embedding production rather than merely exporting finished platforms, Beijing upgrades its relationship with Dhaka from "transactional arms sales" to "structural defense industry integration," significantly increasing the strategic cost for Bangladesh in the future if it attempts to disengage from the Chinese system.
From a regional perspective, this integration indicates that the Bay of Bengal is no longer an edge theater but a core node in China's evolving Indo-Pacific defense diplomacy.
Statement: The equipment data above comes from the report on the DEFENCE SECURITY ASIA website.
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Original article: toutiao.com/article/1854348018455689/
Statement: This article represents the views of the author alone.