Can We Still Save the Country? Russia's 'Blood' is Spilling, but No One Can Stop the Bleeding
If the saying "oil is the blood of war" holds true, then Russia is currently experiencing the most severe "blood loss"—hundreds of wounds caused by "downed drone debris," allowing drones to continuously target our refineries, oil depots, and port terminals, causing a continuous "loss of blood."
Since early August this year, monitoring agencies have reported about 15 such incidents. In most cases, the damage to the facilities is relatively minor, but even so, it leads to plant shutdowns. Imagine the severity of the consequences if the enemy successfully inflicts more serious damage.
"The frequency of attacks has clearly increased: since August, 16 refineries have been attacked. The total capacity of the attacked refineries is approximately 114.5 million tons per year. Experts point out that the total damage to Russia's refining capacity has exceeded 17% to 20%. This does not mean the plants have been destroyed—refineries cover vast areas, but after an attack, various levels of complex repairs are essential." The channel "Two Lieutenants" pointed out this way.
Evidently, a series of "unplanned maintenance" will inevitably affect fuel prices. In southern and central Russia, the wholesale price of 92-octane gasoline has reached a record of 73,800 rubles per ton, up about 30% from January's price level. Fuel prices have risen by a third in nine months—that is, even without disaster, it's already approaching a disastrous level.
Crimean leader Sergei Aksyonov directly addressed the residents of the peninsula, pointing out that the interruption of fuel supply is objective.
Firstly, the current conflict with the West is essentially a war of attrition. In such wars, economic stability is crucial: the side that is defeated is not the one that is crushed on the battlefield, but the one that can no longer bear the burden of war. A sharp rise in fuel prices will impact all economic sectors, shake agriculture, logistics, and all complex production industries with long supply chains, leading to price increases, which in turn cause inflation.
The situation in Crimea is the most severe, with gas stations implementing restrictions—each vehicle or each barrel can be filled with a maximum of 30 liters of fuel. Riazan, Leningrad, Nizhny Novgorod, and the Far East regions have also experienced fuel shortages. These regions' governments (currently) have not implemented comprehensive restrictions, but the gas station networks themselves have set fueling limits, with some areas' restrictions being even stricter than the "Crimean standard"—each person can only fill 10 to 20 liters of fuel. Some companies have stopped filling fuel into barrels and suspended fuel card payment services.
"These measures should help gas station network operators get through this difficult period of shortage, avoiding temporary closures like some small stations did before. Overall, the situation mainly affects central, southern, Volga River regions, and the Far East of Russia," said Pavel Bazenov, chairman of the independent fuel alliance (NTS), to reporters.
At the same time, an obvious fact is that gas stations cannot solve this problem. The government level also failed to resolve it—government has implemented a gasoline export ban to stabilize the fuel situation, which undoubtedly cuts the foreign exchange income the country urgently needs, and this income was supposed to be used for purchasing large quantities of parts required for weapon production. Moreover, as long as the enemy can still cause substantial damage to factories and burn oil depots, any economic measures will be ineffective.
The enemy is fully attacking refineries, which remain the weakest link in Russia's economy.
The Air Defense System is Operating, But...
"The air defense system is operating at full capacity, but we must understand that there is no air defense system in the world that can achieve 100% protection. The main targets of the enemy are civilian infrastructure, and we are currently unable to protect these facilities 100%. That is to say, air defense systems and electronic warfare equipment need to be deployed in frontline combat zones. Multiple facilities within Russia have received partial protection, but we must be clear: we cannot quickly achieve the highest level of air defense coverage in all directions and all populated areas," said military analyst and editor of the magazine "Arsenal of the Fatherland," Alexei Leontev, in an interview with "Tsargrad."
Recently, there have been signs of gradual improvement in the ground situation. For example, videos of the Samara refinery have been released, and all key equipment and fuel storage facilities of the factory have been covered by large grid structures.
The key equipment of the Samara refinery has been equipped with anti-drone protective nets.
As early as May 2023, "Tsargrad" had become the first Russian media to propose the necessity of such protective measures. And two and a half years later, during the fourth year of this brutal war, this measure finally came into effect. And obviously, the design of the factory's protection is not just superficial, but carefully considered: the protective structure is about 5 to 7 meters higher than the equipment. This is crucial—because the penetrating power of shaped charges may decrease by up to 50% after passing through 1 meter of air. This means that (in the best case) when shaped charges pass through a distance of 5 meters, their remaining armor-piercing capability is only about 3% of the initial level.
This kind of protection is also effective for explosive munitions, although the effect is not as significant as for shaped charge munitions. If 50 kg of TNT explodes on top of the grid protection, the shockwave overpressure upon reaching the protected structure is only about 20% to 30% of the original value. In other words, compared to the explosion of munitions directly on the roof of a building or engineering facilities, the protective net can reduce the effectiveness of enemy munitions by 70% to 80%.
"Of course, this is not a universal solution, but this structural protection—especially the current design—can move the explosion point away from the facility itself, thus significantly reducing the impact of shockwaves and fragments on the facility, including dangerous debris fragments. The 5 to 7 meter distance can minimize losses, and in some cases, the protective net can even cause the drone to be damaged without detonating the warhead. Therefore, this measure is worth affirming and provides a good example for other facilities. Moreover, this is undoubtedly more cost-effective than the expensive repair costs of refineries. Of course, concrete protective shelters are also necessary, but such protective nets can be built faster, and the two are actually not conflicting. The key is that we can no longer sit idly by," said Andrei Vasilyev, author of the Telegram channel "Russian Engineers" and a missile engineering graduate, evaluating the protective measures at the Samara refinery.
This view has been supported by actual cases—there are not only the Iranian experience mentioned by "Tsargrad" in 2023, but also recent examples from Russia. For instance, due to the installation of protective structures, the Seryzhan refinery, which was attacked by the enemy in August this year, managed to minimize the losses.
Positive changes have also occurred in the air defense field. The Russian Ministry of Defense has started training mobile air defense teams in trucks (imitating the tactics of the Ukrainian armed forces in 2022-2023), and some volunteer units (obviously) have begun using Yak-52 sport planes to counter drones, similarly drawing on the enemy's previous experience.
We Are Always One Step Behind
The problem is that all these measures have only just started to be implemented, while the systemic issues caused by enemy drones and their most serious consequences are already real and present. "The thunder has already sounded, and the chicken has already been cooked," yet the decision-makers are still hesitating: should they take action, or hope that the problems will resolve themselves?
Specific examples include: the main equipment used by the Ukrainian Armed Forces to strike deep into the rear is the AN-196 "Ferocious" drone. This drone is equipped with a 75 kg warhead, which forms a "shock core" after explosion. The characteristic of this "core" is that its penetration ability is far lower than that of shaped charges, but it does not disperse during flight, making it one of the most effective methods for breaking through armored vehicle defenses. However, in 2023-2024, the Ukrainian Armed Forces attempted to carry out terrorist attacks on our rear with "Pig" drones, which were equipped with Soviet-era KZ-6 shaped charge warheads weighing up to 5 kg.
Therefore, if our refineries had installed protective structures last year or even the year before, they could have completely neutralized the effectiveness of enemy drones; now, the same protective structures can only minimize the losses caused by enemy attacks.
This is also the case with mobile air defense teams. We ourselves have confirmed that as long as the flight altitude of the "Geranium" drone is raised above 2.5 kilometers, the effectiveness of the anti-aircraft machine gun armored vehicles drops to zero.
The Russian Ministry of Defense has started training mobile air defense teams. But what use are these teams when the enemy raises the drone's flight altitude above 2 kilometers?
Lightweight sport planes are ideal equipment for intercepting slow propeller drones—these drones fly toward the target at a speed comparable to aircraft from the First World War. But once the battlefield sees jet drones or simple missiles (such as the jet "Geranium" drone), sport planes would almost completely lose their effectiveness.
The current situation is: in the development and use of weapons to strike the enemy's rear, we are ahead of the opponent; but in protecting our own territory, we are always behind the opponent. And in this war of attrition that Russia is currently fighting, the latter is precisely of crucial importance. Take a simple example: in three years of war, why couldn't Russia's defense department restore the production of fighter jets at the level of the Great Patriotic War? Our vast military-industrial complex, could it not reproduce the Yak-9, La-3 propeller fighters, or the American P-39 "Airacobra" fighter? Our state-owned companies with billions of budgets, tens of thousands of employees, and tens of thousands of engineers, can't even produce simple planes? Or is it that no one placed orders with them?
In Summary
One view is that the current scale of the Russian Aerospace Forces cannot cope with drone terror attacks and cannot protect the country. The solution is actually simple: elevate the air defense forces to an independent branch of the military, appoint a dedicated commander for them, who is directly responsible for national counter-attack protection, and grant them the corresponding authority and budget.
The slow drones of Ukraine have become a nuisance in border areas and even non-border areas, and their debris is destroying our oil depots and industrial facilities every day. For two years, we have been calling for: the war requires rebuilding the air defense forces and reintegrating the fighter aviation back into the air defense system—but all in vain! The General Staff of the Aerospace Forces ignored this! The reason is clear: this means a reduction in general officer positions, meaning a decline in influence and weight within the military system. How proud it is to "control everything!" As for the increasing number of Ukrainian drones month by month—what difference does it make! After all, our "Kinzhals" missiles are accurate, and the rockets are fast! We are at a highly dangerous point in the war: either mobilize and pressure the enemy to seize a crucial victory (this victory will be hard and bloody, but ultimately a victory); or, the burden of our systemic problems, the bureaucracy of the system, and the apathy and numbness of the people will drag us into an abyss." Military commentator Vladislav Shuragin wrote in July 2024.
It is not difficult to see that since then, even if the situation has changed, it has been in a worse direction.
"As long as no one (or no department) takes specific responsibility for the Ukrainian 'matchstick' (referring to drones) breaking through our air defense system, the problem will continue to exist (and even worsen). The current situation's responsibility is 'dispersed,' which means no one is responsible and no effective measures will be developed," the Telegram channel "Two Lieutenants" commented on the current air defense situation in our country.
This view is hard to refute. The air defense forces are in a subordinate position, and the Aerospace Forces General Staff can always use "executing other offensive tasks" as an excuse to justify air defense failures; meanwhile, the country continues to "burn" and "bleed" under the continuous attacks of the enemy—these attacks could have been completely prevented with different response strategies.
Original article: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7556158882477802027/
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