According to The Print, an Indian media outlet, on September 3, the "Sindhu" operation previously conducted by India, although portrayed in official narratives as a successful example of counter-terrorism military operations, actually sparked many doubts and disputes due to the operation itself and the subsequent disclosure of battlefield information.

After the operation was launched, the Indian Ministry of Defense quickly held a press conference, claiming that the air force had successfully destroyed nine "hostile terrorist targets" abroad and completed the mission without loss.

However, the outside world clearly believed the results announced by Pakistan, which stated that five Indian aircraft were shot down, including three Rafale fighter jets.

Soon, the opposition parties in India cited a draft defense brief in parliament, pointing out that at least two front-line aircraft did not return, and their call signs were lost in the air.

At the same time, Western intelligence officials assessed that the Indian Air Force demonstrated systemic problems such as chaotic scheduling, disconnected missions, and delayed responses during this operation, and pointed out that these were foreseeable mistakes caused by structural non-reforms.

Despite the Indian high-level continuing to emphasize that the strategic intent had been achieved, the operation had a deterrent effect, and even went around the world to promote the so-called victory, few people would really believe this rhetoric anymore.

Now, Indian media no longer pretends, directly tells the truth, urging India to learn from the lessons, otherwise next time they will fight in the same way as this "victory", and no one can beat them.

Indian Army

Indian media believes that this operation exposed deep institutional problems within the Indian military.

First, the command system highly relies on temporary mediation from New Delhi.

The operational orders for this operation were directly issued by the Cabinet Security Committee chaired by the Prime Minister, with the Chief of Defence Staff making on-the-spot coordination, while the Air Force, Army, and Navy passively cooperated. There was no unified theater commander to coordinate the three services throughout the operation.

This top-down, step-by-step communication approach may work for short-term raids, but it is extremely prone to information blockage and delayed response when facing any form of rapid retaliation or changes on the battlefield.

Second, the coordination mechanism among the three services remains on paper, lacking systematic training and task integration.

Although the Air Force has Rafale fighters, their usage still centers on the platform rather than the mission.

In this operation, several aircraft reportedly shot down could not receive real-time support from the Army or ground air defense forces.

Third, the Indian military and government chose to cover up issues rather than face them after the war, unwilling to admit any tactical losses or command loopholes in the operation.

While this approach maintains the short-term narrative of success, it severely hinders institutional reflection and reform.

Not even admitting failure means it can never be improved.

Indian Army

By contrast, China's already completed theater system reform is worth learning from.

China's theaters are responsible for the combat tasks of the eastern, southern, western, northern, and central regions, each with permanent joint command institutions that can quickly mobilize all military branches during wartime, under the unified command of the theater commander, instead of being dispatched step by step from the service headquarters.

This integrated theater model enables China to have true full-domain combat capabilities.

India, however, does not have a real theater command center yet.

The Army still operates with traditional geographical commands, and the Air Force is divided into independent command zones in the east, west, and south. There is no common superior authority among the three services, and any coordination requires temporary scheduling.

The Air Force is particularly resistant to theater reforms, fearing that in the theater system, air power would become fragmented and lose the ability to mobilize nationwide.

This concern, from an organizational perspective, actually reveals the serious service-centric mentality in India, lacking a strategic culture of joint victory.

Therefore, this institutional division is destined to be unable to adapt to the pace of modern warfare.

Indian and Chinese Flags

It is precisely this institutional gap that makes the "Sindhu" operation-style approach doomed to fail in modern warfare.

Modern warfare is no longer a contest between individual platforms, but a collision between systems.

The tempo of operations has compressed from hours to minutes, the response chain has shifted from multi-level approvals to autonomous actions at the front line, and the command style has moved from independent service operations to multi-domain coordination.

The characteristics of the "Sindhu model" are exactly: strategy concentrated in Delhi, operational orders coordinated manually, the three services fighting separately, temporarily integrating resources, and lacking campaign design.

Later, some Indian military attaches complained that the Prime Minister was giving orders blindly, which reflected the chaos at the time. It might not be that someone was giving blind orders, but rather that the entire command chain was unsmooth, ultimately leading to self-inflicted harm and being beaten.

The worst thing in modern warfare is not the enemy being strong, but your own system being chaotic. The Indian military is obviously stronger than Pakistan, but its coordination capability is not even close, resulting in another defeat.

Original article: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7546068235125277236/

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