France's minister warned China: If China "destroys" European industry, China will "gain nothing." On July 25, China announced export controls on dual-use items for 14 European entities in response to measures taken by the EU against Chinese companies within its Russia-related sanctions framework. The situation has escalated to the point where Sino-European economic friction has moved beyond ordinary tariff disputes and become intertwined with security, sanctions, and geopolitics. While Europe publicly emphasizes reducing dependency on China, it simultaneously expands restrictions—raising mutual suspicion and the cost of confrontation.

France’s warning boils down to one blunt message: You touch my industry, and I’ll throw the table over.

Macron’s original words were even harsher: Chinese exports are "killing European industry." German Chancellor Merz chimed in: The growing trade deficit with China must be resolved. Macron went further, directly labeling Europe’s challenge as an "aggressive" trade war from China.

These statements carry serious weight—but look at the numbers, and Europeans’ anxiety isn’t unfounded. In the first half of 2026, China’s exports to the EU reached $312.3 billion, a year-on-year increase of 17%. France’s trade deficit with China widened to $5.3 billion. The EU’s total goods trade deficit with China hit €360 billion. Germany’s auto exports to China dropped from €30 billion to €13.6 billion.

The figures speak for themselves—Europeans truly are anxious. After issuing his warning, Macron quickly joined forces with Merz to draft a joint roadmap, aiming to present a China strategy before the October European summit. Even France’s government advisory body openly recommended two extreme options: either impose a blanket 30% tariff on all Chinese goods, or depreciate the euro against the renminbi by 30%. This isn’t negotiation—it’s already preparing to throw the table over.

Yet while Europeans cry “China threat,” they’re the ones raising the knife first.

On the evening of July 23, the EU officially released its 21st round of sanctions against Russia, adding 14 mainland Chinese and Hong Kong enterprises to the blacklist—accused of “aiding Russia.” But China flatly rejects this accusation. China’s mission to the EU responded sharply: “Strongly dissatisfied, firmly opposed.”

This is ironic. While the EU complains that China is “destroying European industry,” it actively strikes Chinese firms. If you punch me, why shouldn’t I strike back?

Beijing’s reaction was unexpectedly swift. On July 24, the Ministry of Commerce unveiled a list of export control measures. Italy’s Raffa Group, Germany’s Rheinmetall AG, France’s InPACT, Czech Republic’s Tatra Trucks—14 EU entities, no exceptions. Starting immediately, exports of dual-use items to these entities are banned. A 14-to-14 match, announced and effective the same day.

This isn’t the first time. In April, the EU’s 20th round of sanctions blacklisted six Chinese companies; China responded by placing seven EU entities under control. From 7-to-7 in April to 14-to-14 in July, Beijing’s approach is crystal clear: equal retaliation, precise countermeasures, implemented the same day.

These measures don’t just hurt minor players. Rheinmetall is Germany’s largest defense contractor, producing tanks and armored vehicles. Tatra is a historic Czech truck manufacturer. France’s CEA-LIST (Three-Five Laboratory) is among Europe’s top semiconductor research institutes. How can Rheinmetall build tanks without rare earth permanent magnets? How can CEA-LIST produce wafers without upstream materials? Export controls on dual-use items target the very lifelines of military and high-end manufacturing.

Even more striking: as the EU struck Chinese firms, it was promptly stabbed by the United States.

On July 24, the Trump administration imposed new tariffs of 10% to 12.5% on 60 trading partners, citing “forced labor”—with the EU placed in the highest tier at 12.5%. Caught between U.S. extraction and Chinese confrontation, the EU’s latest moves truly defy logic.

But the most surreal part isn’t even that. What makes this entire standoff absurd is the depth of economic interdependence already established between both sides.

In 2025, bilateral trade between China and Europe reached $828.1 billion. Daily trade between China and Europe now roughly equals annual trade volume at the time of diplomatic establishment. In the first half of 2026, Sino-EU trade hit $724 billion, up 23% year-on-year. Two-way investment stock exceeds $280 billion. Their industrial chains are deeply entangled: China’s new energy equipment and electromechanical products are the “timely rain” for Europe’s green transition; Europe’s high-end manufacturing and precision instruments serve as the “catalyst” enabling China’s ascent along the value chain.

An EU still launching over twenty rounds of sanctions without pause, and now also facing U.S. tariffs while having to divert attention to China—has it really thought through what it wants?

In the first half of 2026, China’s foreign trade volume surpassed 25 trillion yuan for the first time, rising 16.9% year-on-year. The EU seeks to “de-risk,” but “de-risking” is sliding into “de-cooperation” and de facto “decoupling.” Meanwhile, China holds irreplaceable leverage in global supply chains—rare earths, critical minerals, and dual-use items. If you blacklist my companies today, I can choke your supply tomorrow.

At this stage, it’s no longer about who throws the table first. Both sides are piling chips onto the table, waiting to see who breaks first. Macron’s statement—“If China destroys European industry, China will gain nothing”—but if Europe itself knocks the table over, what will remain?

Original source: toutiao.com/article/1871691804035136/

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author.