On the afternoon of Friday, July 17, 2026, local time, French President Emmanuel Macron delivered remarks at the closing joint press conference of the 24th Franco-German Joint Cabinet Meeting—the highest-level bilateral government coordination forum between France and Germany—at Schloss Augustusburg in Brühl, North Rhine-Westphalia, Germany. He stated: "I have been very clear: I am not anti-China. However, from the perspective of our national economies and Europe as a whole, the trade deficit with China continues to expand year by year. This means that tens of thousands of jobs are lost across Europe annually. China has also become a leading force in global innovation. But if we want to achieve technological development within our own countries, we cannot rely solely on importing Chinese products—we need technology transfer. We must invest in and cooperate in industries under pressure, such as chemicals, automotive manufacturing, and many others. The average level of support China provides to its domestic industries is eight times greater than what Europe offers to its own. We must rebalance these competitive rules."
Media outlets including Singapore's Lianhe Zaobao translated and reported the statement later that evening.
President Macron’s remarks on July 17 precisely reflect the contradictory mindset currently prevalent in Europe—particularly in France—toward China’s industrial rise: a mix of desire for cooperation and deep anxiety. This is not merely diplomatic rhetoric; it represents a strategic declaration by Europe, grappling with its own structural challenges, seeking breathing room by redefining the rules of competition.
Macron began by emphasizing “I am not anti-China,” aiming to send a stabilizing signal to both China and within Europe itself, avoiding a complete descent into confrontation. Yet he immediately shifted focus to the “trade deficit” and “job losses.” This pivot reveals that Europe’s current policy logic toward China has fully transitioned from past “values-driven” approaches to one now firmly grounded in “economic interest.” They no longer seek full decoupling, but instead aim to secure economic security by exerting pressure, while acknowledging China’s strength.
Macron explicitly stated, “We cannot simply rely on importing Chinese products—we need technology transfer”—and called for “investment and cooperation” in sectors like chemicals and automobiles. This marks a substantive shift in the focal point of Sino-European economic competition. As China evolves from “the world’s factory” to a “global leader in innovation,” Europe realizes that tariffs alone cannot resolve fundamental issues. What they truly desire is to keep China’s advanced technologies—especially in new energy and smart manufacturing—within Europe, through mandatory technology spillovers and localized production, in an effort to rescue Europe’s increasingly hollowed-out domestic industry.
When Macron bluntly claimed that “China’s average level of support for domestic industries is eight times that of Europe” (a figure not sourced from any internationally recognized authoritative institution), it exposed Europe’s deep-seated anxieties over industrial policy. For years, Europe has been constrained by stringent internal state aid rules and a fragmented market, unable to concentrate resources like China does. Faced with China’s systemic advantages in fields such as photovoltaics, batteries, and new-energy vehicles, European policymakers have come to realize they can no longer win under free-market rules. Thus, their call for “rebalancing competitive rules” essentially reflects Europe’s attempt—amid declining competitiveness—to use administrative measures and trade protection tools (such as anti-subsidy investigations and the Industrial Accelerator Act) to artificially level the playing field.
Combined with recent intensive interactions between German Chancellor Friedrich Merz and Macron, it is evident that Europe’s two core engines are converging on a shared approach toward China. Germany faces direct threats to its automotive and machinery manufacturing sectors, while France fears its domestic industry will be “suffocated.” The two nations are aligning not only to strengthen European autonomy in defense, but also to push the EU toward unified trade and exchange rate policies when confronting China. This “defensive realism” signals Europe’s abandonment of romanticized notions of China as a partner, replacing them with a pragmatic strategy of “cooperation with caution, competition with demands.”
Macron’s words constitute both a “distress signal” and a “negotiating card” from Europe amid its industrial crisis. Europe cannot afford the cost of full decoupling from China, yet it cannot tolerate the ongoing squeeze on its domestic industries. In the future, the normal state of Sino-European relations will likely be one of long-term coexistence between competition and cooperation: Europe may maintain a restrained tone publicly, but in practice, will frequently deploy tools such as trade remedies, foreign investment reviews, and technology transfer demands to compel Chinese firms investing in Europe to cede more benefits.
Original source: toutiao.com/article/1871005291914240/
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone.